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THEORY AND PRACTICE. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the poetry of S.T. Coleridge in relation to his 
idealist theories of the poetic imagination. According to his various writings on the function of the 
imagination, the act of poesis ought to reflect the internal principles of creation as manifested in 
nature. The primary imagination, as Coleridge defines it in Biograpbia Uteraria^ speaks the 
language of God; the secondary imagination (the medium for poetic creativity) strives to imitate 
this universal power within the language of men. Poetry is thus understood as the vehicle which 
activates the "whole soul", moving man towards a sympathetic appreciation of the world he 
inhabits. However, as I intend to demonstrate, Coleridge's poetic language proves consistently 
inadequate in providing a constubstantiality between the mind and nature. The arbitrary nature of 
words often undermine the poet's intentions, ironically providing an outlet for repressed desires and 
fears. This is reflected strongly in the nature of poetic diction which often achieves an artistic 
fluidity at the expense of theoretical conviction. By contrast, when Coleridge's poetry remains 
faithful to his views, the language is often forced and stilted. 
Modem critical theory, in its emphasis on the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, can be useful in 
locating such a subversion of intended meaning within the romantic text. In my introduction, I shall 
discuss the generic term "romanticism" in relation to post-modernist literary theory in a manner 
which suggests that romantic discourse is already profoundly aware of inherit contradictions 
within its own creative process. Having established a correlation between romanticism and its 
twentieth century literary criticism, I shall investigate Coleridge's poetry in the terms of his own 
theory, which always suggests the duplicity of the literary imagination in its articulation of artistic 
distinctions (Imagination/Fancy; Imitation/Copy). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In one of the most provocative essays of the age, Hazlitt writes: 
The imaglDaticHi is an exaggerating and exclusive fkcui^ it takes ftom one thing to add to another it 
accumulates circnmstances together to give the greatest possible efitet to a favourite object. The 
understanding is a dividing and measuring faculty: it judges of things not according to tfaeii immediate 
impression on the mind, but according to tiieii relations to one another. The one is a mcmopolising 
faculty, which seeks the greatest quantity of present excitement by inequality and disproportion; the 
other is a distributive faculty, which seeks the greatest quantity of ultimate good, by jnitice and 
propcxtiotL The one is an aristocratical, the other a republican &cuity. The principle of poetry is a very 
ami-levelling principle. It aims at effect, it exists by aartrast. It admits of no medium. It is every thing 
by excess. It rises above the ordinary standard of sufi'erings and crimes. It presents a dazzling 
iq>pearance. It shows its head turretted, crowned, and crested. Its ftont is gilt and blood-stained. Before 
it 'it carries noise, and behind it leaves tears'. It has its altars and its victims, sacrifices, human 
s»;rifices. Kings, priests, not)les, are its train-bearers, tyrants and slaves its executionen.-Camqge is its 
daughter*^ ., 
In his discussion of Coriolanus (1817), Hazlitt emphasises the ambivalent nature of the 
imagination, locating within its creative faculty a potentially despotic and authoritarian force. This 
deconstruction of the psychology of the imagination is shockingly anachronistic at a time when the 
sympathetic function of poetiy was being emphasised in the British moral tradition. As Peter 
Conrad declares, "in England in particular, the literary imagination has aspired to renunciatory 
meekness and pastoral modesty. Hazlitt makes his principle the more rebariiative by enunciating it 
in the course of a defence of tyranny" .^ 
Before one can begin to apply Hazlitt's incisive perceptions on the aggrandising nature of the 
imagination to the poetry of his own age, it is important to consider romantic poetry in the terms of 
what it set out to achieve. English romantic poetry is traditionally associated widi the concept of 
emancipation on a mutiplicity of levels. In a literaiy sense the romantic movement is understood as 
the period of artistic licence; the first generation poets initiate the new age by fredng themselves 
from what they saw as the austere shackles of the age of Reason in their celebration of uninhibited 
creative thought. Socially the romantics emphasise the equality of human beings in their persistent 
attempts to reconcile man with "Nature". "Nature" is often represented in romantic poetiy as an 
authentic and unrationalised Utopia, where the individual can escape from his or her own social or 
intellectual entrapment. Historically the movement coincides with the advent of the French 
Revolution which, in its radical transformation of a traditional feudal hierarchy, embodied the spirit 
of this new imaginative freedom. 
The purpose of this thesis is, in the introductory chapter, to provide a frameworic of the key 
concept of "romantic imagination" as the pivotal medium through which the poets attempt to 
realise their various visionary paradises, and how the "divinity" of this exceptional gift is often 
tainted by the restrictions of their own humanity, and ttien to investigate these claims with specific 
attention to the works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Like the French Revolution whose vision of 
universal freedom degenerates into tiie destructive "reign of terror", the romantics discover that 
poetic vision is an extemporaneous exercise, briefly allowing the poet a glimpse of its divinity only 
violently to revoke it. The careo^ of Wordsworth and Coleridge bear out this failure for, initially 
blessed with romantic imagination, they survive its death and become constant burdens, tied round 
the necks of the second generation romantics like Coleridge's albabxjss (the essayists- Hazlitt, 
Lamb and De Quincey -all begin by hero-worshipping their idols Wordsworth and Coleridge, 
before becoming more or less disillusioned). In attempting to pull down the barriers that hinder the 
workings of the imagination, the idealisation of the imagination in theory often leads to a sense of 
finitude in practice. Often the vision can only be i»^erved if the text is aborted and more 
extremely, body and brain are recognised as the ultimate hindrance which encourage a discursive 
rather than intuitive form of knowledge. Idealisation is tiius only maintained at the cost of extreme 
rtietorical manoeuvres (Coleridge, for example, omits a whole chapter in the Biographia Literaria in 
his attempts to provide an idealised account of the imagination). 
If, as the romantics themselves suspect, language is an imperfect form that cannot fully represent 
their visions, their texts dramatise the equivocal nature of artistic creation. In fact, as Haditt saw, 
the texts often serve a rhetoric of power in their fluctuation between the antithetical poles of 
egotism and sympathy. Shelley's "The Triumph of Life" is a good example of the imagination's 
effective ambivalence as the poem fluctuates between multiple forms of unstable light imagery. 
The destructive force of imagination is emphasised by the procession of life which frequenfly 
degenerates into violent visions of darkness and, although the speaker recognises that the car which 
carries it is ill-guided, he must also tellingly confess that "it passed/With solemn speed majestically 
on" (105). Wordsworth's "Nutting" reveals similar attractions to images of power. The poem can be 
read as a mini-fall where the speaker is not Adam but Satan, finding himself for the first time in 
paradise "where the unpierced shade/Embrowned the noontide bowers" (PX: IV 245-6). The 
sensuality of the description of nature, the feelings of exclusion, the mingled admiration, envy and 
the wish to brutalise make Wordsworth and Satan soul-mates. Blake even goes so far as to 
emphasise the patriarchal element of Nature (and by . implication God) in "The Tyger" where he 
resonantiy evokes the entrancing magnificence of power. As these instances suggest, the romantics 
themselves were often ambivalent about imaginative processes. In retrospect for us it may become 
increasingly difflcult to distinguish the revolutionary motivation of a Shelley from the language of 
sensation and power that one might associate with Nietzsche or Hazlitt's Coriolanus. In aesthetical 
terms the demarcating boundary between two opposing political viewpoints can become 
confusingly blurred for both derive their inspirational focus Irom the same imaginative source. 
Eagleton highlights this dyadic aspect of romantic aesthetics, argumg that the Utopian idealism 
which manifests itself in the period as a reaction against traditional hierarchy, eventually comes "to 
represent a devastating loss for the political left". The "intuitive dogmatism of the imagination" ,^ 
and "the intimidatory majesty of the sublime'"* can equally be seen to localise themselves in right-
wing ideology. The romantic imagination enforces a Foucaultian recognition that aesthetic 
categories and political power are inextricably related. 
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The implications of the imagination's embryonic political ambivalence become crucial when 
focusing on questions of ideology because they highlight the intensely equivocal nature of these 
phenomena we name "Romantic" in a way that renders simple definitions of "Romanticism" 
impossible. M.H Abrams's critical survey Natural Supematuralism defines romanticism as a 
humanisation of theological tradition and as a movement towards an enthusiastic ot^ anic unity in 
which political opposites are sublimated by romantic reconciliation: 
The Romantic writers neither sought to demolish their life in this wodd in a desperate search for 
something new nor lashed out in despair against the inherited culture. The burden of -vAat they had to 
say was that contemporary man can redeem himself and his wodd, and that his only way to this end is 
to reclaim and bring to realization the great positives of the Western Past^ . 
Abrams presents the self-image of romantic idealism by replicating its fundamental organicism 
in his own critical methodology. However, as McGann explains, Abrams's reification of "certain 
key romantic self-conceptualisations like 'spirituality', 'creativity', 'process', 'uniqueness', 
'diversity'...cannot be taken at face value. They lie at the very heart of romanticism's self-
representation and as such they must be subjected to critical analysis" .^ Abrams's argument 
becomes unstuck in bis deliberate omission of Byron, absent "not because I think him a lesser poet 
than the others but because in his greatest work he speaks with an ironic counter-voice and 
deliberately opens a satirical perspective on the vatic stance of his romantic contempoiaries"'. In 
selectively ignoring Byron, Abrams's notion of romanticism is immediately complicated in its 
confession of absences that threaten the coherence of his own perception of the romantic. 
Subsequent surveys of romanticism attempt to revise the traditional humanist approaches, 
focusing instead on the fundamental concept of "Romantic Irony". Drawing upon the theories of 
the German ironist Friedrich Schlegel as a paradigmatic model, Mellor offers an alternative theory 
of romantic practice: 
The authentic romantic ironist is as filled with enthusiasm as with skepticism. He is as much a 
romantic as an irotust. Having ironically acknowledged the fictiveness of his own pattemings of human 
experience, he romantically engages in the creative process of life by eagerly constituting new forms, 
new myths. And these new fictions and self-concepts bear with them the seeds of their own 
destruction. They too die to give w ^ to new pEtttems, in a never-ending process that becomes an 
analogue for life itself. The resultant artistic mode that alone can properiy be called romantic irony 
must therefore be a form or structure tiiat simultaneously creates and de-creates itself .^ 
But while Mellor might acknowledge a fundamental scepticism in the romantic creative process, 
she continues to assert that Romantic Irony becomes mcoherent as a programme when creative 
enthusiasm is disrupted by the eventuation of the negative emotions of fear and guBt. At this point, 
so Mellor continues, we move away from romanticism into the realms of "something else": "the 
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romantic ironist's enthusiastic response to process and change terminates where \be perception of a 
chaotic universe arouses either guilt or fear" ,^ and hence challenges the ideology of open-ended 
spiritual growth. Mellor's sceptical approach to romanticism ironically suffers from her own 
wariness of non-enthusiastic creativity. Her celebratory fertile romantic universe merely extends 
traditional humanist studies in order to incorporate the ironic stance of the previously 
unaccountable Byron. Mellor's comment on Byron, that "the p^losophical ironist who successfully 
performs this difficult manoeuvering between enthusiastic self-creation and skeptical self-
destiuction, produces that self-expanding, 'progressive universal poetry' which Schlegel hailed as 
the only genuinely 'romantic poetry'"^", illustrates the dangers of fully assimilating the EngKsh 
romantic movement with the transcendental philosophies of its German counterpart because it 
ignores the more negative aspects of romantic creation that threaten to destroy a poet's idealistic 
intentions. The presence of the desperate emotions of fear and guilt further complicate the subject 
of romanticism as they are essential responses that hint at the darker, power-grasping facets of the 
imagination. 
In this light we may be confronted with an ambivalence so profound that it is inappropriate to 
separate, as Swingle does, theories of romanticism into "ideological" and "anti-ideological" 
components: 
Were the Romantics fundamentally interested in aiticuiating systems of belief- as, for example, a 
philosophy of organicism, a theory of the creatiye imagination, an epistemology grounded in the 
primacy of heart over head? Or were tbey, to the contrary, f^ mdamentaUy dubious about such beliefs 
and interested, instead, in pursuing the questions that appear to militate against an ideological 
orientation of thought?'^ 
Such a question neglects the possibility that romanticism forms a far more discursive and 
complex ideology in which apparenfly disparate romantic theories synchronically interact with one 
another. 
In this respect modem deconstructionist criticism can be helpful in highlighting romantic 
ambivalence if it is used as a methodological tool for a more historically particular analysis. This 
critical movement emphasises, in its radical interpretation of Saussurean lingiiistics, a 
dissemination of meaning that afflicts all texts at all times 'a priori"^ meaning cannot be fixed to 
preconceived essences, but can only be articulated in difference because "In language there are 
only differences without positive terms"^^. But while Saussure proposes that language stabilises 
arbitrary identities, creating a"total sign'', deconstruction challenges the construction of a definitive 
ideology in language by suggesting tiiat the relationship between the signifier and the signified is 
also arbitrary. In the words of Roland Barthes: "we know now that a text is not a Kne of words 
releasing a single 'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the Autiior God) but a multidimensional 
space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash" Dojonstructionist 
techniques are useful in locating arcane power conflicts in the romantic imagination because they 
displace notions of the central authority in the text, bringing to the attention of the reader the 
mai;gins and subtexts which often prove to be equally as important. T. Rajan emphasises the 
importance of breaking down logocentric conservatism in romantic writing, arguing that meaning is 
subjected to a dissemination that undermines the supposed organic unity of the text: "The histoiy of 
Romantic poetry and aesthetics can be seen as tiie gradual bringing to light of a counterplot within 
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the apparently Utopian narrative of Romantic desire, through the confrontation of recognitions 
initially hidden in the subtexts rather than the texts of works''^ '*. 
McGann, however, objects to the deconstaictionist approach to literature, arguing that its 
ahistorical process obscures the historical distinctions that can ultimately distinguish the romantic 
from other literature. McGann might be correct in his assertion that it is a general misconception to 
imagine that romantic poetry transcends the social, the political and the historical, but his insistence 
(based on Heine's model of historical self-consciousness) that the romantic position is an 
"historically limited and determinate one"^ ^ immediately poses the problem of escaping from the 
"false-consciousness" of one ideology only to plunge headlong into the limits of an alternative 
ideological position. In other words it is naive to assume that we can simply step outside 
romanticism. McGann affirms that "a critical procedure like Heine's undermines an ideological and 
reifying criticism by isolating and historicising the originaty forms of thought, by placing an 
intellectual gulf between the present and the past"^ .^ This, however, will not do because it ignores 
the fact that our own current historical awareness is the direct result of a process that continuously 
reacts and interacts with past historical assumption. Of course this is not to say that histoiy forms a 
continuum that is free from contradiction or breakdown; rather it suggests that the niptures which 
do occur are a direct result of an historical discourse that is aligned with a power that may be 
oppressive, and which indeed involves the poet in discrediting or revaluing the literature that has 
preceded him. In his critique of McGann's historical isolation of the romantic period Siskin 
justifiably states that "Literature as the discipline we study and know., .invented and was the 
invention of a self that both uses it to establish hierarchical difference and requires it as a cure"''. 
By historically isolating the romantic period, McGann deprives romanticism of its authority to 
perform the inherently romantic characteristic of a literaiy iconoclasm; a characteristic that reveals 
intensified monopolising and aggrandising tendencies in the literature of the period, in spite of 
romanticism's own ideological commitments. 
In romanticism's attempt to discover a poetry which will reflect a universal and eternal notion of 
truth, romantic ambivalence manifests itself in the movement's attempts historically to isolate itself 
from other forms of literature. In this light, Bloom's supposedly ahistorical "anxieties" can be 
viewed alternatively as the inevitable historical process of a literature utilising its "present" power 
over past literature in order to formulate new values and perspectives. The self-questing natitre of 
the romantic consciousness is, according to Bloom, doomed to failure because it is always at war 
with its literary progenitors and with its siblings. The myth of an exclusively romantic "self is an 
impossible ideal because "self-appropriation involves the immense anxieties of indebtedness"**. 
This becomes explicit in the manner in which the romantic poets attempt to free themselves from 
the influence of Milton. Romantic poetry abounds with allusions to Milton as the poets deliberately 
misread, outwrite, rewrite and pervert their epic predecessor, in a desire to appear "original". If the 
romantic imagination simultaneously performs both an historical and an ahistorical function, it also 
suggests that these may be inseparably caught up in each other's processes. Simpson explains this 
by suggesting that the romantics "were aware of exactly the problems we now discuss under the 
heading of 'hermeneutics'" and "that they used the paradoxes implicit in them to fashion a discourse 
based on transference, repetition, and the 'doublebind'"*'. 
Deconstructionists may claim then, as Rajan does, that their own critical methodology is already 
pre-empted by Romantic practice and is not an alien or ahistoric form of discourse. This is perhaps 
emphasised in romanticism's relation to subsequent literary movements which claim to reject 
romantic theories of art. T.S. Eliot's essay, 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', was composed as a 
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deliberate response to romantic subjectivism, insisting that poetry has nothing to do with the 
expression of emotion, and comparing the poet's mind to a "receptacle" within which "special, or 
very varied, feelings are at liberty to enter into new combinations"^. Eliot claims that the act of 
composition, far from being an expression of a complex individuality, ought to be an impersonal 
process where the self is extinguished by the embodiment of Tradition which reflexively articulates 
itself within the text: 
What happens is a continual suirendeT of himself as he is at the moment to scmething 'which is more 
valuable. The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality^ ^ . 
However, it is kooically from the very school he attacks that Eliot formulates his own aesthetics. 
The romantic imagination is perceived, by the very poets themselves, as an external presence 
which insouciantly possesses the artist, leaving him/her at the mercy of impersonal forces which 
are beyond his control (see the extract from Shelley's Defaice of Poetry below). As the central 
artistic theorist of his age, Coleridge understands the imagination as both an active and a passive 
entity which serves as a fulcrum between internal and external perception. Here, the self-
consciousness that Eliot objects to, is ultimately neutralised by an absolute transcendental version 
of the self which negates identity: "We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF, in order to end with the 
absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to lose and find all self in God" {BL I : 283). 
The same perceived shift from subjectivity to objectivity is evident in Eliot's own poetic theory 
when he comments that "The business of the poet is not to find new emotions, but to use the 
ordinary ones", enabling Eliot to conclude that "Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an 
escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality"^ .^ In 
both cases the artists are concerned with the tense relationship between identity and literature. In 
both cases it is similarly the ambiguous nature of language which undermines their theories in 
practice. Just as Eliot's repression of the ego in art only serves to resurrect it, arguably greater than 
ever in his own verse, Coleridge's poetic practice, as I will argue, becomes a haven for a manic 
subjectivity. 
The romantics' scepticism concerning the ability of words to convey an exact meaning makes 
them the forerunners of some aspects of modem critical theory. Shelley's Defence of Poetry 
implicitly laments the fractining of the signifier and the signified which results in the locus of 
meaning being shifted away from the text to the elusive process it is taken to transmit: 
A man caimot say, "I will compose poetry". The greatest poet even catmot say it; for the mind in 
cteati(»i is as a fading coal, which some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to 
transitory brightness; this power arises from within, like the co]cai oS a flower which Ikks and 
changes as it is developed, and the ccxiscious portions of our nature are unprophetic either of its 
approach or its departure. Could this influence be durable in its original purity and force, it is 
impossible to predict the greatness of the results; but when composition begins, inspiration is already 
on the decline, and the most glorious poetry tiutt has ever been conomunicated to the world is probably 
a feeble shadow of the original conception of the poet^. 
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Shelley confesses here to a dissemination of meaning end^c to composition that has the 
dubious effect of destroying the unity of conception. This produces, what Rajan terms " the 
disappearance of narrative, dramatic, or conceptual 'actualisation', a phenomenon that results in the 
absence from romantic writing of embodied or achieved meaning as opposed to discamate 
meaning"^ .^ That is to say meaning is increasiagly something in need of being reconstructed. 
Logocentric organicism thus threatens to dissolve into a stmctureless mess of floating signiflers 
and signifieds, where meaning becomes open and wholly dependent on the play of language and an 
appeal to the reader for completion. 
Idealising critics who believe that language is essentially a mimetic and stable entity that forms a 
relationship of correspondence between the mind and the world, subject and object, cannot have 
fully acknowledged the implications of Shelley's enquiiy into the nature of words which suggests 
that the centre of organic thought is immediately displaced in composition. Egalitarian idealism, 
therefore, may be distorted in its textual representation b^ause the damaged relationship between 
thought and articulation will always provide other meanings that may contradict the author's 
intentions^ .^ The work of Jacques Lacan may be helpful in situating notions of autonomous 
individuality in Romantic theory (most evident in Wordsworth and Coleridge rather than Shelley 
who does not defend a view of the autonomy of the individual in creative processes at least) as a 
form of psychic fantasy. According to Lacan language can only dismande the idealised S3mthesis of 
subject and object within poetic form. Lacan explains the disruptive influence of language in his 
famous example of an infant who, before his acquisition of linguistic communication, undergoes 
the "mirror stage". In recognising his own image in the mirror, the uncoordinated child begins to 
identify with a unified image of itself: 
This jubilant assumption of bis specular image by the child at the in&as stage, still sunk in his motor 
incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplaiy situation the symbolic 
m^iix in which the / is precipitated in a piimordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of 
idtentification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its fimctira as 
subject26. 
This imaginary correspondence of self and not-self, subject and object, creates an fllusory 
sense of control and stability which is disrupted by the child's entrance into the system of language. 
Here identity is dependent on difference rather than an imaginary self-identification. Language thus 
contributes to the fragmentation of the self by creating desire and the unconscious which become 
repressed subtexts when the subject assumes the pre-defined positions that are available to him in 
language: 
the formation of the / is symbolized in dreams by a fortress, or a stadium-its inner arena and 
enclosure sunounded by marshes and rubbish-tips, dividing it into two qpposed fields of contest w*ere 
the subject fioundeis in quest of the lofty, nrnat inaa castle whose tcna (som^imes juxtaposed in 
the same scenario) symbolizes the id...Similarly, on the mental plane, we find realized the structures of 
fortified works, the metaphor of which arises spontaneously, as if issuing fiom the symptoms 
themselves, to designate the mechanisms of obsessional neurosis-inversira, isolation, reduplication, 
cancellation and displacement '^'. 
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Lacan's analysis of language's disclosure of repressed fantasies is illuminating in relation to 
romantic piBsentations of organic unity because it reveals how the intended fusion of subject and 
object is an imaginaiy ideal which is undermined by the vision's linguistic figuration. Quite often in 
romantic texts imagination can be interpreted as the imposition of a fantasy that would deny its 
own fractured rendition of being. 
In this respect the application of feminist criticism to romantic texts is particularly illuminating 
because it can also demonstrate another aspect of romantic ambivalence in its questioning of the 
theoretical conception of a unified self in language. The French feminist movement is of relevance 
here because, in the words of Mellon 
Jt originated in the attempt to call into question, even deny, the validity of the binary mode of 
thinking that has characterized philosophical discourse since the ancient Greeks. The dualism inherent 
in Western though, whether conceived in terms of the Greek opposition between techne/physis, or the 
Cartesian mind/body split, or the Kantian subject/object (ding-an-sich), or the Hegelian dialectic of 
thesis/antithesis, or-most crucially for feminist tbeorists-tfae diiference of male/female, enforced a 
cultural practice that could only produce the repression and exploitation of the Other, be it the other 
class, the other race, the other sex. French philosophers and psychoanalysts have insisted that one can 
eliminate social oppression only by first eliminating binary rational thinking. In particular, French 
feminist theorists have insisted that the cultural practice of Hoping the female as Other, as that which is 
opposed to mind/subject/techne, must be radically altered^ .^ 
The romantics view the female values of mothering and sympathy as essential to their conception 
of the imagination as a benevolent and (in some cases) androgynous entity. However, the role of 
the female Other within romantic verse may reveal two distinctive ways in which the text may be 
taken to deconstruct its vision of unified harmony and questions the imagination's status as a 
reconciler of opposites. In the first place, as critics have pointed out, the desire to fill the void of a 
solitary male ego with the sympathetic tendencies of a female psyche often reveals the colonising 
tendencies of the romantic imagination^'. The romantic ego thus may be envisaged as a potenfly 
male power which appropriates its female counterpart as a function of its own subjectivity. Marion 
B. Ross emphasises this by imderstanding the romantic experience in the terms of an explicitly 
male ego which becomes engaged in figurative batties of possession and conquest: 
The self-questing of the Romantic poet enacts the attempt to leestablish a relatioa with-a hold on-the 
world, a relation that is predetermined by the nanire of the historical changes that envelope and 
transform the poetic vocation itself. The Romantics rescHt to masculine meUphors of power not only 
because they are socialized and indoctrinated into a masculinist tradition but also (and tautologically) 
because these metaphors allow tfaem to reassert the power of a vocsdon that is on the vrage of losing 
whatever influence it had within and over that tradition^. 
Browning's post-romantic poem 'Porphyria's Lover' (1842) is particularly illuminating in this 
respect because it provides an ironic exposition of the romantic male speaker's futile attempts 
mentally to possess a Female Other^ ^ The poem dramatises the inescapable subjectivity of a 
romantic speaker who, in his search for an objective counterpart, can only confirm the totalising 
nature of his masculine imagination. Browning presents a speaker who, fearful of the inconstancy 
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of the female's subjective desires, waits for the moment in which he can deprive her of her 
animation. The speaker transforms his beloved into the status of an object, thereby hoping to secure 
her love and distance himself from the intense subjectivity of his own emotion: his love 
impersonally manifests itself as "A thing to do" (38). The act of murder can only violentiy reassert 
his self-possession for he now imposes his own mental p-ocesses on a mind whose inconstancy he 
had earlier feared. The lover's mind assumes the "exclusive and exaggerating" function that Hazlitt 
ascribes to the self-conscious romantic imagination: transformed into an "it", Porphyria's head no 
longer moves of its own accord-"its' will", rather, is that of her subjective interpreter. Porphyria's 
inanimate body becomes a work of art, a poem in itself that confirms the creativity of the masculine 
ego: 
I propped her head up as before, 
Only, this time my shoulder bore 
Her head, which droops upon it still: 
The smiling rosy little head, 
So glad it has its utmost will. 
That all it scorned at once is fled. 
And I , its love, am gained instead! (49-55) 
The egocentiic speaker has reduced his female counterpart into an image of male fantasy whereby 
she is now animated only by the demands of a controlling masculine power. 
Knoepflmacher emphasises the influence of Coleridgean antecedents in the poem: "Unable to find 
iuel in 'that inanimate cold world' his imagination projects, Coleridge's agonised speaker [of 
'Dejection: an Ode'] seeks vainly to remove the 'viper thoughts, that coil around my mind' by 
listening 'to the wind' 01- 51, 94); Porphyria's Lover, beset by similar anxieties, prefers to relieve 
his agony by coiling his thoughts around Porph)aia's 'litfle throat'"^. With respect to a poet like 
Coleridge it may suggest that the source of supposedly divine inspiration is an intrinsically male 
source which is at once dominant and creative. The imaginative paradise in "Kubla Khan' combines 
an image of masculine, ejaculative power (the mighty river Alph) with an image of female 
servitude (the wailing woman). The desire to incorporate female attributes witiiin a male ego serves 
to intensify the problem of a radical gender opposition rather than promote a vision of androg)mous 
harmony. The damsel of the poem's closing lines might be seen to reject her appropriation into a 
male paradise of satiated desire and, in doing so, fractures the unity of the vision by revealing its 
subversive element of male domination. 
A second strategy with the feminine Otherness in romantic poetry is mythically to assimilate the 
female with the duplicitous Eve of both Biblical and literaiy ill-repute. Marina Wama- emphasises 
the female's figuration within literary history as a diabolic monster beneath a beautiful exterior 
Male beasts, as in Beauty and the Beast, or male devils, as in the temptaticxis of St Antony, dmt 
possess the same degree of dupiicity; you can tell you're dealing with the devil on the whole, tnit when 
evil comes in the female guise, you have to beware: the foiry queen may turn to dust in your arms, and 
poisonous dust at that. This is a trope that sends thrills through stories as disparate as Wagno's 
Tannhauser, in which the knight loses his soul to the carnal goddess of the Venusbag, and Rider 
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Haggard's Sbe, where, as you might remember from the film, Ursula Amfress cracks open like a 
speeded-up earthquake and reveals beneath the image of loveliness, nothing but a crumbling hag. But 
none of these dissembling serpents and the-mmsteis can compare with the vision of Lamia in Keat's 
gorgeous romance noir: 
Sbe was a goidian shape of dazzling bne 
Vennilion-spotted, golden, green, and blue; 
Striped Hke a zebia, heckled hke a paid. 
Eyed like a peacock, and all crimson-baned; 
And Ml of silver moons, that, as she breathed. 
Dissolved, or brighter shone, or interwreathed 
Their lustres with the gjLoomier tapestries... 
Sbe seemed, at oace, some penanced lady elf. 
Scone demon's mistress, or the demon's self... 
Her head was a serpent, but ah, bitter-sweet! 
Sbe had a woman's matth, with all its pearls complete... 
Her throat was sapeia, but the words she spake 
Came, as through bubbUng hooey, for Love's sake.^ 
The female is often figured within romantic texts as the source of postlapsarian duplicity. Her 
mythical associations make her a convenient scapegoat for the masctiline poet's own sense of guilt 
and inadequacy. Unable to create a vision of Edenic harmony within his own poetry, the masculine 
speaker transfers his intense desires of self-fulfilment on to the unsuspecting female; she can 
convenientiy account for the distortion of the womanly qualities of sympathy and empathy into 
monstrous aberrations of masculine self-pursuit within her own mythical figuration as the 
initial deceiver. For Coleridge the androgynous male is the source of divine creativity, producing 
the mighty fountain of the river Alph in 'Kubla Khan' in an image that is powerfully ejaculative. 
The potentially androgynous female, on the other hand, recurs again and again as an image of 
horror that plagues Coleridge's nightmares: the gihastiy Life-in-Death of 'The Ancient Mariner', and 
the lamia-like Geraldine of 'Christabel*. The impetuous desire to seek an objective Eve in order to 
enrich the meaning of the solitary Adamic self ultimately only serves to intensify the subjective 
nature of the fallen speaker. 
I l l 
Let us now turn, with these pictures of ambivalence in mind, to Coleridge in particular. As both a 
poet and a literary theorist Coleridge uniquely provides the opportunity for the modem reader to 
und^tand romantic poetty in the terms of its own theory. Col^dge's poetic theory attempts to 
idealise the literary imagination as a medium which can provide the basis for a poetry that speaks 
the divine language of God. Instrumental to the success of this sympathetic function of the 
imagination in practice is the significance of language itself. From the very outset of his 
philosophical career Coleridge rejects the idea of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign and seeks to 
restore the*natural"meaimig of words^. As I hope to demonstrate in the remaiQder of this chapter, 
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Coleridge fails to produce a theory of language that will justify the divine function that he reserves 
for the literary imagination. The tense and unstable conjunction between the imagination and 
language in Coleridge's theory, highlights poetic form's susceptibility to the ambivalences of 
interpretation as previously discussed. 
Coleridge's theory of the imagination reaches ftiiition in his 1817 Biogmpbia Literaria definition. 
Here he argues that through an act of self-awareness, the imagination can synthesise the subject 
and object through the structure of artistic creation. Through the medium of art, the self surrenders 
itself to the objective principles behind creation itself provoking a consubstantiality of mind 
(subjective experience) and nature (objective experience): 
The IMAGINATION then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary IMAGINATION I hold to 
be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a rep^tion in the finite mind of the 
eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as an echo of the fc^er, co-existing with 
the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and dilfoing only in degree, 
and in the mode of its c i^eration. It disserves , diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process 
is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it strug^es to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as 
all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. (BL: I 304) 
This most commonly quoted passage from Biogiapbi'a Uteraria has been continually argued over 
and re-interpreted, but in the words of Jonathan Wordsworth: "with the primary imagination, man 
unknowingly reenacts God's original and eternal creative moment; with the secondary, he 
consciously vitalizes an object-world that would otherwise be dead; with the fancy he plays unvital 
games, dependent upon choice and the laws of association"^ .^ The primary imagination is the 
faculty which unconsciously hypostasizes the external world via a passive act of perception. The 
primary imagination speaks the language of God as manifested in natural phenomena. Its univocal 
status requires no explanation, and it is wholly disconnected from the world of art. The secondary 
imagination, on the other hand, is a human faculty which functions within human language; it seeks 
to comprehend the language of God by a conscious act of progressive awareness, not only by 
mirroring its divine perceptive process, but by discovering what might be called its laws of 
generative grammar. According to Coleridge the poet must rely not on the primary imagination's 
rendering of the objective, physical world but on the secondary imagination's rendering of an 
intimate human relationship with that worid. 
If the primary imagination allies itself with the powers of the deity, continuously recreating the 
natural world, the secondary imagination can only be by comparison, an inferior entity. Coleridge 
hardly emphasises this gap in his Biograpbia ctefinition, where the secondary imagination (and by 
implication, the poet) is elevated to an almost identical divine status. This discrepency in 
distinction between the two faculties of imagination is pointed out by Jackson Bate: "flie primary 
imagination is rather the highest exertion of the imagination that the 'finite mind' has to offer; and 
its scope...necessarily includes universals which He beyond the restricted field of the 'secondary' 
imagination. For the appointed task of the 'secondary' imagination is to 'idealize and unify' its 
objects; and it can hardly 'unify' the universals"^. This is emphasised by the syntax and content of 
Coleridge's prose which dramatises a shift in language that diminish^ the eminence of the 
secondary imagination. The wonderfully simple and fluent description of the primary faculty is 
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replaced, in the afRrmation of the secondary, by a complicated grammar of laboured consecutive 
clauses. The series of negatives that accompany these lines convey a sense of absence rather than 
totality: "echo... degree... impossible... struggles". The unified narrative of the primary imagination 
speaks for itself; the disrupted narrative of the secondary, however, requires qualification after 
qualification. 
The secondary imagination thus, in its continual self-justifications, disregards the Plotinian 
admonition quoted in Chapter XII of Biograpbia Literaiia: 
it is not lawful to enquire from '^ lieooe it [nature] sprang, as if it were a thing subject to place and 
motion, for it neither approached hither, nor again departs from hence to some other place; but it either 
appears to us or it does not appear. So that we o u ^ not to pursue it with a view of detecting its secret 
source, but to watch.in quiet till it suddenly shines upon us; preparing ourselves for the blessed 
spectacle as the eye waits patiently for the rising SUTL (JBL: 1241) 
Although the theory of the secondary imagination is part of a defence of a transcendentally 
grounded notion of natural language, Coleridge does not provide, along with his definition of 
imagination, bis theory of how human language can be heightened by the imagination. The 
Logosopbia, which he refers to in chapter XII of the BiograpbJa, remains the missing link which 
can vindicate his theory of imagination in practice. Without it the discovery of primary knowledge 
via self-conscious contemplation can only subject the univocal silence of divine language to the 
rupturing garrulity of art, which fractures the relationship between sign and referent. The secondary 
agency, as a result, becomes potentially promethean for it is an image-making power that can 
transform the worid according to an individual's whim or fantasy '^'. Language offers its speaker the 
medium to create an other universe via the secondary imagination. In Coleridge's hands the poetic 
imagination often becomes a potentially disruptive violence on the primary imagination. In this 
respect Robert Langbaum's assertion that the romantic experience consists of a desperate 
"movement towards objectivity" for which "subjectivity was...the inescapable condition"^*, 
encapsulates the situation of a poet like Coleridge. As we shall see, the intended resolution of the 
subject/object opposition in his poetic theory is undermined in poetic practice by language's 
mediation for the plight of an individual ego "isolated within himselF', bereft of an "objective 
counterpart"^^ for his explicitly subjective desires. 
As a power which can only realise its full potential within the boundaries of language, 
Coleridge's poetic imagination is doomed to commit itself to the inevitability of error his definition 
of imagination ironically reveals itself in the flawed words and stubborn sounds of the 
philosophically imperfect. This is emphasised in the Biograpbia definition by the rejection of the 
fancy as a mode of writing unfit for true artistic presentation. The fancy is defined as "a mode of 
Memory emancipated from the order of time and space; and blended with, and modified by that 
empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word CHOICE. But equally with the 
ordinary memory it must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association" {BL'. I 
305). In this sense it is both limited and dangerous; limited because it can only play with "fixities 
and definites"; dangerous because it has the capacity to run riot, destroying true poetry. It is, of 
course, with the fancy's origins in the principles of association that Coleridge initially embarks 
upon his theory of imagination. In his eariy formulations of the poetic imagination Coleridge draws 
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upon the theories of Hartley who stresses the need to restore the original, prelapsarian state of 
natural speech, where all concepts can be expressed imequivocally: 
If all the simple articulate sounds, with all the radical words, '<fMch are found in the present languages, 
were apprc^riated to objects and ideas agreeable to the jvesent sense of words, and their fitness to 
re[»esent objects and ideas, so as to make all consistent with itself; if, farther, the best rules of 
etymology and syntax were selected from the present languages, and ^ plied to the radical words here 
spoken of so as to render them capable of expressing all the variations in objects and ideas, as far as 
possible, i.e. so as to grow proportionably to the growth of knowledge, this might also be tenned a 
philosophical language... (Obsetvatiaas oa Man, i. 316-7) 
Hartley's theories became, for the young Coleridge, the basis of a philosophical language which 
allows the epistomologist to take the all important step from mere perceiver of nature, to interpreter 
of its laws and agencies. Hartley explains this differentiation in Ms Obsavations through his theory 
of mental images or ideas which become templates for the impressions of the natural worid. On the 
flyleaf to his copy, as Wylie notes, Coleridge faithfully writes: "Ideas may become as vivid & 
distinct, & the feelings accompanying them as vivid, as original Impressions-and this may finally 
make a man independent of his senses-one use of poetry"* .^ Coleridge is here already making a 
hierachical distinction between two faculties: "Original Impressions" and "Ideas". He is also 
suggesting that ideas can merge into original impressions in a poetry of natural speech. Ideas, in 
this sense, represent an early formulation of the secondary imagination; there is even the similar 
hint of ambiguity, implicit in the word "may", in respect to its unifying powers. 
Coleridge, however, later repudiated Hartley's system of Ideas on account of its rigorous adhesion 
to mechanical association. Although Hartley's association led to a final spirituality in the constant 
refining of the senses, it was the idea that the imagination ultimately had its origins in the senses 
that Coleridge foimd unpalatable: 
Now it will be a sufficient proof, that all the intellectual pleasures and pains are deducible ultimately 
from the sensible ones...For thus none of the intellectual pleasures and pains are evidentiy originals. 
They are therefore the only ones, l.e. they are the common source from whence all the intellecnial 
pleasures and pains are ultimately derived. (Observadona 1. 416-7) 
Although Hartley went on to stress the religious or transcendent telos of the process of association, 
for Coleridge imagination, in Hartiey's sense, remains an ambivalent faculty that proves unable to 
transcend the limits of the body. However, as I intend to ai^e, Coleridge does not wholly succeed 
in surpassing Harfley's theories and they become unsurmoimted subtexts in the Biograpbia 
definition of the imagination. I shall suggest that Coleridge confuses what he perceives as the 
imperfections of a fdiilosophical theory, with the imperfections of language which can reveal tiie 
particular desires and neuroses that prevent tiie potential for complete or total vision. The fancy is 
thus an intrinsic element of the imagination, despite Coleridge's attempts to alienate it from his 
idealised version of perceptive faculty. 
Chaptei^ VI and VII of the Biograpbia attempt to finalise Hartley's influence as a particular 
period in Coleridge's own intellectual development. The law of association, restricted to a 
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"common condition" of contemporaneity, reduces the voluntary will to the passive automatism of a 
"memoria techuica". However, in the most important passage of chapter VII, Coleridge confesses 
the significance of the passive faculty of the mind which plays an intrinsic role in his overall 
conception of the imagination as a trichotomy of active thought, the passive thing, and the 
intermediate faculty: 
Most of my readers will have observed a small water-insect on the surface of rivulets, which 
throws a cinque-sponed shadow fringed with the [xdsmatic colours on the suimy bottom of the brook; 
and will have noticed, bow die littie animal wins its way up against the stream, by altenutte pulses of 
active and passive motion, now resisting the cunoit, and now yielding to it in order to gather strength 
and a mcmentaty Mcwm for a fiulher propulsion. This is no unapt emblem of the mind's self-
experience in the act of thinking. There are evidently two powers at wortt, which relatively to each 
other are active and passive; and this is not possible without an intermediate faculty, which is at once 
both active and passive. (In philosophical language, we must denominate this intermediate faculty in 
all its degrees and determinations, the IMAGINATION... {BL: 1124-5) 
The passive faculty of the mind, which Coleridge understands as an act of sense-perception, 
confirms a worid already imbued with imaginative life by mechanically reproducing its external 
presence; the active faculty insists that this imaginative force is created by a voluntary act of 
perception. This bears witness to the mind's independence of nature-in other words, one can 
"imagine" an image of nature even though the object itself is not present in time and space. The 
intermediate faculty, on the other hand, can reconcile the active and the passive even if the two "are 
in necessary antithesis" (BL: I 255). 
If the conscious will is to function as the lynch-pin in Coleridge's elevation of the secondary 
imagination, then it must be disassociated from the accidental passivity of the fancy. An 
ambivalence of opinion is already apparent in chapter VII in a lengthy passage where the speaker 
attempts to reduce association to a common condition of contemporaneity: 
But if we appeal to our own consdonsness, we shall Qixl that even time itself, as the cause of a 
particular act of association, is distinct fit>m contemporaieity, as the condition of all association. 
Seeing a mackarel it may happen, that I immediately think of gooseberries, because I at the same time 
ate mackareJ with gooseberries as the sauce. The first syllable of the latter wtxd, being that which had 
co-existed with the image of the bird so called, I may then think of a goose. In the next momeiU the 
image of a swan may arise before me, though I had never seen the two birds together. In the two 
former instances, I am conscious that their co-existence in time was the drcumstance, that enabled me 
to recollect them; and equally conscious am I, that the latter was recalled to me by the joint (^ )eration 
of iikraiess and omtrast. So it is with cause and effbct, so too with on/er. So am 1 able to distinguish 
whether it was proximity in time, or continuity in space, that occasioned me to recall B on the mention 
of A. They catmot be indeed separated tiom contemporaneity; for that would be to separate them from 
die mind itself. (BL: 1125-6) 
Coleridge argues that contemporaneity enslaves the mind to a passive association of external 
objects, yet simultaneously he recognises that flie workings of consciousness cannot be 
emancipated from such a contemporaneity. From a deconstructionist viewpoint, as Jerome 
Christensen argues, the final seateoce implies that "the notion of an integral consciousness (the 
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ego, the self which is somewhere present to itself) depends on the premise of the contemporaneity 
of the mind-the temporal identity within itself. Hence it would appear that it is esseatiaUy accurate 
in respect to Coleridge's own ontology to hold the contemporaneity of the mind as the condition 
and final cause of all acts of the mind"^^ In other words Coleridge understands that 
contemporaneity must be repudiated if the epistemologist is to progress beyond necessitarian 
association, yet such a rejection would also involve a confession of a constitutive or deconstitutive 
difference which would threaten the absolute unity of being. 
This, of course, has severe consequences for tiie importance which Coleridge places on the human 
will in his forthcoming theory of the imagination. Coleridge thus, in chapter XIII, si^ resses the 
threat of association by isolating it as a faculty separate and distinct from the imagination. This 
shifts the balance of his initial conception of the mind as a trichotomy of a passive and active 
agency brought into consubstantiality by an intermediate faculty. The trichotomy presented in 
chapter XIII is, on the other hand, elitist and imstable, neatiy side-stepping, by mere fiat, the issue 
of fancy as an intrinsic facet of imagination by alienating it fiiom the more advanced components of 
the mind. 
The idealisation of the poetic imagination thus develops into a tension between monism and 
dualism which haunts the parameters of the Biogiapbia. On the one hand Coleridge recognises the 
importance of passive association as a faculty which must be reconciled or balanced in order to 
confirm the totality of the imagination, yet on the other hand he realises the possi*ble threat it can 
pose to the act of imaginative perception which must rely heavily upon an active motivation of the 
conscious will. In upholding the latter proposal, Coleridge's conception of the secondary 
imagination contains, in its definition, a time-bomb which threatens to explode its unifying powers 
at any given moment. Just as the secondary imagination, as Coleridge hopes can mer^ e into the 
primary, creating, in the words of Wordsworth, "The vision and faculty divine" {BL: I 241), so too 
can it be invaded by the deconstructive agency of fancy. As a discursive and interrogatory 
knowledge rather than an intuitive one, the secondary imagination is infected continually by the 
duplicity of language. Within language's system of arbitrary signs the imagination can lose its 
"superior voluntary controul" {BL: I 125) and be subjected to the lawlessness of fancy which, 
hovering dangerously in the margins, realises its potential as a deconstructive subtext. The two 
powers, far fi-om remaining disparate or alienated, are co-existent and interchangeable. 
The slippage in language from the spiritual mimesis of the Absolute to the desires and demands of 
a conditioned, finite self enacts a duplicity in the Kterary imagination. The fragile 
Fancy/Imagination distinction thus conceals a fear that the aesthetic is, to its very roots, potentially 
elitist and powerful; a domain where the self can reign supreme. Such an irreversible dichotomy 
between the rhetorical and conceptual dimensions of consciousness, from the empiricist philosophy 
to Coleridgean epistemology, can be best understood, as William Walker explains, in Nietzsche's 
tropological critique of metaphysics: 
Because the notion of a self and the notion of an object or thing confhsited, recognized, or known 
by this self are victims of this rhetorical critique, the snbject/object dualism of empiricist epistemology 
is of course abrogated, or at least reduced to the illusory effect of Qgural power. The move from 
em(Mricist epistemology to Nietzschean rhetoric results in the liquidation of the conceptual premises 
and investments of the former, and permits a radical reformulation of the main problems and insights 
of romantic literature'* .^ 
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Walker argues, through the mediatory influence of de Man, that Nietzsche's model of trope and 
concept refines associationist theories of the mind and language so that "in one crucial respect, the 
move from empiricism to Nietzsche is no move at all'"*^ 
Nietzsche's notion that "All rhetorical figures (i.e. the essence of language) are logically erroneous 
reasonings [logiscbe FelscbluBe]" ^ evokes Hartley's description of language as compromiser of 
deivant or "radical" words. But whereas Hartley mistakenly believes that language can be 
etymologically purified so that images and ideas can stand in a direct relationship to one another, 
Nietzsche emphatically demonstrates that the processes of the mind are explicitly metaphorical or 
"anthropomorphic": 
We produce beings [Wesen\ as bearers of properties [Trager der Eigenscbattea] and abstractions 
[Abstracktionen] as causes of these properties. That a unity [Einbeit], a tree, for example, appears to us 
as a multiplicity of properties, of rdations, is anthropomorphic in two respects [ist in doppelter Weise 
antbropomorpbiscJiy. first, this demarcated unity "tree" does not exist; it is arbitrary to cut out 
[berausznscbneiden] a thing in this way (according to the eye, according to the form); this relation is 
nc^ the true, absolute relation, but is again tainted by anthropomorphism [antbropomorpbiscb 
gefarbtf^ 
Coleridge, of course, subsumes the empiricist notion of ideas into a would be transcendental 
theory of imagination. But the Nietzschean revaluing of associationist philosophy into a theory of 
tropes, rather than a theory of ideas, may be read as a devastating critique of idealist accounts of 
the literary imagination. Read from this viewpoint, far from becoming an analogue of divine 
creation, Coleridge's idea of imagination foreshadows a human frailty fliat not only redirects it back 
towards the sense-perception of associationism, but also moves it dangerously closer to Nietzsche's 
elitist "Will-to-power". 
The problem of language becomes even more acute in Coleridge's attempts to assimilate German 
transcendental philosophy into his Biograpbia defence of imagination. Coleridge fashions his 
theory of self-consciousness which he hopes will valorise his defence of the imagination as a 
"transfiguring power" that reconciles the traditional dilemma of the subject/object opposition. The 
imagination for Coleridge functions in the same way as the transcendental mind does in Kant 
whereby it ultimately neuti^lises the corrosive power of self-consciousness by producing an 
absolute transcendental version of the self. It is Kant's (Critique of Judgement (1790) that paves the 
way for Coleridge's philosophical consttuction of the dochine of self-consciousness with its 
emphasis on the " I am" and " I think" which, via transcendental contemplation, are transfigured 
from a "conditional finite I " into an "absolute I AM". In brief, Kant argues that the unity of 
subjectivity and objectivity can be recovered in the form of "fine art". The thesis is based on the 
identification of two concepts of constructive activity: the natural worid's organic production (the 
objective worid) and artistic production (the subjective worid). Artistic production, according to 
Kant, is self-determining and unified, unaffected by external forces or governed by anything other 
than itself. Art is thus considered as pure production, without any purpose and free from the 
constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature. Kant, however, daiies that poetic 
language can form the basis of absolute knowledge because the nature of the concepts it attempts to 
articulate are "indeterminate": in "language we have many such indirect presentations modelled 
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upon analogy enabling the expression in question to contain, not the proper schema for the concept, 
but merely a symbol of reflection"*^. Coleridge, on the contrary, attempts to surpass Kant's work on 
the inaccessibility of "things-in-themselves" by turning to Kant's immediate successors who, as he 
believes, develop the seeds of truth which are embedded, but nowhere explicitiy elaborated, in 
Kantian doctrine. In Fichte's Science of Knowledge Coleridge discovers his central principle of the 
self-positing activity of consciousness, and Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism provides 
the basis for Coleridge's postulations on the consubstantiality of mind and nature via aesthetic 
intuition. For Kant, Coleridge's notion of the secondary imagination would be inadmissible in its 
claims to encapsulate the absolute knowledge behind creation. 
Under the influence of Fichte and Schelling, however, Coleridge begins to argue that the mind 
and nature are "different modes, or degrees in perfection, of a common substratum" {BL: I 130). 
Fichte replaces Kant's unknowable "thing-in-itself' with the self-authorising activity of the 
consciousness. Coleridge, however, dismisses Fichte's transcendental schema on accoimt of a 
"crude egoismus, a boastful and h)rperstoic hostility to NATURE, as lifeless, godless, and 
altogether imholy" {BL: I 158-9). Schelling, on the other hand, inverts Fichtean theory (which 
begins with the ego and then goes on to postulate the non-ego of nature) by assenting to the reality 
of nature as a first principle, while simultaneously taking on board a Fichtean transcendental 
idealism as a secondary deduction. Fichte's dynamic self-consciousness is thus elevated in 
Schelling to the status of a notion of the absolute as a subject/object that unites reflecting 
consciousness and unreflecting nature in a way that confirms the activity of the "plastic power" in 
both mind and nature. 
Schelling's Odyssey of Spirit attempts a construction of the history of self-consciousness through 
what Leask identifies as three principle powers: "undifferentiated identity of the Absolute, 
separation into opposite poles in ceaseless antagonism, and reconciliation at tiie highest level of 
self-consciousness, the so called 'intellectual intuition' which...Schelling found 'objectified' in art-
work'"'''. The conscious activity of the mind and the unconscious power of the Absolute as it is 
manifested in nature are thus recognised as bi-polar forces which are reconciled in an act of 
aesthetic intuition. Art's elevation as the highest form of knowledge is the subject of Schelling's 
System of Transcendental Idealism (1800). Here Schelling postulates that the artist must initially 
withdraw from the objectivity of nature and look inside himself. In this way flie poet can recapture 
the creativity of nature in his own creative act so that artistic mimesis can be understood as 
productive rather tiian reproductive: 
It is the poetic gift, which in its primary potentiality constimtes the primordial intuition, and 
conversely, what we speak of as the poetic gift is merely productive intuition, reiterated to its higher 
power. It is one and the same capacity that is active in both, the only one whereby we are able to think 
and to couple together even 'wliat is contadictory-and its name is imagination...that which appears to us 
outside the sphere of consciousness, as real, and that which appears within it, as ideal, as the world 
of art, are also products of one and the same activity^*. 
Self-consciousness is thus identified as a subject which becomes its own object or, as Coleridge 
explains in chapter XII of the Biograpbia: "If then I know myself only through myself, it is 
contiradictory to require any other predicate of self, but that of self-consciousness. Only in the self-
consciousness of a spirit is there the required identity of object and of representation" {BL: I 276-
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8). Imagination, for both Schelling and Coleridge, is an intermediate faculty where the object and 
the subject are dialectically synthesised in the "infinite I AM". Kant's notion that art represents an 
aesthetic ideal which does not achially impart knowledge, means that poetic language can only be 
an analogue for an absolute totality; form and matter are separate. Schelling, on the other hand, 
imbues art with the power of creation itself so that form and essence become co-determinants. 
Under Schelling's influence the principle of artistic creation becomes for Coleridge the principle 
of God. Coleridge can thus proclaim that "philosophy would pass into religion, and religion 
becomes inclusive of philosophy. We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF in order to end with tiie 
absolute I AM. We proceed from tiie SELF, in order to lose and find all self in GOD" {BL: I 283). 
This transgresses the Kantian doctiine that systematic knowledge is an analogy of absolute unity 
which prevents philosophy from achieving an absolute self-completion. Schelling's elevation of art 
to an almost God-like status means that poetic language must be purged of any equivocality if it is 
to represent an absolute form of knowledge. As early as 1800 Coleridge had offered his own advice 
in a letter to Godwin "to destroy the old antithesis of Words and 7j6iD^5...elevating, as it were, 
words into Things, and living Thmgs too" {CL: I 625-6). Language, as Coleridge mtimates, 
undergoes an organic growth which mirrors and is mirrored by the productive powers of nature. In 
this sense Coleridge can be seen to anticipate the influence of Schelling who advocated a direct 
correlation in the principles of both mind and nature. In the Biograpbia, as Hamilton points out: 
"Coleridge's language-model confusingly tries to cater for Schelling as well as Kant. If he remained 
loyal to a Kantian position he would have to say that language refers to the world, but only to the 
world as we experience it. But sometimes he states that language shows the real identity of the 
principles explaining growth in nature and progress in knowledge"*'. 
In order to vindicate his theory of the imagination as derived from Schelling, Coleridge appeals to 
his Logosopbia. He declares in chapter XII of the Biograpbia that "In the third treatise of my 
Logosopbia, announced at the end of this volume, I shall give {Deo volente [God willing]) the 
demonstrations and constructions of the dynamic philosophy scientifically arranged" {BL: I 263). 
When, in chapter XIII, Coleridge (posing as a friend) informs his reader that he will reserve his 
ideas on the imagination for his "announced treatises on the Logos or communicative intellect in 
Man and Deity", he must be intending to propose how human language might be heightened by the 
power of Imagination. The idea of language is therefore crucial in understanding Coleridge's 
definition of the primary and secondary Imagination. The failure to produce the Logosopbia has 
devestating effects for Coleridge's theory of the imagination (there is already a hint of its 
insuperable difficulties in Coleridge's parenthetical "Deo Volente"). Its absence renders 
Coleridgean theory susceptible to his own description of the dissevered body at the begirming of 
chapter XII: 
The fairest part of the most beautiful body will appear deformed and monstrous, if dissevered from its 
place in the organic whole. Nay, on delicate subjects, where a seemingly trifling difference of more or 
less may constitute a diflference in kind, even a faithful display of the main and supporting ideas, if yet 
they are sqarated from the fcxms by which they are at once clothed and modified, may perchance 
present a skeleton indeed; but a skeletc» to alarm and deter. {BL: 1233) 
Without the intended exposition of how language can imitate the divine, poetic language falls 
short of Coleridge's idealising attempts to embody the perception gained by the intuition of flie 
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primary imagination. Without the notion that language is the human equivalent of the Logos, it is 
impossible for Coleridge to argue that man can, via artistic creativity, move up the "Ascent of 
Being" towards God. The failure to incorporate the Logosopbla within the defence of the 
imagination can only highlight the fact that artistic creativity cannot recreate the divine Logos^. 
The implications for Coleridge's theory and practice of poetic language are potentially 
devastating: art can now create its own totalising alternative to the natural world which caters for a 
Fichtean solipsism that entails "an almost monkish mortification of the natural passions and 
desires"(BL: I 160). The "self-construction" of the Absolute in language may metamorphose into a 
chaotic and forceful slippage over which the imagination can wield no control. Words, as "the 
shadows of notions" {BL: I 243), ultimately distort divine truth. This is intimated in the letter from 
"a friend" which precedes Coleridge's fragmented definition of the imagination. On reading the 
missing chapter of the imagination, the friend describes the effect on his feelings: 
by supposing myself to have known only our hgbt airy modern cbapels of ease, and then for 
tbe erst time to have been placed, and left a/one, in one of our largest Gothic cathedrals in a 
gusty mocaligbt night of auturrm. "Now in glimmer, and now in gloom"; often in palpable 
darkness not without a chilly sensation of terror, then suddenly emerging into broad yet 
visionary lights with coloured shadows, of fantastic shapes yet all decked with holy insignia and 
mystic symbols; and ever said anca coming out fhll upon pictures and stcmework images of great 
men, with whose names I was familiar, but which looked upon me with countenances and an 
expression, the most dissimilar to all I bad been ia the baiat of cormecting with those names. 
Those whom Ibad bear taught to venerate as almost super-human in magnitude of intdlect, I 
found perched in little 6et-work niches, as grotesque dwar&; while the grotesques, in my 
hitherto belief, stood guarding the high alter with all the characters of Apotheosis. In short, what 
1 had supposed substances were thinned away into shadows, while everywhere shadows were 
deepened into substances. (BL: 1301) 
The moment dramatises a confrontation between self and other where the analogy of the 
imagination is drastically transformed from a "light airy modem chapel", into a foreboding Gothic 
cathedral. In spite of the "palpable darkness" which engulfs the setting, "visionaty lights" emerge, 
peopling the cathedral with grotesque images who have usinped the seat of reason. As the 
imagination degenerates into riotous intermingling of saints and ogres, it transforms its shadowy 
terrors into substances and dissolves its pillars of reason into shadows. The friend advises a 
censorship of the definition of the imagination because he interprets its agency as a candle burning 
at both ends, where poetic enlightenment ultimately amounts to spiritual darkness. 
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IV 
Coleridge's frequent ruminations on a symbolic language which represents the internal forms of 
organisation behind nature, have led many commentators to accept Coleridge's poetic practice in 
the terms set out in his theories. M.H. Abrams, for example, discusses Coleridge's poetic strategy 
as a synthesis of mind and nature where "nature is made thought and thought nature both by their 
sustained interaction and seamless metaphorical continuity"^ ^  Earl Wasserman, similarly, cites 
Coleridge as the reconciler of "the phenomenal worid of understanding with the noumenal world of 
reason"^ "^ . However, as de Man argues, the claim for a reconciliation of self and other in Coleridge 
is based on the assertion of "affinity" or "sympathy", terms which only "apply to the relationships 
between subjects rather than to relationships between a subject and an object"^ .^ De Man argues 
that "the dialectic between subject and object does not designate the main romantic experience, but 
only one passing moment in a dialectic, and a negative moment at that, since it represents a 
temptation that has to be overcome"^". According to de Man this dialectic "originates...in the 
assumed predominance of the symbol as the outstanding characteristic of romantic diction"^ .^ The 
romantic symbol is understood as a "seductive" illusion because it deni^ the "truth" of the 
subject's relationship to nature and its own "destiny"^. That truth lies in an "authentically temporal 
predicament"^ ^ that is the domain of allegory and irony: the two faces of the same fundamental 
experience of time. What de Man terms "allegorical" language thus supplants symbolic language 
within the romantic text because it forces an identification, not between the subject and the object, 
but between the subject and its own temporal condition: 
Whereas the symbol postiilates tiie possibility of an identity or identification, allegory designates 
primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to 
coincide, it establishes its language in the void of tiiis temporal difference^*. 
De Man's study on the allegorical nature of language is particularly relevant to a poet like 
Coleridge where poetic language, as I will argue, often substitutes for the repressed desires of a 
temporal self. Indeed in 'Dejection: an Ode' (1802), perhaps his last significant poem, Coleridge 
confesses to the poetic imagination's inability to present the organic imity of his ideals. In a 
particulariy revealing stanza the speaker laments the interruption of imcontaminated vision by the 
basic ur^ gencies of the temporal, self-gratifying nature of human existence: 
But oh! each visitation 
Suspends what nature gave me at my birth. 
My shaping spirit of Imagination. 
For not to think of what I needs must feel. 
But to be still and patient, all I can; 
And haply by abstruse research to steal 
From my own nature all the natural man-
This was my sole resource, my only plan: 
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Till that which suits a part infects the whole. 
And now is almost grown the habit of my soul. (84-93) 
The lines affirm Coleridge's ceaseless failure to present his oi^ ganic ideals in a completed form. 
Indeed the moment of interruption is so severe that Coleridge's later conception of the symbol as a 
part which reflects an organic totality, is disfigured here to the extent that it has become an 
allegorical shadow which substitutes for tiie speaker's subjugation to putative disease. This sense 
of overwhelming darkness that wholly encompasses the speaker is an intrinsic element of 
Coleridgean poetic practice. In the following survey I will suggest that Coleridge's later theories 
attempt to disguise this imaginative ambivalence. I shall read the eariier poems in tiie light of his 
imitation/copy distinction, the 1816 fragment poems in the terms of the imagination/fancy 
distinction, and the 'Ancient Mariner' in the terms of its own gloss. Particulariy in the final case the 
theory can almost be regarded as a therapeutic palliative which tries to sanitise the imagination's 
inherent attraction to power. The imagination, which is initially embraced by Coleridge as a 
glorious affirmation of freedom and unity, becomes a torment which must be concealed to protect 
of the poet's own moral safety. 
29 
I 
POEMS O F FANCY 
It addresses itself entirely to tbe imaginative &ciilty; and although the illusion may be 
assisted by the effect on the senses of the complicated sceneiy and decoiadons of modern times, yet 
this sort of assistance is dangerous. For tbe principal and only genuine excitement ougbt to come from 
witbin,-from the moved and sympathetic imaginatioo; ^ t^ereas, where so much is addressed to the 
more external senses of seeing and hearing, the spiritual vision is apt to languish, and the ^traction 
from -without will withdraw the mind from the proper and only legitimate interest which is intended to 
spring from within. (Letts 1808-19: II 268-9) 
]n his lectures on Shakespeare of 1818-19 Coleridge offers his poetic theoiy that art ought 
to represent an imaginative transformation of reality. Because a play (or indeed a poem) ought to be 
addressed to the imagination, Coleridge opposes certain aspects of the theatre of his time which 
attempt to create an illusion of reality on the stage via various props or devices. Such an attitude 
towards dramatic representation encourages a passive act of perception that stimulates the senses, 
producing a mere transcription, or copy, of reality. 
This argument of course has its origins in the controversies that dominated eighteenth century 
aesthetics where, as Wheeler acknowledges, "artifice was set up against inspiration, conscious 
against unconscious, and the mechanical against the organic"^ The influence on Coleridge's own 
philosophical development is evident in his revision of the old maxim that poetry is merely a copy 
of nature. The imagination, as he perceives it, both transforms and essentialises objects with the 
effect that the senses are spiritualised. In this respect Coleridge proposes a new distinction in 
terminology, namely the distinction between an "imitation" and a "copy". An imitation, as he 
defines it, is the genuine product of imagination which uncovers the internal principles of creation. 
Here the image works in service of the idea. A copy, on the other hand, is merely a reflection of 
external objects. The image is now taken as self-essential and can lead to a degeneration of art in 
its emphasis on sense-impression. It is the task of the imagination to reconcile the dichotomy 
between the senses and the mind. Wheeler sees this as being triumphantly realised in the 
Biographia definition of the imagination: "imagination is a 'self-circling energy* capable of 
converting elements of a 'series into a whole'; it encircles the senses in the reason and vice versa, 
and transforms reason's series into a sensuous whole" .^ However, division is embedded within 
Coleridge's very own definitions as a prerequisite to the proper functioning of the imaginative 
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faculty. These distinctions, as I have already suggested in the introduction, attempt to mask a 
doubleness naturally intrinsic to the poetic imagination in practice. This is made evident in the 
early poems which, propounding the theory of the "one life" as their theme, actually cater for the 
repressed agency of what would later be termed a copy or the fancy. Once again, Coleridge's theory 
seems to be a denial of aspects of his poetic practice. 
The theory behind the notion of imitation proposes a rejection of the standpoint of associationism 
which believed that the higher arts had their origins in the senses. Instead of merely perceiving a 
landscape via the senses, and then copying the empirical data before his eyes, the poet must record 
his response or emotion towards that landscape thereby discovering the creative principles of 
organisation behind natural beauties. The earliest formation occurs in the Notebook entries of 
October-December 1804: 
Hard to express that sense of the analogy of likeness of a Thing which enaUes a Symbol to 
rq>Tesent it, so that we think of the Thing itself-& yet knowing that the Thing is not presented to us.-
Soidy, on this universal fact of words & images depends by more or less mediations the imitatioa 
instead of copy which is illustrated in veiy nature sbakespeaiiaiuzed-\b3X Proteus Essence that could 
assume the very form, but yet known & felt not to be the Thing by tbat difference of the Substance 
wliich made every atom of the Form another thing-that likeness not identity-an exact web, every line of 
direction miraculously the same, but the one worsted, the other silk. (CA^ II 2274) 
That Coleridge's emotions or feelings were informed by his own senses, however, is 
made explicit in his own practical examination of the self during the period of his love for Sara 
Hutchinson and this may provide a useful insight into Coleridge's practice in the eariy poems. D.S 
Miall's survey of the nature of feelings in respect to this area of Coleridge's experience, reveals 
first, how bodily processes participate in the processes of the mind, and secondly, how their 
repression leads to an intense, unhealthy solipsism: 
This was the domain in which Coleridge mainly explored (at great cost to himself) extreme 
states of feeling. It came to seem that not only the definition of the self, but its veiy survival, depended 
on understanding the nature of the feelings that beset him. But it is here that the unconscious 
component of feelings, their many hidden connecticHis with thought and bodily processes, their 
indeterminacy, place an insuperable barrier in the way of full understanding .^ 
In the notes of 1810, Coleridge speculates how the self is vulnerable to powerful feelings 
that seem to link all thoughts: 
My love of [Asra] is not so much in my Soul, as my Soul in it. It is my whole Being wrapt 
up into one Desire, all the Hopes & Fears, Joys & Sorrows, all the Powers, V g^or & Faculties of my 
Spirit abridged into <one> peipetual Inclination. To bid me not love you were to bid me annihilate 
myself-for to love you is all I know of my Life, as far as my Life is an object of my Consciousness or 
my liree Will (OV: ffl 3996) 
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Here Coleridge relates his love in the terms of his aitire mental constitution: it is the 
"Spirit" that leads the "Inclination" towards the act of love and the "annihilation" of the self is 
conceived mentally as the destruction of his own "Consciousness". In another note Coleridge, 
however, emphasises that the communication of love is expressed powerfully through physical 
contact: "all that is characteristic of his Nature as Man, is seated in the incommunicable part of his 
Being, of which we know that it is not his Body, nor of it; tho' it may well be, that his body is of it" 
{CN: III 3962). The body here is recognised as a form of communication through which he can 
consummate his love for Sara and yet, in the face of unfulfilment, the body becomes the utmost 
symbol of failed communication. The "perpetual inclination" of the first note is thus linked to an 
unremitting physical desire and its repression, as Miall notes, "of the self in love turns love into a 
kind of prison, in which the self is threatened by auto-destmction'"* 
myself is therefore only not a feeling for reckless Despair, because she is its object / Self in 
me derives its sense of Being from having this one absolute Object, including all others that but for it 
would be thoughts, notions, irrelevant fancies-yea, my own Self would be-utteiiy deprived of all 
connection with her-only more than a thought, because it would be a Burthen-a haunting of the 
daemon, Suicide. (CM II 3148) 
The self of this note is a physical one who, without the object of his love, would become 
mentally imprisoned by the "hauntings" of unconsummated sexuality. Self-annihilation is now only 
recognisable in the act of physical destruction. This disturtring pathological intention effectively 
emphasises the inherent dangers of repressed bodily feeling which can overwhelm and torture the 
psyche. 
Coleridge's early poetry reveals similar tensions and anxieties which manifests itself as a dialectic 
within the texts between the desire to arrive at universal tniths, together with an intimate and 
subtextual psychological detail that renders these truths open to alternative interpretations. In 
attempting to expound a universal philosophy of the internal principles of nature, the poems 
actually uncover a subtext of repressed sensuality so that Ihey withdraw into psychological self-
examinations. In Trost at Midnight* the lonely speaker is left to contemplate the "Abstruser 
musings" of his mind; 'The Dimgeon' examines the "friendless solitude" of self-contemplation; and 
'This Lime Tree Bower My Prison', as I will argue, excludes the poet from a sympathetic 
appreciation of natine. In these poems, Coleridge's idealisation of imaginative vision cannot mask 
the fact that it is primarily something that is happening to others, to Hartley in "Frost at Midnight*, 
or Lamb in 'This Lime Tree Bower My Prison' (where Coleridge's recolla:tion is made within the 
solitude of a bower, preventing him from sharing the experience of his companions). Narrative is, 
therefore, often an escape from the torments of the self rather than the self-effacing communion 
with another. The sense of personal exclusion from his theories of the "one life" is eventually 
confronted in the threnodic lines of 'Dejection: an Ode', where the speaker can only desparately 
confess his subjugation to the "tyranny of the senses": 
I see them all so excellently fair, 
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I see, not feel, how beautiful they are! (37-8) 
Although the copy/imitation distinction has yet to be formulated, I believe that a reading of the 
poems in the terms of this distinction is instttictive in revealing the manner in which the texts 
subvert their idealistic intentions and suggest how far Coleridge's later theory is a denial of some of 
the implications of his practice. Indeed, within the texts, what may be termed the faculties of fancy 
and imagination are evoked on equal terms or as working in tandem. The distinctions only come 
later and periiaps can be understood as an attempt to conceal a doubleness already intrinsic to the 
imagination. 
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Around the time of the eariy poetry Coleridge was expounding a theory of imagination as 
proposed by the philosophies of Hartley. In 1795 Coleridge was far from finding the idea of a 
mental mechanism repugnant, since it was precisely the element of determinism in Hartley's 
explanation that seemed to give an attractive final validity to the psychological proof of 
Christianity from human nature. In the Lectures on Revealed Religion (1795) Coleridge adopts a 
necessitarian line of argument in which the individual may be regarded as a sort of refinery in 
which the highest spirituality is being mechanically distilled out of sense. To use an example, 
physical pain, as Coleridge suggests, thus activates the innate ideas, or imagination to perform a 
progressive, moral function: 
The Teeth sometimes ake, but surely that we may eat not that they may ache is Ae great and 
evidently designed end of Teeth. This aching does it not proceed from uncleanliness or scorbutic 
Diseases? Are not these immediately or remotely the Effect of Moral Evil? But the greatest possible 
Evil is Moral Evil. Those Pains therefore that rouse us to the removal of it become Good. So we shall 
find through all Nature that Pain is intended as a stimulus to Man in order that he may remove moral 
Evil. (Lects 1795: 106) 
Here the self-conscious will is subjected to the mechanical framework of a universe 
governed by "design": "Is the Paia the designed or the accidental Effect of our organisation?" 
(Lects 1795: 106) The danger of such an argument is that the relegation of evil to the margins and 
the subtexts only serves to resurrect it, often most violently, dsewhere. Lockridge correctiy points 
out that "Ironically, Hartley's optimistic psychology derives from Locke's chapter, "Of the 
Association of Ideas", in the fourth edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in 
which association is the unnatural, idiosyncratic connection of ideas occasioned by "chance or 
custom", often manifested in unreasonable (we might say neurotic) antipathies dating from 
accidental associations in our youth"^. Such repressions have serious consequences for Coleridge's 
system of natural language which struggles to unify this sort of fragmentation. 
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This becomes evident in the major philosophical poem 'Religious Musings' (1794-6) where 
Coleridge attempts to conjoin a theoretical notion of the imagination with a vision of millenial 
ephiphany. Coleridge's millennium philosophy was acquired via a number of sources (Hartley, 
Priestley, Newton), but the prose tracts of Milton also appear to be a dominant influence on the 
young poet, and he filled the Gutch memorandum notebook with references to the likes of 
Areopagidca, Of Reformation, Animadversions, and Tbe History of Britain. Coleridge, perhaps, 
envisaged the philosophy of the millennium as being compatible with his ideal of Pantisocracy, 
writing to Southey in August 1795 that the scheme of the latter might be realised in "a miraculous 
Millennium" (CL: I 158). It is also valuable to make a distinction, as Kitson does, between the 
major area of dispute among millennium theologians which centred around whether the second 
coming of Christ would precede or follow the event of the millennium: 
Those who believed it would precede the millennium, 1 shall designate "millenatians", those 
expecting the sudden, violent establishment of the millennium by divine cataclysmic action. Those 
who believed that the second coming would follow the millennium, I shall designate "millennialists", 
those expecting the mill«uiium to be realised gradually and, periiaps, internally by the progressive 
application of Christian values^. 
Coleridge in 'Religious Musings' is cleariy a 'millenarian', assimilating the French Revolution with 
the apocalypse, and expecting the millennium to be realised in its aftermath. Like his epic 
predecessor Milton during the Puritan insurrection, Coleridge believed he was at the point in 
history where a millennium appeared imminent. The standpoint is informative in relation to 
Coleridge's poetic practice: the millennium aspect within the poem is considered in the terms of the 
violent, self-consuming imagery of apocalypse which is a necessary prerequisite to the 
emancipation of the nations. However, as Coleridge's confidence in the latter process waned, so did 
the millenarian element, until the apocalyptic alone remained. Without their fulfilling millennial 
antithesis, apocalyptic discourse and imagery threaten to become grotesque. This process of 
bedevilment is a strong characteristic of the poem: the narrative of 'Religious Musings' barely 
manages to contain the apocalyptic visions before the end of the poem. 
In "Religious Musings' the poet undertakes the burdensome task of incorporatijig the entire span of 
world events within his millennial vision. In this sense the poem is a Unitarian version of Paradise 
Lost. The aim of Milton's epic was to "justify the ways of God to men" by explaining the origin of 
evil and demonstrating its eventual sublimation in a greater good. Coleridge too in his poem assays 
to justify the presence of evil by regarding it as an opposition which must be overcome in order to 
herald the arrival of the millennium. The agency via which Coleridge hopes to dismantie the 
presence of evil and bring his poem to a millenarian conclusion is the imagination. In this respect 
he was influenced by Hartley who proposed that evil was intrinsically man-made. Hartley's 
philosophy propounded that there was no evidence in the design of the universe of the existence of 
evil, rather it was embedded in sensuous requirements of man. However, via the arts, man can 
elevate himself away from the false perceptions of a sensate consciousness towards an 
understanding of the unity of the creation. This is made explicitiy clear in lines 201-12: 
34 
But soon Imagination conjured up 
An host of new desires: with busy aim. 
Each for himself, Earth's eager children toiled. 
So Property began, twy-streaming fount. 
Whence Vice and Virtiw flow, honey and gall. 
Hence the soft couch, and many-coloured robe. 
The timbrel, and arched dome and costly feast. 
With all the inventive arts, that nursed the soul 
To forms of beauty, and by sensual wants 
Unsensualised the mind, which in the means 
Learnt to forget the grossness of the end. 
Best pleasured with its own activity. 
Evfl is envisaged as a necessary means to a worthwhile end because it eventually gives way to a 
superior knowledge. But according to the tenets of associationism, the imagination cannot 
transcend the senses in any ultimate way because its agency is derived from a continual refining of 
the senses (a theory Coleridge would later reject). In its usage here imagination is thus coterminous 
with the later definition of the fancy. Coleridge's solution to the problem of evil is, as a result, 
problematic because, although evil is presented as an entity which can be overcome, it still remains 
an opposition which appears to be embedded within the very faculty of imagination itself. 
The passage has its counter-part in 'The Destiny of Nations' where what is termed as the 
imagination in 'Religious Musings', is now referred to as the fancy (the terms appear to be 
synonymous at the time): 
He marks the streamy banners of the North, 
Thinking himself those happy spirits shall join 
Who there in floating robes of rosy light 
Dance sportively. For Fancy is the power 
That first unsensualises the dark mind. 
Giving it new delights; and bids it swell 
With wild activity; and peopling air. 
By obscure fears of Beings invisible, 
Emancipates it from the grosser thrall 
Of the present impulse, (77-86) 
McGann argues that "the 'Wild phantasies' of Greenland's epic lore are full of deep import. Not 
only is such primitive lore symbolic; it illustrates the developing historical operation of the One 
Life"^. But the lines, on the contrary, aptly disclose the ambivalent nature of the imagination. The 
"unsensualising" of the mind is almost immediately countered by the provocation of a "wild 
activity" which, as lines 38-40 inform us, opposes the creative process of God whose **naked mass" 
"Acts only by its inactivity". 
The relationship between the apocalypse and the millennium via the agency of the imagination 
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thus proves to be a tense and hostile one, with the evil elements always threatening to ovemm the 
ideological structure of the poem. This is reflected in the language of 'Religious Musings' which 
often appears forced, stilled and repetitive when describing the nature of the "one omnipresent 
MindyOmnific" (105-6), and yet releases a more spontaneous energy in the images of destnjction 
and carnage which accompany the apocalyptic visions. An example occurs in lines 94-126 where 
the speaker begins by identifying a shepherd who, through a process of associationist principles, is 
transformed into a "young angel": 
As when a shepherd on a vernal mom 
Through some thick fog creeps timorous with slow foot. 
Darkling he fixes on the immediate road 
His downward eye: all else of fairest kind 
Hid or deformed. But lo! the bursting Siml 
He from his small particular orbit flies 
With blest outstartingl From himself he flies. 
Stands in the sun, and with no partial gaze 
Views all creation; and he loves it all, 
And blesses it, and calls it very good! (94-113) 
Self-interested or sensuous perception is transmuted into an ability to perceive the unity of God's 
creative process so that the individual partakes of the essence of the "one omnipresent Mind" (105). 
And yet the rhythm of the verse refuses to corroborate this process: the language is repetitive and 
laboured, and meaning is obscured by clmnsy construction. However, when this vision suddenly 
dissolves into the chaos of postlapsarian destruction, the stilted diction gives way to a linguistic 
involvement with power, enforced by expressive alliterations and energetic rhythm: "and, 
behold!/A sea of blood bestrewed with wrecks, where mad/Embattling Interests on each other 
lushAVith unhelmed rage!" (123-6), The passage enacts a mini fall as language seductively 
involves the speaker in a libidinous and impassioned release. The imagination's complicity in such 
a process recalls Burke's anti-idealistic notion of the sublime as an irrational, passionate entity, 
devoid of the purpose of truth, 
Coleridge's divine speculations accordingly emit a sense of personal exclusion: he finds it easier 
to believe that such harmony exists than to feel himself part of it. In lines 126-8 the speaker 
declares: "Tis the sublime of manJOur noontide Majesty, to know ourselves/Parts and proportions 
of one wondrous whole". And in case anybody gets it wrong he adds: "But 'tis God/Diffused 
through all, that doth make all one whole" (130-1). This strenuous willing to propose a divine 
philosophy which unifies the self with the creator is undercut almost immediately when the speaker 
digresses onto the subject of superstition, Coleridge's notion of a "natural language" is ironically 
fulfilled only in passages associated with violence and powen poetic diction suddenly picks up, 
becoming wholly intimate with its subject-matter 
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I will raise up a mourning, O ye Fiendsl 
And curse your spells, that film the eye of Faith, 
Hiding the present God; whose presence lost, 
The moral worid's cohesion, we become 
An Anarchy of Spirits! Toy bewitched. 
Made blind by lusts, disherited of soul. 
No common centre Man, no common sire 
Knowetii. (142-9) 
Language here is substituting true imagination for a debased, self-interested version which 
subversively asserts a corrupting passion in the guise of a religious fervour. The passage thus 
becomes an affirmation of the very vices it outwardly contests, and this is emphasised in the 
following lines: 
A sordid solitary thing, 
Mid countless brethren with a lonely heart 
Through courts and cities the smooth savage roams 
Feeling himself, his own low self the whole; 
When he by sacred sympathy might make 
The whole one Self! Self, that no alien knows! (149-54) 
The "sordid solitary" and "smooth savage" are elevated to an aesthetic eminence in the 
aggrandising alliteration, influencing the authorial voice to follow suit "sacred sympathy" and 
thereby weakening its impact-"might make". The "whole one self is therefore irrevocably 
damaged and the ambiguity is heightened by its emphatic prominence at the beginning of each 
sentence as if it were indulging in a megalomanic assertion: "Self, far diffused as Fancy's wing can 
travel!/Self, spreading still!" (155-6). 
'Religious Musings' fails adequately to control the eschatological element of a Christian 
millennium within its relative schema. The intrinsic doubleness of the imagination, whereby it can 
so effectively cater for the cataclysmic turmoil of the apocalypse, confirms its dubious attraction to 
images of power and destruction. Such ambivalence diminishes the possibility of a milleimial 
golden age because the threat of reinfection is always imminent. As the speaker embarks upon the 
visions of the apocalypse he fears for the narrative collapse into the mire of unstable and 
oppressive images: "and pale Fear/Haunted by ghastlier shapings than surround/Moon-blasted 
Madness when he yells at midnightl/Retum pure Faith! return meek P i ^ l " (336-9). The 
interjections suggest a sense of participation in the unnatural occurrences. But when the speaker 
comes to describe the glory of the millennium, he can only offer a tenuous vision of the future that 
serves to emphasise his non-participance in the present: "And such delights, such strange 
beatitudes/Seize on my young anticipating heart/When that blest future rushes on my view!" (355-
7). 
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If 'Religious Musings' gives the reader a hint of the profound torture that characterises the 
imagination of the later supernatural poems, the effusions can be related to the workings of fancy in 
its sexual and mischievous sense. In these poems Coleridge's ruminations on the "one life" are 
often undermined by an errant playfulness. As a result the speaker of these poems can rarely 
respond to the inner spirit of nature and they often emit a sense of personal exclusion. Accordingly, 
as Conrad emphasises: 
Coleridge describes nature with a (tetail and subtlety missing in Wordswoith-tbe tangled 
underwood in The Nightingale', the weeds and matted thorns in The Picture', the four seasons in 'Frost 
at Midnighf-but he does so because he can only see, not feel it. In This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison', 
entrapped within his frail self, he does not even see the landscape which his friends traverse, bat must 
imagine it. 'My eyes make pictures, when they are shut, as he puts it in 'A Day Dream', and flMse 
pictures, for all their topographical acuteness, are of the mind's contents .^ 
In this way the poems might be said to threaten to become copies, rather than imitations of nature, 
allowing the fancy the "fixities and definites" with which it can sport. The dangers of such a 
perceptive process are made self evident in an article that appears in the Fiiend (1809-10) some 
years later, where the speaker attempts to explain the phenomenon of Luther's devilish apparition: 
At the coming on of Evening, it was my frequent amusement to watch the image or reflecticxi of the 
Fire, that seemed buming in tbe bushes or between the trees in different parts of the Garden or the 
Fields beyond it, according as there was more or less Light; and which still ananged itself among the 
real objects of Vision, with a distance and magnitude proportioned to its greater or less liaintness. For 
still as the darkness encreased, the Image of the Fire lessened and grew nearer and more distinct; till 
the twilight had deepened into perfect night, when all outward objects being excluded, the window 
became a perfect Looking-glass: save only that my Books on the side shelves of the Room were 
lettra^ ed, as it were, on their Backs with Stars, more or fewer as the sky was more or less clouded (the 
rays of the stars being at that time the only ones transmined). Now substitute the Phantcxn from the 
brain for the Images of leOected light (the Fire for instance) and the Forms of the room and its furniture 
for the tnaismitted rays, and you have a fair resemblance of an Apparition, and a just conception of the 
manner in which it is seen together with real objects. (.Fiiend. H I ) 
Beer emphasises the potential degeneracy behind such an act: "The superimposition of the 
interior scenery upon the garden beyond is no longer seen as a possible image for the mind's 
relationship to outward nature but is offered simply as a phenomenon of illusion to explain how 
Luther might have come to believe he saw the Devil when he was only looking at the opposite 
walls. An imagery of possible mental sublimity, in other words, is being deployed simply to 
explain delusion" .^ Indeed Coleridge's rational explanation reveals a tendency that is unleashed in 
his own poetic process: as the window becomes a "perfect Looking Glass*', it de-animates its 
surroundings, superimposing upon the lifeless images, further images and objects, so that they 
become hauntingly illusory. The copying of nature thus encourages the fanciful element of the 
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imagination to usurp its sympathetic counterpart. 
This is made evident in the two poems 'Lines on an Autumnal Evening' (1793), and "The Eolian 
Harp' (1795). Both poems are linked by their inclusion in the volume Poems on Various Subjects 
(1796). In the latter poem the area of particular interest is the lines 26-33 which first appear in the 
errata of the Sibylline Leaves (1817): 
O! the one Life within us and abroad, 
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul, 
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light. 
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance eveiy where-
These lines are usually interpreted as the major philosophical statisment of the poem which attests 
to a consubstantiality of the mind and nature. However, their omission in the previous versions of 
the text is informative in comparison to a poem like 'Lines on an Autumnal Evening' where there is 
an evident similarity in the nahire of poetic language. To offer a reading of 'The Eolian Harp' in tiie 
terms of its additional pronouncement would obscure the process of a sensuous interpretation of 
nature which is the evident characteristic of both texts, 
'Lines on an Autumnal Evening' (Effusion xxxvi in the 1796 edition) begins with an exhortation 
for "wild Fancy" to "check thy wing", but no sooner has the speaker uttered his wish, he invokes 
the help of a sorceress to complete his poem: "Aid, Lovely Sorceress! aid thy Poet's dreamlAVith 
faery wand O bid the Maid arise,/Chaste Joyance dancing in her bright-blue eyes;" (14-16) and the 
poem immediately becomes a whim of the Fancy whose influence the poet tried to halt from the 
beginning. The speaker is subsequentiy seduced by this poetic Muse who, stripping him of 
"Learning's meed", encourages a heretical, sensuous approach to poetic practice: 
As erst when from the Muses' calm abode 
1 came, with Learning's meed not unbestowed; 
When as she twin'd a laurel round my brow. 
And met my kiss, and half retum'd my vow, 
O'er all my frame shot rapid my thrill'd heart. 
And every nerve confess'd the electric dart. (17-22) 
The thrill of an erotic titillation with which the stanza breaks off, contents the speaker to adopt a 
passive contemplation of the nature presented before him. The images of the poem therefore, have 
no further significance beyond the satisfaction of desire: the flowers blush "like a bride" (11); the 
lambent radiance of light assumes a salacious energy, throbbing with "rich amber-glowing floods" 
(4). When the speaker orders the "Spirits of Love" (37) to "Obey/The powerful spell" (37-8) of the 
poem's witchery, the image of the Maid becomes an end in itself, catering for the poet's sexual 
requirements. Her bosom heaves with the anticipation of carnal fulfilment (representing, by 
implication, the speaker's similar demands); and the spirits duly oblige in seducing the Maid with 
passionate gestures: "Love lights her smile-in Joy's red nectar dips/The flamy rose, and plants it on 
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her lips" (51-2). The sensual paradise ignites the speaker with a self-related desire so that he 
"stills" the voice of moral admonition, in order to prolong the seductive notes of that "passion 
warbled song" (53). 
Nature now is presented in terms that reflect the desires of the self as the speaker, invoking tiie 
metamorphic power of Proteus, transforms himself into images of natural beauty: 
A flower-entangled Arbour I would seem 
To shield my Love from Noontide's sultry beam: 
Or bloom a Myrtle, from whose od'rous boughs 
My love might weave gay garlands for her brows. 
When Twilight stole across Uie fading vale, 
To fan my Love I'd be the Evening Gale; 
Mourn in the soft folds of her swelling vest. 
And flutter my faint pinions on her breast! 
On Seraph wing I'd float a Dream by night. 
To soothe my Love with shadows of delight:-
Or soar aloft to be the Spangled Skies, 
And gaze upon her with a thousand eyes! (59-70) 
The seemingly unselfish guises belie a self-interested design of voyeurism. This is manifested 
explicitiy in the final line where the senses are multiplied in order to heighten their intoxification. 
Coleridge, later embarrassed by the nature of these lines, adds a lengtiiy footnote in which he 
endeavours, to an excessive extent, to discredit his own composition: 
I entreat the Public's pardon for having carelessly suffered to be printed such intolerable stuff 
as this and the thirteen fc^awing lines. They have not the merit even of caiginality: as every thought is 
to be found in the Greek Epigrams. The lines in this poem from the 27th to the 36th, I have been told 
are a palp^e imitation of the passage from the 355th to the 370th line of the Pleasures of Memory 
Parts. 
The apologetic words, which even include a charge of unconscious plagiarism, smack of 
the alibis and excuses that accompany the prefaces and glosses of later poetry and may be 
understood as an attempt to disburden himself of his heretical muse. 
The text too continually plays down the witchery it has encouraged: the haunts which have 
provoked such sensual indulgence are described as places "where Virtue still is gay;AVhere 
Friendship's fix'd star sheds a mellow'd ray" (87-8); Memory's ceaseless glutting on "the lambent 
flame of joy!" (94) is euphemistically underscored as a "Vestal's chaste employ** (93). But nature's 
enslavement to fancy in the performative or playful sense manifests itself when the scenes melt like 
ghosfly apparitions: 
No more your sky-larks melting from the sight 
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Shall thrill the athmed heart-string with delight-
No more shall deck your pensive Pleasures sweet 
With wreaths of sober hue my evening seat. 
Yet dear to Fancy's eye your varied scene 
Of wood, hill, dale, and spariding brook between! (93-98) 
Of course "Fancy" here does not yet have the perjorative sense of Coleridge's later theory, yet such 
a sense would not be inapt. When the imagined landscapes disappear so that the poet cannot see 
them any more, he laments in a desperate final stanza as his senses ache for further involvement: 
"Scenes of my Hope! The aching eye ye leave/ Like yon bright hues that paint the clouds of eve!" 
(101-2). Bereft of his phantom-like visions, the poem finally descends into remorseless darkness, 
attesting to the fact that the scenes, in the terms of Coleridge's later distinctions, were a form of a 
degenerate copy. 
The imagery of 'Lines of an Autumnal Evening' reappears strongly in the 'Eolian Harp' (Effusion 
XXXV in the 1796 edition) and again the language of the poem draws attention to its own status as 
an artificial construct. This becomes evident immediately in lines 1-5: 
My pensive Sara! thy soft cheek reclined 
Thus on mine arm, most soothing sweet it is 
To sit beside our Cot, our Cot o'ergrown 
With white-flower'd Jasmin, and the broad-leav'd Myrtie, 
(Meet emblems they of Innocence and Love !) 
The symbolic significance of the natural objects Jasmin and Myrtle is undercut by the inclusion of 
the parenthesis which has the effect of excluding the moral qualities they impart by bracketing 
them from the main body of the text. The impact of the Jasmin and the Myrtle, which would unite 
reason and experience and thus vouch for a consubstantiality of mind and nature, is diminished 
because it is now realised as a linguistic "emblem" or trope. This only reinforces the view that the 
displacement of a symbolic language occurs at the precise moments where the unity of part and 
whole are most needed. The following emblem of the evening star - "and mark the star of 
eve/Serenely brilliant (such should Wisdom be)/Shine opposite!" (7-9) similarly conspires to 
transform the natural landscape into an artifical literary trope. Commonly associated with erotic 
and generative love, the evening star functions as an emblem of wisdom only by a parenthetical 
denial of the erotic and an affirmation of purity and innocence^°. 
The repression of sensual love within the parenthesis ultimately only serves to displace it 
explicitly to the following stanza. The lute's corruption from natural object into aesthetic instrument 
imbues it with an erotic power which caresses the ear, as a lover seduces his sweetheart: 
How by the desultory breeze caress'd, 
Like some coy maid half yielding to her lover, 
It pours such sweet upbraiding, as must needs 
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Tempt to repeat the wrong! And now, its strings 
Boldlier swept, the long sequacious notes 
Over delicious surges sink and rise. 
Such a soft floating witchery of sound 
As twilight Elfins make, when they at eve 
Voyage on gentie gales from Fairy-Land, 
Where Melodies round honey-dropping flowers, 
Footiess and wild, like birds of Paradise, 
Nor pause, nor perch, hovering on untam'd wing! (14-25) 
The passage performs a mimesis of the sexual act, prolonging its "long sequacious notes'* with 
erotic adjectives which counterpoise their natural objects: the **surges" of sound "sink and rise" 
deliciously; the "honey dropping flowers" become "footless and wild"; and the birds of paradise are 
"untam'd" and irreverent with a resflessness akin to the agency of the fancy. The later insertion of 
the one life theory thus appears hopelessly out of place, and its inclusion ironically conspires with 
the erotic nature of the verse that precedes it: the interjection "O!**, in its sequestered position at the 
beginning of the line, provides the text with a seminal release from the delicious rhythm of 
language. 
The theme of 'The Eolian Harp* is often interpreted as Coleridge's vision of 'all of animated nature' 
as "organic Harps" played upon by "one intellectual breeze^At once the Soul of each, and God of 
all" (47-8). But the story of the poem can alternatively be read as a dramatic confession of a man 
who allows himself to indulge in "idle flitting phantasies", "shapings of the unregenerate mind" 
amounting to heresy. Like 'Lines on an Autumnal Evening', the invoked "witchery" produces a 
copy rather than an imitation of nature. The use of Sara as an ideological reminder who reproaches 
the poet for his "indolent and passive brain" (41) (a charge that confirms the agency of fancy within 
the poem), further emphasises the instability of the speaker's "one life" vision. Sara's role as 
spiritual guide, "Meek Daughter in the family of (Uirist" (53), merely substitutes her sensual appeal 
(which inspires the erotic context of the poem), for an austere Clhristian abstinence. The 
conjunction is uneasy and inappropriate, wholly diminishing the humble conclusion: 
For never guiltless may I speak of him. 
The Incomprehensible! save when with awe 
I praise him, and with Faith that inly feels; 
Who with his saving mercies healed me, 
A sinful and most miserable man, 
Wilder'd and dark, and gave me to possess 
Peace, and this Cot, and thee, heart-honour'd Maid! (58-64) 
The "Faith that inly feels^' (analagous to what will later be termed an imitation) has already been 
undermined by the dominance of external sense perception (a copy), relating the poet to the atheist 
of the footnote, whom Coleridge charitably empathises with, and yet simultaneously distances 
himself from: 
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L'athee n'est point a mes yeux un faux esprit; je pais vivre avec lui aussi bien et mieux 
qu'avec le devot, car il raisonne davantage, mais U lui manque un sens, et mon ame ne se fond point 
enti^ronent avec la sienne: il est froid au spectacle le plus ravissant, et il cherche un syllogisme lorsque 
je rends une acticxi de grace. 
The poem, of course indulges in a similar casuistry, allowing the speaker to ease the threat 
of his idle fantasies with an image of spiritual reproof (Sara) that has inspired the "witchery" in the 
first place. But even this tenuous conciliation is damaged by the seductive nature of the text: Sara's 
"serious eye" only offers a "mild" (49), half-hearted reproach, further incensing the speaker with 
playful denial: "nor such thoughts/Dim and unhallow'd dost thou not reject,/And biddest me walk 
humbly with my God" (50-2). Coleridge is using "Sara" as a scapegoat for the inherent figurality of 
his vision, assimilating her with the seditious Eve. Such indecisiveness at once ensures the moral 
corruption of speaker, Sara, and poem. 
IV 
The sensuous rendition of nature encourages a solipsism that manifests itself more fully in the so 
called conversation poems. 'Lines on an Autumnal Evening' concludes with the speaker's fall into a 
lonely darkness, and the "shapings of the unregenerate mind" in 'The Eolian Harp' confirm the 
speaker as the "sinful and most miserable man,AVilder'd and dark" that he attempts to distance 
himself from. Within poems such as 'Frost at Midnight' 'This lime-Tree Bower my Prison', and 
'The Nightingale', conversation is actually replaced by monologue encouraging a confrontation 
with the speaker's own psyche. The texts accordingly finally offer no realised communion with 
another, and the process of their potentially megalomanic narratives, as I hope to demonstrate, is at 
odds with the idealistic readings that have characterised critics responses to them. From start to 
finish the conversation poem is an allegorical disruption of the pursuit of knowledge trapped within 
the cogito; the desired reciprocity of man and nature, self and other, turns out to be a chimera, an 
escape that confirms the fact of its own imprisonment. 
Traditional readings of 'This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison'(1797), emphasise how the speaker's 
dejection becomes a catalyst for creativity so that the bower, transformed by the power of. 
imagination, is no longer a prison but the catalyst for an intimate relationship with God's nature 
beyond its confines. This view is fortified by a deliberate riietorical construction within the poem 
which attempts to establish a reader/author relationship whereby conversation is used as a means to 
project beyond the boundaries of the poem by asking the reader to enact imagination in experience 
and so, through sympathy with the narrator, release him from the bower which entraps him. Within 
the poem itself this model of reading is r^)eated through the relationship between Coleridge and 
Lamb, the former acting as the sympathetic interpreter of the latter. The very act of communion, or 
shared experience, is therefore essential in the riietorical construction of the poem if it is to succeed 
in reversing the parodox that the title of the poem suggests. However, as I intend to argue, this 
complex construction of vision is undermined by the lack of any real communion between 
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Coleridge and Lamb within the material essence of the text. When Lamb is addressed within the 
poem (twice in line 28 and 68), it is via grandiose rhetorical apostrophe as if the speaker has 
forgotten the subject of his poem and is re-introducing Lamb to his equally forgotten audience. 
Without Lamb's presence within the main body of the text to act as the agent of nature's divine 
presence, the act of communion and sharing of imaginative experience is destroyed. As a result, an 
alternative and powerful reading of the poem emerges from the margins which figuratively re-
orders God's landscape in accordance with the speaker's own solitary mind. 
The pictoral accuracy of language and the topographical exactness of natural description 
corroborates with such a reading because it brings attention to the fact that the external element of 
nature is being evoked rather than its inherent spirituality. Stillinger points out that: "One could 
easily draw (or mentally re-create) a picture of Coleridge's dell, giving a proper angle to the sides, 
adding the branchless ash tree in front of the waterfall, and sketching in the trembling leaves, the 
long lank weeds, and the blue clay stone. Coleridge*s syntax is a little awkward, but the images are 
concrete, highly detailed, and presented in clear relationships to one another*'However, 
Stillinger misses the point when he continues to draw an analogy between this precise landscape 
with the "ubiquity of beauty and God's presence in nature"^ .^ It is precisely the exactness of 
description and accuracy of detail that ultimately confirms the poem to be a "copy" of nature, 
which constructs its vision through trope and metaphor. The language of the poem can thus be seen 
to reflect the design of its construction whereby the act of conversation is reliant upon an artificial 
relationship between author and reader. In both cases the contrivance is susceptible to a breakdown 
where the speaker is left alone to confront his own solipsism. 
A sense of isolation manifests itself immediately in the opening line of the poem where the 
announcement of the departure of others is balanced with the introduction of tiie solitary I , creating 
an almost insuperable barrier "WELL, they are gone, and here must I remain". The beauties which 
are recorded as lost are thus refigured by the speaker's own imagination which substitutes true 
nature for its own subtie yet finally distorted interpretation. As Coleridge's absent friends enjoy a 
wholesome communion with the natural world in their own constitutional, they are led into a 
Spenserian wood of error in Coleridge's text: as they traverse "The roaring dell, o'erwooded, 
narrow, deep" (10), they metaphorically enter into the dark, labyrinthine psyche of the speaker. 
Images of adumbration begin to manifest themselves: the dell becomes "only speckled by the mid 
day sun" (11); "that branchless ash" remains "Unsunn'd and damp" (13-14); and the hues of 
verdant scenery assume a shadowy and overgrown perspective in "the dark green file of long lank 
weeds" (17). The "long lank weeds" are a "most fantastic sigiht!" because they are the creation of 
the speaker's own fantasy which attest to his powers of almost God-like creation. In the post-coital 
aftermath of his self-contained vision, he tries to ground his imagined landscape in fact by 
ascribing to his vegetation an authorial classification in a footnote: " The Aspleniiua Scolopendiium 
called in some countries the Adder's Tongue, in others the Hart's Tongue, but Withering gives the 
Adder's Tongue the trivial name of the Ophioglossum only". However, as so often in Coleridge, the 
addendum, instead of verifying the speaker's claims, reveals his complicity in the act of false 
creation: by assimilating the weeds with Asplenium Scolopendrium through the proverbial name of 
Adder's Tongue he emphasises, in the words of Conrad, "their devilishness... they are nests for the 
serpent which always in Coleridge betokens the imagination's attraction to a forbidden 
knowledge)"i3 
The poem now may be read as a fantasy of the power of one's own imagination as the poet 
invokes "ye clouds" to *'richlier bum" (35) and "thou blue Ocean*' to "kindle" (37). This diminishes 
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the impact of the Berkeleyan reading of nature as the symbolic language of God because it implies 
that the imagination has the power of divine fiat. In other words, the speaker can be seen artificially 
to ascribe the imagined scenes to the agency of God as a sort of underwriting of the personal 
imagination: 
yea, gazing round 
On the wide landscape, gaze till all doth seem 
Less gross than bodily; and of such hues 
As veil the Almighty Spirit, when yet he makes 
Spirits perceive his presence. (39-43) 
The poet is sequestered from this vision and, in spite of his exhortation-"and I am glad/As I myself 
were there!" (44-5)-he remains imprisoned within his own uneasy consciousness that is now 
represented by the bower. In his total seclusion nature becomes unnaturally silent: "the batAVheels 
silent by"(56-7), and 'not a swallow titters"(57). Even the bower, described in its minute detail, can 
almost be dismissed as an ephemeral Coleridgean fantasy: the foliage hangs 'transparent'ly (47); 
and a "deep radiance" (52) "usurps" (53) tiie substantiality of the "fronting elms" (54) with an 
adumbration of "blackest mass". 
The poem's conclusion attempts to re-establish the conversational element by suggesting that "My 
gentle-hearted Charles!'"s (68) current sympatiiy with nature's beauties can at least induce us to 
contemplate "With lively joy the joys we cannot share". But even this is diminished by recourse to 
the earlier description of Lamb which is explicitly autobiographical, recalling a similar moment 
where the poet describes himself in lines 51-3 'Frost at Midnight': 
My gentle-hearted Charles! for thou hast pined 
And hunger'd after Nature, many a year, 
In tiie great City pent, winning thy way 
With sad yet patient soul, through evil and pain 
And strange calamity! (28-32) 
The striking sinularity between this description of Lamb and Coleridge's description of himself in 
his later poem intensifies the solipsistic nature of the narrative. More importantiy, however, it 
conflates and confuses the intentional structure of the poem which assimies both a sympathetic 
reader or interpreter and an experiencing author. Instead of being the experiencing author of the 
original excursion, the figure of Lamb can equally be interpreted as a Coleridgean doppleganger 
who has been wholly appropriated by the mischievous author of the imagined excursion. By 
blurring the author/reader relationship within the text, the poem thus generates an alternative 
reading where conversation is displaced by the brooding malaise of monologue. 
It has been widely acknowledged by critics that a sympathy with flie laws of natiire in the 
conversation poems is always achieved vicariously via an act of bestowal. Such an act in itself 
attests to a sense of personal isolation or a displacement of feeling, and yet it has often been 
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interpreted as an unselfish gesture through which the speaker can escape from his past and undergo 
a kind of restorative process''*. But Coleridge's invoked personae always seem to reflect himself, 
making the release from the self an almost insuperable task. In 'Frost at Midnight' (1798), Coleridge 
uses his infant son as a surrogate through whom he may comprehend a sympathetic union with 
nature. The poem thus embarics upon a sort of rite of passage, developing from the self-conscious 
contemplation of the speaker through to the self-effacing sympathy towards nature enjoyed by the 
young Hartley. Rajan sees this as being realised in the image of the frost, which: "marks the last 
verse paragraph as an answer to the first. At the beginning the poet is cut off from his world by the 
coldness of the season and fluctuates restlessly between "Abstruser musings" and unfulfilled 
daydreams (I . 6, STQ. At the end the emotional climate has changed, and the child inhabits a 
paradisal world in which all seasons are equally sweet"However, the image of the frost is 
displaced within the poem by the central image of the stranger which connects all images through 
its sequence of associations. The stranger, with its narcissistic connections, emblematises the 
woricing of fancy so that all images prove to be a figurative re-ordering of each other. The 
predominant emotion is accordingly one of stasis as the narrative appears incapable of escaping 
from its own self-domination. 
The poem is thus explicitly self-referential and this is manifested immediately in the opening lines 
where the frost's silent task seems to offer no reciprocity with the natural worid: "The Frost 
performs its secret ministry./Unhelped by any wind". Its arcane movements, as a result, acquire a 
sinister and subversive form that threatens and frightens God's creatures. The owl's portentous cry 
sets an atmosphere of uneasy disquiet that is qualified by an immediate analogy between the frost 
and speaker 
The inmates of my cottage, all at rest, 
Have left me to that solitude, which suits 
Abstruser musings: save that at my side 
My cradled infant slumbers peacefully. 
'Tis calm indeed! so calm, that it disturbs 
And vexes meditation with its strange 
And extreme silentness. (4-10) 
The silence that envelops the surrounding vicinity does not promote an opportunity for peaceful 
contemplation, but rather allows a dangerous potential solipsism to provoke the "Abstruser 
musings" of the mind. Within such self-enclosure the image of the 'cradled infant' is casually by-
passed as the extremity of the silence provokes an almost trance like reverie. The lines "Sea, hill, 
and wood,/This populous village! Sea, and hfll, and wood" (10-11) unlocks the forbidden world of 
the speaker's dreams where the self can reign supreme and can connect all images to its own 
dominating consciousness. This is realised linguistically in the hypnotic r ^ t i t i o n of the line 
which, in the addition of the second conjunction "and", provides a sequence of association where 
all images disturbingly melt into one another, and then randomly evaporate into nonentity. 
The text now suddenly focuses on the image of the fluttering stranger and its self-generated 
activity immediately makes it analogous with both the speaker and the frost: "Methinks, its motion 
in this hush of nature/Gives it dim sympathies with me who live,/Making it a companionable form" 
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(17-19). As a "companiable fonn" which offers "dim sympathies", the stranger, we will see, may 
be read as a parody of the creative force behind nature, reasserting in its stead a degenerate 
creativity which threatens to transform the natural imagery of the poem into proxies for its own 
agency. The stranger, in the words of Newlyn, "both mirrors and focuses meditation, ordering the 
associations and allusions through which the poem moves"^ .^ This is made explicit in the revision 
of the text which omits lines that juxtapose the seriousness and frivolity of fancy's workings, and 
displays a liberating potential alongside such idle association: 
But still the living spirit in our frame, 
That loves not to behold a lifeless thing. 
Transfuses into all its own delights. 
Its own volition, sometimes with deep faith 
And sometimes with fantastic playfulness^'', (21-5) 
In the revision the possibility of a "deep faith" is rejected because the stranger randomly constructs 
objects that have no spiritual significance, and the imagery of the poem accordingly becomes a 
slave to its whimsical connections: "Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit/By its own 
moods interprets, every where/Echo or mirror seeking of itself,/And makes a toy of Thought" (20-
23). 
Release from the self thus appears impossible, and as the speaker attempts to recreate the natural 
splendours of his "sweet birth place" (28), the vision falls victim to the image of the imprisoned 
stranger that precedes it. Coleridge's description assumes a dream-like fabrication which subjugates 
nature to the constructs of self-imposition: the bells of the church tower which ring 'so sweetly" 
(31), haunt the speaker with "a wild pleasure, falling on mine ear/Most like articulate sounds of 
things to cornel" (32-3), The undercurrent of a sensuous, daemonic pleasure is creative in its 
"articulacy", investing it with a self-assertion opposing the self-effacing silence of the divine logos. 
When the speaker awakes the "following mom" (36) his dream encourages an intense introspection 
so that the reality of the surrounding community is replaced by a series of fictional personae who 
attest to the stranger's powers of self-mutation: ' 
And so I brooded all the following mom. 
Awed by the stem preceptor's face, mine eye 
Fixed with mock study on my swimming book: 
Save i f the door half opened, and I snatched 
A hasty glance, and still my heart leaped up, 
For still I hoped to see the stranger's face. 
Townsman, or aunt, or sister more beloved, 
My play-mate when we both were clothed alike! (36-43) 
The penultimate stanza's apostrophe to the sleeping babe attempts to move away from the idle 
rBcreations of the fanciful stranger, envisaging a future for the infant that is imbued with the 
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imaginative presence of nature's spectacles. However, Hartley's absorption of the "one Life" 
takes place in the future tense that is more obviously wishful. This can be contrasted directly to the 
speaker's own earlier recollection of childhood which exudes a strong sense of isolation and 
imprisonment. It is almost as i f Coleridge is trying to create for himself a fictional, idyllic 
childhood through his son. In this sense the presence of Hartley within the poem is merely a 
refiguration of the image of the stranger as both are vicarious agents through which the speaker 
hopes to achieve a kinship with nature. Hartley is the natural offspring of the poet, and the stranger 
is his imaginative counterpart. The one is a dangerous parody of the other just as the poem inherits 
its author's self-revolving nature, the mental vices of Coleridge are transposed into his own son. 
The subsequent imagery of the one life accordingly fails to represent the Berkeleyan description of 
nature as a divine and holy alphabet: the images of nature we are offered, the lakes, mountains, and 
clouds, are oddly static. Furthermore their reflection in the clouds produces a copy of nature which 
appeals to the senses: "so shalt thou see and hear/The lovely shapes" (58-9). It is the extemal form 
of nature and not its internal principles of creation that are evoked. Despite the idealistic reading, 
offered by Coleridge himself, that would have the poem returning to its opening but at a higher 
level of vision, one can equally well argue that the poem comes full circle, failing to escape the 
entrapment that it set out initially to overcome. 
'Frost at Midnight' hints at the fact that the speaker's imprisonment may in some way be connected 
to the frailty of poetic language (ie. the contrast between human and divine language). There is a 
sense that the infant Hartley, in his state of linguistic innocence, might well feel the creative 
principles behind nature's extemal presence. The hope, however, that he will continue to do so is 
altogether more tenuous. The divine word or logos of God persistently resists its incorporation into 
the language of men which appears to mediate for the repressed desires and fears of the speaker. 
This is signified by the capricious stranger which, as an agent of fancy, transforms the poetic 
imagery within the poem according to its own volitions. Fancy is thus an intrinsic element of the 
poetic imagination because its deconstmctive powers will always be at woric within the equivocal 
system of language. This is made evident in the poem 'The Nightingale' (1798) which emphasises 
poetic language's inability to produce an imitation of nature. 
When the speaker of 'The Nightingale' describes the eponymous bird as '"Most musical, most 
melancholy' bird!" (13), he appropriates the nightingale within an established poetic form so that it 
becomes a Miltonic mouth-piece reminding him of man's fall from a natural, intuitive knowledge, 
into a discursive, poetic knowledge. The line is accompanied with a footnote that discloses a 
characteristic gesture of self-qualification: 
'Mcst musical, most melancholy. This passage in Miltcaa possesses an excellence far 
superior to that of mere descripdon; it is spoken in the character of the melancholy Man, and has 
therefore a dramatic propriety. The Author makes this remark, to rescue himself from the charge of 
having alluded with levity to a line in Milton; a charge than which none could be more painful to him, 
except perhaps that of having ridiculed his Bible. 
As Luther explains: "Like many defensive gestures, this note calls attention to that which it 
was apparently designed to conceal. His overly scrupulous protestation of good faith underscores 
that, i f Milton is Coleridge's literary 'Bible', the Author's conversational alter ego actively engages 
in promoting heresy "^ *. This is corroborated by the retraction in the verse which immediately 
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attempts to redress the nightingale's poetic figuration: "A melancholy bird? Oh! idle thought!" (14). 
The line, however, has its counterpart in a deleted line of 'Frost at Midnight' which implicitly 
relates the bird to the allusions and associations of the fanciful stranger: "With which I can hold 
commune. Idle thought!" (19). The nightingale's song must now accommodate a poetic 
consciousness which diminishes its status within the poem as a natural sign. The speaker is of 
course correct when he declares that "In Nature there is nothing melancholy" (15), because it is 
nature's incorporation within the boundaries of poetic language which renders it susceptible to the 
fanciful erotic overtones of the speaker. 
The "night-wandering man" who "filled all things with himself,/And made all gentle sounds tell 
back the tale/Of his own sorrow" (19-21) is, in this way, a natural poet as his song mediates for his 
own solipsistic fears and desires. Language proves inefficient in imitating the creative process of 
the divine logos and this becomes apparent when the speaker declares: 
and so his song 
Should make all Nature lovelier, and itself 
Be loved like Nature! But 'twill not be so; 
And youths and maidens most poetical. 
Who lose the deepening twilights of the spring 
In ball-rooms and hot theatres, they still 
Full of meek sympathy must heave their sighs 
O'er Philomela's pity-pleading strains. (32-9) 
Poetic imagination is a fall away from primary vision because it is marred by its form of 
representation and can thus only offer a conditional form of knowledge (as the speaker of 'Kubla 
Khan' discovers). 
The twenty-five lines of self-qualification (14-39) for having uttered the initial Miltonic phrase 
means that 'The Nightingale' is not a celebration of "different lore" (41), but a product of a "Poet 
who hath been building up the rhyme/When he had better far have stretched his limbs/Beside a 
brook in mossy forest-dell" (24-6). The bird, unable to free itself from its poetic appropriation, 
becomes an outlet for the speaker's subconscious to manifest itself within the narrative. Its song 
accordingly, acquires an inherent sensuality which breaks the stillness of the evening: its "delicious 
notes" (45) require a constant gratification which even the day proves incapable of sating. 
When the nightingale "disburthents] his ful l soul/Of all its music" (48-9), it infects the language 
of the poem with the brooding repressions of a postlapsarian consciousness so that nature becomes 
insidiously fallen: the grove becomes wild and tangled as it bears the imprint of the speakei's own 
deranged pysche, and the emergence of the uninhabited gothic castle realises the manifestation of a 
dark, sensuous desire: 
And I know a grove 
Of large extent, hard by a castle huge, 
Which the great lord inhabits not; and so 
This grove is wild with tangling underwood, 
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And the trim walks are broken up, and grass, 
Thin grass and king-cups grow within the paths. (49-54). 
The "most gentle Maid" (69) who finds herself compulsively attracted to the seductive notes of the 
nightingales is presented almost as a fragile Christabel whose exposure to the powerful "sensation" 
of an amplified choius of song threatens to transform her into the more experienced Geraldine. Her 
perception of nature is subsequently destabilised as her swimming senses interpret her 
surroundings with images of erotic intoxification: the nightingales now appear to "perch giddily" 
(83); and their "wanton song"[s] (85) are tuned to the motion of the "swinging" (84) branch so that 
they are articulated "Like tipsy Joy that reels with tossing head" (86). 
The problem behind the faithful imitation of nature thus appears to be directly linked to the 
equivocal nature of poetic language itself. Articulation accomodates the agency of the fancy which 
mars an imitative approach to nature in its manifestation of subconscious repressions. The young 
Hartley's "imitative lisp" (93) at the conclusion of the poem is already indicative of his 
transmission into a worid of language. His disturbing dream is evidence of his completion of the 
Lacanian mirror phase where identity appeared unified and stable, and his entrance into a system of 
difference where the repository of that which has to be repressed is manifested in the realms of the 
subconscious. His eyes which "glitter in the yellow moon beam" (105) may well attest to the 
remedial text of nature, but their configuration within the boundaries of poetic language 
allegorically aligns them with the solipsistic narcissism of the coruscating eyes of the Ancient 
Mariner. 
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II 
THE 1816 FRAGMENT VOLUME 
Or substance might be called ttiat shadow seemed 
For each seemed either! (P.L 1:301) 
The Miltonic citation in the friend's letter in Biograpbia Literaria advising the poet not to disclose 
the theory of the imagination is as significant as it is revealing. Mudge argues that the invocation 
plays a role in legitimating "the importance of the transformative powers of the literary 
imagination"', which acts as a "fulcrum" between internal and extemal perception so that subject 
and object merge into a subliminal unity. The implications of the reference are in fact far more 
sinister, confirming Coleridge's fears that the creative faculty is irrevocably divided, a victim of 
Bloomian "anxieties of influence". Milton's epic text, with its irresistible anti-hero of Bloom's 
reading, has been read as informing its successors that the literary imagination is a fallen faculty 
which disrupts the symbolic relationship between idea and image: aesthetic value is, in this light, 
potentially self-serving, often drawing upon the inexhaustible energies of the morally degenerate 
Satan. The Coleridgean narrative of the Biograpbia, fraught with such tensions, thus implicitly 
relates the imagination to what Conrad describes as "a trespass upon a prohibited knowledge"^, and 
"knowledge", as the motto of the prospectus of the WatchmaD informs us, "is power". The excerpt 
from Paradise Lost alludes to the arbitrary nature of imagination, interpreting its agency as a 
Pandemonium of impalpable and infernal dreams, and is directly behind the friend's call for the 
censorship of the mechanics of artistic creation. 
The 'Pains of Sleep' (1803), published together with 'Christabel' and 'Kubla BChan* in 1816, 
analyses this self-destructive poetic process which amounts to a moral and spiritual denunciation. 
The poem's mistrust of the supposedly visionary power, together with its helpless attraction for the 
prohibited and fantastic images, makes it paradigmatic for the unhallowed practices of the 
supernatural verses. The opening stanza strives towards the moral function that Coleridge assigns 
to poetry in its attempt to establish a unity of self that corresponds to the imity of the poem. The 
speaker adopts a Christian rhetoric which he hopes will symbolise the benevolent, sympathetic 
faculty of imagination in its appeal to the quietism of love: 
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My spirit I to love compose. 
In humble trust mine eye-lids close. 
With reverential resignation, 
No wish conceived, no thought exprest, 
Only a sense of supplication. (5-9) 
The attempts, however, to conjoin poetic theory and practice are diminished by an overwhelming 
lack of conviction which manifests itself in the text through a forced and stilted diction. The 
speaker tries to achieve the feeling of love via the laborious process of "slow degrees"; this 
conflicts with Coleridge's theories on the subject of love which should reflect the instinctive 
movement of our nature. The personal failure to achieve a spontaneous response is compensated 
for by an affirmation of the redemptive powers of God: "A sense o'er all my soul imprest/That I am 
weak, yet not unblest,/Since in me, round me, every where/Eternal Strength and Wisdom are" (10-
15). Yet again, however, the text illuminates a disjunction between idea and articulation in the 
clumsy rhyming of "where.../Are" which concludes the stanza in a dangerously dissonant manner. 
The fracturing of the univocal nature of the voice thus provides an immediate outlet for a 
repressed Other which seismically erupts into actuality in the following stanza: "But yester-night I 
prayed aloud/In anguish and in agonyyUp-starting from the fiendish crowd/Of shapes and thoughts 
that tortured me" (14-17). This disfiguration of the theoretically sympathetic imagination into a 
powerful and daemonic force ironically aids and abets poetic fluidity so that artistic inspiration 
acquires a salacious energy which is morally destructive: "A lurid light, a trampling throng^Sense 
of intolerable wrong" (18-19). The speaker, caught perilously between the imperatives of two 
voices, evokes the dichotomous nature of the imagination in a series of images which fuses 
together diametric opposites: 
Thirst of revenge, the powerless will 
Still baffled, and yet burning still! 
Desire with loathing strangely mixed 
On wild or hateful objects fixed. (21-4) 
The lines aptly enact the breakdown of the later spurious Fancy/Imagination distinction: in its 
"poweriess" state the wil l , devoid of self-consciousness, assumes a Hartleian necessitarianism 
which relates it directly to a corruptive physiognomy ("burning"); and yet the word "baffled" 
suggests a self-conscious recognition of the ensuing confusion so that the speaker is 
simultaneously attracted and repulsed by his moral apostasy. This self-generated activity of the 
narrator's imagination is thus inextricably linked with an illicit form of power which assimilates 
artistic creation with a reduplication of original sin. This is confirmed by the speaker's reaction of 
"guilt, remorse or woe" (30), and when the visions have finally passed he is, like the wedding-
guest, "saddened and stunned" (34), by what he has experienced. 
'The Pains of Sleep' interprets the process of poetry as a continual act of seduction between other 
and self which involves a necessaiy tiansferral of knowledge. The speaker's redemptive tears 
momentarily defer this schizophrenic disorder only for the process of diabolic possession to be 
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repeated all over again. As he concludes in reflection that "Such punishments, I said, were due/To 
natures deepliest stained with sin,-" (43-4), the word "sin" brings the nartBtor full circle, reminding 
him of his fallen status. The dash, like a foreboding calm before a storm, signifies the inevitable 
moral collapse and the text responds violently with a seismic burst of daemonic energy which 
transfixes the speaker in its visionary gaze: "The tmfathomable hell within,/The horror of their 
deeds to view^To know and loathe, yet wish and do!" (46-8). This presence of a conflicting 
dialogue within the poem is the condition of romantic creation which haunts the narratives of the 
supernatural verses, and is precisely accoimtable for the way in which they subvert their own 
idealisms. 
I I 
In her analysis of 'Kubla Khan', Kathleen Wheeler uses the previously quoted Miltonic lines from 
chapter XI I I of the Biograpbia Literaria to emphasise the importance of metaphor within the poem: 
The implied exchange of value between shadow and substance reinforces the idea that the metaphors 
(shadows) implied by the images (substances) of lines 1-30, may be at least as important as the images 
taken literally [Wheeler understands the shadow/substance opposition within the poem as an example 
of the imagjnaticm's synthesis of the object/subject dilemma in pi^ticej: stanza ii i has one further 
significant complication, and that is the ambivalent referent of the pronoun "it" in line 35. The pronoun 
ougjit by progression and continuity to refer to the "shadow of the dome of pleasure". But the 
continuation into line 36 shifts the force of the referent to "A sunny pleasure-dome with caves of ice". 
The "miracle of rare device" itself floats between these two images, and the uncertainty as to which the 
miracle uniJGes the shadow with the final image in another daring stroke of identification or synthesis, 
which seems to confuse at the level of imagery, but which continues the game of mimesis at the level 
of self-referring poetic commentary. Thus the "miracles of rare device" are metaphors, symbols, and 
images embodying ideas, as \yell as whole works of art. Stanza i i i has forced us to a recognition of the 
nature of relationship at the expense of sensible content in poetic tropes. But this is precisely the 
direction necessary for the gradual transition from representative language and description to symbolic 
and relational language expressive of ideas, especially the idea of the nature of human creativity as 
figuration, or the m^dng of figures of speech .^ 
The elevation of metaphorical language, which, she argues, contributes to the overall effect of unity 
Avithin the poem, is directly related to her formalist interpretation of the secondary imagination: 
"Artistic creation is a re-creation which re-news, restores, and refreshes the familiar, the no longer 
strange, the merely customary, or the habitual worid.,."* Knowledge, in this sense, is explicitly 
metaphorical because it re-invigorates the obscured act of perception via a novel and fresh 
figuration of language. Wheeler, however, fails to acknowledge the fact that the figurative language 
employed in the definition of the secondary imagination causes a slippage which underscores the 
faculty's unifying powers so that it loses its consubstantiality with primary perception (see Intro, 
p. 12). Her interpretation of the secondary imagination, therefore, in the terms of its own self-
presentation allows her, confusingly, to assimilate the roles of symbol and metaphor within the 
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poem: " 'Kubla Khan' depicts precisely and self-consciously the necessity for the image and the 
senses to work in the service of the idea and the imagination, and vice versa, through the medium 
of metaphor and symbol"^. 
In the later Aids to Rejection (1825), Coleridge makes a clear differentiation between symbolic 
and metaphorical literary usage: 
I have only to add that these analogies are the mateiial, or (to speak chemically) the base, of symbds 
and symbolic expressions; the nature of which is always tau<egoricaI (i.e. expressing the same subject 
but with a difTereDce) in comr^listinction from metaphors and similitudes, that are always ai/egorical 
(i.e. erpressing a dilTereat subject but with a resemblance) (Aids to ReHectioa 1825: 206). 
The former implies mimesis, or at least synechdoche, whereas the latter implies association or 
theatrical performance. Such a distinction lies at the very heart of the division in interpretation of 
the secondary imagination; on the one hand committed to an imitation of the divine (where the 
image works in service of the idea); and on the other hand a potential fiction-making power (where 
the image is divorced from the idea and becomes the end in itself). Metaphors, as "shadows", thus 
imply an abstraction rather than an illumination of truth, replete with the Miltonic connotations of 
fraudulence and subversion in their ability to recreate. 'Kubla Khan' does not, as Wheeler suggests, 
progress "through differences and oppositions towards similarity, and finally oneness or unity 
rather it works on the level of its own metaphorical seduction so that it undermines the notion of a 
unified self in language. 
m 
The very fact that Coleridge felt that 'Kubla Khan' could not speak for itself without the addition 
of a prefatory explanation is already indicative of a tension between rhetoric and ideology within 
the poem itself which must be qualified and patched over. By virtue of its very presence, the 
preface embarics upon a process of impersonal! sation which avoids any intimate involvement with 
its subject-matter by providing a critical over-view of it. This is reflected in its contents which offer 
a succession of alibis and excuses that amount to a contrived diminishraent of poetic responsibility: 
Byron is blamed for the poem's publication; the nature of the verse is the result of an unconscious 
opium dream; and the man from Poriock is held responsible for its incompletion. 
Such evasiveness invites a direct comparison with Derrida's "second signification of the 
'supplement'" in Of Grammatology, which also offers empty compensations and substitutions: 
But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates iteelf in-tbe-place-
of, if it mis, it is as i f one fills a void. If it represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default 
of a presence. Compensatory [sapplant] and vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a snbaltem 
instance which tedces-(tbe)-place [tient-lieu]. As substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a 
presence, it produces no relief, its place is assigned in the structure by the marlc of an emptiness. 
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Somewhere, somelliing can be filled up of itself, can accomplish itself, only by allowing itself to be 
filled through sign and proxy. The sign is always the supplement of the thing itself. 
The first signification of the supplement is, by comparison, far more positive: "The supplement 
adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence. 
It cumulates and accumulates presence" .^ According to Derrida the second signification of the 
supplement cannot be separated from the first as both are linked by a condition of exteriority: "But 
their common function is shown in this: whether it adds or substitutes itself, the supplement is 
exterior, outside of the positivity to which it is super-added, alien to that which, in order to be 
replaced by it, must be other than i t " ' . As an "exterior addition" to the text, the preface thus 
performs the role of a supplement where meaning is dependent upon the play of signification: "But 
the inflexion varies from moment to moment. Each of the two significations is by turns effaced or 
becomes discreetly vague in the presence of the other" 
Shelley's prefaces, as E. Gold asserts, function in the manner of the first signification of the 
supplement, accumulating and enriching presences in the text: 
Shdley's prefaces often reflect their poems in miniature, embodying the psychological, philosophical, 
and imaginative struggles their speakers or protagonists undergo. Intimately connected to the verse 
they precede thematically, verbally, even structurally, they bring the reader to their poem's thresholds; 
engage the reader in their work's creative processes 
I f we apply this commentary on Shelley to the relationship between Coleridge's preface and poem, 
the dangers of supplementation become apparent in a perversion of meaning where, as Derrida 
continttes, "the sign, the image, or the representor, become forces and make 'the worid move'"^ .^ In 
a traditional, hiimanist reading of 'Kubla Khan' the position of the preface is generally regarded in 
terms of the second signification of the supplement, as "compensatory and vicarious"'^, or in the 
words of Ober, an empty "Coleridgean hoax, albeit a harmless one"^ .^ Gold's words, applied to 
Coleridge, would appear remarkably out of place here. But a deconstructive reading of the poem 
{as I intend to argue myself) would view the spurious substitutions of the preface as an integral part 
of the creative processes of the poem itself, so that the emphasis of the signification shifts from the 
second to the first inflexion. 
As a result, each of Coleridge's non-committal exemptions in the preface relate him directly to the 
intensely subjective desires that are released in the poem. Byron's responsibility for the poem's 
publication is extended throughout the preface by the use of a third person narrative which creates 
an effect of aesthetic distance. This is further complicated by the fact that the referent of this 
"Author" remains imclear. When the persona of the preface writes: "as far as the Author's own 
opinions are concerned", there is a certain degree of uncertainty as to who "the Author" refers to. It 
could be the writer of the advertisement, the writer of the verse, or even Lord Byron, the "poet of 
great and deserved celebrity". Such ambiguity is even further confused by a sudden shift into the 
first person singular in the final paragraph which suggests a possible complicity in the act of poetic 
creation: "As a contrast to this vision, / have annexed a fragment of a vety different character, 
describing with equal fidelity the dream of pain and disease". However, as most critics fail to note, 
these various subterfuges of peisona are reiterated in the verse which shifts uneasily from the third 
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to the first person singular. In other words the preface is accumulating presences that are already 
evident in the text itself so that its apparent disclaimers paradoxically suggest involvement. 
The story of the administering of opium at the time of the poem's composition similarly evades 
the vital question of poetic ownership. The speaker is keen to emphasise that 'Kubla Khan' is the 
product of the creative unconscious over which he has effectively no control: 
The Author continued for about three hours in a profound sleep, at least of the external senses, during 
which time he had the most vivid confidence, that he could not have composed less than from two to 
three hundred lines; if that indeed can be called composition in which all the images rose up before 
him as things with a parallel production of the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or 
consdousness of effort. 
The endnote of the recently discovered Crewe manuscript, on the other hand, offers a contradictory 
account of the composition of the poem: 
This fragment with a good deal more, not recoverable, composed in a sort of Reverie brought on by 
two grains of Opium taken to check a dysentery, at a Farm House between Poriock & Linton, a quarter 
of a mile from Culbome Church, in the fall of die year, 1797 (quoted by E i . Griggs in CL: 1 349). 
The main point to note here is the divergence in description of the state of mind which possessed 
the author when he wrote the poem: a "sort of reverie" cannot be compared with "a profound 
sleep". The latter implies a complete disassociation between the poet's conscious thought and his 
vision. The former, on the other hand, implies daydreaming where some sort of conscious control is 
being exercised. In the light of such a semi-conscious state of poesis, 'Kubla Khan' must bear with 
it the undeniable imprint of Coleridge's own poetic imagination which is woildng (at least to some 
extent) Independently of the influence of opium. 
It is precisely at such moments of self-awareness that Coleridge discovers the imagination's 
effective ambivalence which prevents the convergence of poetic theory and practice: the creative 
faculty's attraction to power, lust and oppression in 'Kubla Khan' poses a constant threat to 
Coleridge's idealised notion of imagination as a sympathetic and benevolent entity, and, as a result, 
it must be disburdened. The fanciful elaborations of the 1816 Preface (which encourages the reader 
to accept an almost mythological account of the properties of opium) could even be regarded as a 
cunning subterfuge behind which the poet hopes anonymously to disappear. 
The final excuse that the preface offers (in relation to the poem's incompletion) also involves a 
deferral of responsibility which ultimately relates the speaker of the preface to the speaker of the 
poem. Ostensibly the man from Poriock is blamed for a poem which is only a quarter of its 
intended conceptual length. But Coleridge also implicitly suggests that the interruption of the 
vision is not only responsible for its fragmentation, \»A also for the rupturing of the relationship 
between intention and meaning in the existing poem. By doing this, as Janowitz argues, Coleridge 
is actually invoking the fragment as "a convenient rubric" through which he can explain away a 
poetry that attests "to an inadequation of figuration to meaning" This is authenticated by an 
extract from another poem, 'The Picture', which explains the repercussions of poetic loss as a 
gradual misrepresentation of the original vision: 
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Then all the charm 
Is broken-all that phantom-worid so fair 
Vanishes, and a thousand circlets spread. 
And each mis-shape[s] the other. (91 -4) 
The extract continues in the confidence that the vision will return and the simdered fragments will 
be unified back into an epiphanal completion: "And lo, he stays,/And soon the fiagments dim of 
lovely forms/Come trembling back, unite, and now once more/The pool becomes a mirror" (97-
100). But the extract ultimately belies the speaker's intentions in its subversive mediation for a 
narcissistic "other" which diminishes the professed unity of artistic perception. The youth forgets 
the forms of nature so that when the reflection fades he transposes his own image and thus 
completes his own Narcissean metamorphosis. 
The problem of misrepresentation thus extends beyond a mere loss of inspiration to the more 
serious consequences of an intransigent disjunction between vision eind articulation. The preface to 
'Kubla Khan' creates an expectancy of wholeness in its allusion to visionary completion by 
circumnavigating the inefficacy of words: Coleridge refers to his dream as one in which "all images 
rose up before him as Things". Poetic language, on the other hand, caimot mirror the "Things" of 
the vision which promise to bring the poem into an untampered congruence. This becomes clear in 
the text when the speaker wishfully projects himself into the impossible, non-existent time-zone of 
the conditional where self-hood is effaced: " I wou/d build that dome in air" (46). The "woulds" and 
the "shoulds" effectively amount to a deferral of poetic responsibility which evade the 
complications imposed by human language and its necessary representations of the self, along with 
its various drives and energies. With its false promises of poetic completion, poem and preface 
share an intimate relationship which link them to the same voice. 
This relationship is made explicit in Coleridge's manipulation of the source, Purcbas bis 
Pilgrimage, where the preface engages itself in the rfiythmical turbulences that haunt the narrative 
of the poem. The descriptive narrative of Purchas which states passively- "In Xamdu did Cublai 
Can build a stately palace, encompassing sixteene miles of plain ground with a wall"-is subjected 
to an insidious rhetoric of power which anticipates the oppressive nature of the verse: "Here the 
Khan Kubla commanded palace to be built, and a stately garden thereunto. And thus ten miles of 
fertile ground were inclosed within a wall". As Conrad explains, "The metrical impulse starts up 
here, only to be stifled again. When the poem itself delivers a third version of those words in its 
first lines, that impulse is violenUy freed, and in being freed it imleashes Kubla's overweening 
romantic imagination"^^. 
For this reason 'Kubla Khan' caimot be interpreted as a reganing of paradise where oppositions 
are converted into a totality. Jasper declares that the poem dramatises "the theological task of the 
poetic imagination which is explored, as it "revives" the symphonic vision and rebmlds Kubla's 
dome; paradise lost and regained"^''. Wheeler too posits that the poem concludes with the notion of 
paradise as the poetic genius itself, devoid of the temptations of a "sensible or purely sensuous 
fallen world"^^. But the figurative language of the poem attacks the notion of an idealised, 
transcendental self because it frequenfly caters for a conditioned and finite other. At the centre of 
the Khan's landscape stands a pleasure dome, while at the centre of Eden grows the tree of life and 
the hiee of knowledge of good and evil. The two trees exercise man's faculty for moral choice; the 
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dome caters for his sensuous task, and in fact Xanadu is a fallen landscape littered with insidious 
temptations. 
Khan's worid may pretend to imitate the garden of Eden with its vernal "gardens bright with 
sinuoiis rills" (8), but it is actually a mamfestation of the dictator's own aggressive identity, 
conforming to his own desires and whims; Xanadu's prominent landmark is ordered by "decree" 
(2), and even the natural worid itself is coerced to comply with the Khan's demands: "So twice five 
miles of fertile ground/With walls and towers were girdled round" (6-7). In other words Xanadu is 
afflicted by the limitations of a fallen consciousness which relates the world in the terms of 
property and ownership. The garden is an elitist area of land \ ^ c h is built for the sole purpose of 
intense self-indulgence. This demand for personal elevation and aggrandisement is a necessary 
condition of autonomous, self-fulfilling desire. Kubla "girdles" his domain with a circular figure, 
and in doing so, suppresses the anomah'es which oppose his notions of order. As a result his 
carefully constructed paradise conceals the violence of its underlying energies. 
Beneafli the imagined paradise thus lurks a dark, sexual energy, pounding bdiind the words with a 
foreboding rhythmical consistency. By the second stanza the narrative relents: 
But oh! that deep romantic chasm which slanted 
Down the green hill athwart a cedem cover! 
A savage place! as holy and enchanted 
As e'er beneath a waning moon was haunted 
By woman wailing for her demon-lover! (12-16) 
As the sexual impulse is released, language resists an enforced structural closure by i»jtsuing its 
own performative instincts. The initial interjection-"But oh! "-represents a transvaluation of the 
prelapsarian intention in the previous stanza, so that the "chasm" functions as an entrance into a 
compulsive discourse of desire. Xanadu now becomes "A savage place! "-dominated by competing 
sexual egos which individually demand a personal gratification. 
The metaphorical language of the poem assists in this breakdown of an idealised concept of 
transcendental secondary knowledge (as Ctoleridge defines it in the Biograpbia), by consistentiy 
directing the imagination back to its origins of hedonistic association. The overpowering 
momentum of the urgent phrase-"A savage |^ ace"-resists the imposition of its endstop in order to 
continue in the pursuit of a self-interested conclusion (realised in the image of the "woman 
wailing"): the subsequent adjectives "holy" and "enchanted" prove powerless in their attempt to 
redress this seductive figurative rhetoric and accordingly assume a parodic figurative context of 
their own (emphasised by the rhyming of "enchanted" with "haunted"). As a result they helplessly 
collaborate with the hypnotic cadences and inflections of the verse that they wish to conceal. The 
concluding metaphor completes the reversal of text and subtext in a usutpatory image of a fallen 
Eden, where the natural vigour of the moon is diminished by a ghastiy shadow of daemonic 
craving. Fittingly the scene has its counterpart in Paradise Lost when the fallen Adam is overcome 
with a pagan lust as the voluptuous Eve inflames his "sense/With ardour to enjoy thee" (IX: 1032-
3). 
The text stands as a constant threat to Col^dge's conceptual premise of "imitation" because, 
rather than uncovering the internal principles of nature, Xanadu "copies" its external appearances 
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via an excitement of the senses. Lines 17-28 respond to the woman's urgent physical request in a 
vivid linguistic recreation of the sexual act: 
And from this chasm, with ceaseless turmoil seething. 
As i f this earth in fast thick pants were breathing, 
A mighty foimtain momently was forced: 
Amid whose swift half-intermitted burst 
Huge fragments vaulted like rebounding hail. 
Or chaffy grain beneath the thresher's flaU: (17-22) 
Repressed energy, implicit in the phrase "with ceaseless turmoil seething" excites language into a 
state of muscular, monosyllabic thrusting (18). The poem now becomes enslaved to a rhythmic, 
vital beat where self-conscious contemplation is reduced to the mechanics of sensory involvement. 
This is further emphasised by the metaphor which conveys a strong sense of ui^ency and 
immediacy, portending flie outcome of a compulsive, seismic eruption. The libidinal momentum is 
finally released in the following metaphor of lines 21-22 where the violence of the climactic 
moment has already been anticipated by a language that has become synonymous with power and 
violation: "mighty"; "forced"; "burst"; "Huge"; "vaulted"; "rebounding". 
At this point it is cmcial to note the significance of the central image of tiie river Alph. Many 
critics have interpreted the river as the imconscious operation of the unifying powers of the 
imagination which reconciles the opposites within the poem. Coleridge too regarded the general 
images of rivers as instrumental markers in poetry for "the one life". In the Biograpbia, Coleridge 
describes a stream as the inspiration behind his poem 'The Brook': 
I sought for a subject, that should give equal room and freedom for description, incident, and 
impassioned reflections ao men, natnie, and society, yet supply in itself a natural connection to the 
parts, and unity to the whole. Snch a subject I conceived myself to have found in a stream, traced tram 
its source in the hills among the yellow-red moss and ccnical g^ ass-shaped tufts of bent, to the first 
break or fall, where its drops become audible, and it begins to form a channel... 
Coleridge, as Holmes points out, never managed to complete 'The Brook' in the form that he hoped 
to: "Initially he had thought of a lengthy reflective poem, not unlike Cowper's 'The Task, which 
would use the evolution of the Holford stream to provide development and transitions which would 
not be 'abrupt and arbitraty'"^^. However, as Holmes continues to suggest, "the controlling image of 
Uie river or stream occupied him throughout these months, and eventually emerged in 'Kubla 
Khan"'^°. It is periiaps significant that the image of the river should eventually find fndtion in a 
poem as diverse and arbitrary as 'Kubla Khan' after the personal failure of 'The Brook'. Far from 
imparting "unity" or "freedom", Xanadu's TV/er is corrupted by its subterranean course which 
starves it of any natural light. In this way it is made analogous with the seditious activities of the 
underwoiid whose caves and caverns are traditionally the recesses for moral deprivation (cf: 
Milton's Pandemonium; Pope's (Zave of Spleen; and Coleridge's own "uttennost cave/By mis-
shaped prodigies beleaguered" in 'The Destiny of Nations' 100-1). 
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Idealising readings of 'Kubla Khan* tend to explain the significance of the river in the terms of 
Coleridge's later definition of the primary and secondaiy imagination in the Biograpbia. I . Chayes's 
interpretation of the poem involves mapping a three stage development which corresponds to 
Coleridge's own distinctions between the three perceptive faculties of the mind: the first stanza 
relates to the "woric of the arranging and ornamental fancy"; the second stanza functions (through 
the image of the river) in accordance with "the autonomous and unconscious" operation of 
imagination; the final stanza demonstrating the imagination to be, in its highest form, a self-
conscious activity: 
The last stmiza...is concenied with a new creative process, governed by a purposive will, ' ^ c h would 
replace and onrect the earlier process, autonamous and unconscious, or partially conscious, tb^ was at 
work in the dream vision^ ^ . 
Chayes might be correct in emphasising the p i v c ^ significance of the river in the poem as a 
whole, but she fails to account for the erotic and sensual connotations of the chasm which subverts 
and distorts Alph's symbolic course. Similarly, whfle she emphasises the "ornamental" nature of 
the Fancy, she does not explain its sexual aspect which is highly implicit in the pounding, rhythmic 
impulse of the initial stanza, and which is indeed responsible for the metaphorical manipulation of 
language in the remainder of the poem. 
Alph's snaking course thus fails to estaUish a Fancy/Imagination distinction, anticipating the 
slippage of language inheroit in the Biographia definition of the imagination. The river's first 
introduction in the poem is curiously curt: "Where Alph, the sacred river, ran/Through caverns 
measureless to man/Down to a sunless sea" (3-5). The expectation of further topographical 
description is halted by the resounding {^rrase-"Down to a sunless sea"-which metaphorically 
suggests a moral errancy as the river reaches a dim and stagnant conclusion. This, however, is 
almost immediately counterposed in the following line by the adjective "fertile" which suggests 
that the river is imparting a natural and innocent fecundity. Milton's Edenic river in Paradise Lost 
performs a similar horticultural function: just as Xanadu's garden is "bright with sinuous rills", 
Eden is irrigated by a river which, "with many a rill/Watered flie garden" GV: 229-30). But in such 
prelapsarian settings the serpent lurks, and in both cases it assumes the apparently innocuous form 
of the river. Milton's stream runs "with mazie error under pendant shades" (IV: 239); as Conrad 
ai^es: 
the noun ['error*], more unfcrgiviiig than Spenser's wayward delaying of his characters in Etrn's wood, 
reveits ttcan the topogn^>hicaUy errant to the morally erroneous and linguisticalfy inserts sin into a 
world as yet ignorant of it; at tbe same time his adjective, converted to infernal uses, enables Coleridge 
to map his own heU of indulgent fantasy^ .^ 
Language remains duplicitous to its very roots: the river fails to operate as a symbol because with 
all of its metaphorical implications, it has acquired an allegorical purport which forces a 
confrontation with what de Man describes as "the rhetoric of temporality": 
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...die pievaience of ailegxy always corresponds to the unveiling of an authentically temporal destiny. 
This unveiling takes place in a subject that has sought reftige against the impact of time in a natural 
wodd to which, in truth, it bears no resemblance^ .^ 
AUegoiy involves the temporality of consciousness because it is a form of alliKion to pre-existent 
texts. Xanadu's sacred river is thus perverted away from its symbolic course by a seductive 
figurative language which has its origins in associationistic Fancy. As the river metaphorically 
thrusts towards a self-gratifying orgasm and then, in the heady aftermath of fulfilment, winds 
down, language vigorously repeats itself, confirming .the temporal predicament by allegorically 
referring to previous signs: 
And 'mid these dancing rocks at once and ever 
It flung up momently the sacred river. 
Five miles meandtering with a mazy motion 
Through wood and dale the sacred tiverraa. 
Then reached the caverns measureless to man. 
And sank in tumult to a lifeless ocean?^ (24-28) 
The final phrase of the passage, "to a lifeless ocean", is a figurative reentering of the earlier words 
"to a sunless sea" (S). The opening stanza can now no longer be assimilated with Edenic, 
descriptive virtue because the language of the poem is working retix>actively (as well as 
progressively) through a series of implied metaphors that refer back with the advantages of 
hindsight This temporal perspective is enforced by the allegorical significance of the river which, 
as it concludes its self-motivated course, effectively sows the seed of forbidden knowledge, 
introducing into the t«rt a suddai realisation of time and history: "And 'mid this tumult Kubla 
heard from far/Ancestral voices prophesying war!" (29-30). Again, the atavistic adjective 
"Ancestral" is an allegorical sign refraring back to a previous adjective "ancient" (10) that has, in 
the first place, already anticipated the consequences of temporal fragmentation. 
The river affirms the dualism within the poem by preventing the self from an illusory 
identification with the nonself. Stanza i i i thus presents us with "The shadow of the dome of 
pleasure" (31). As the products of time, shadows distort and fragment the relationship between 
signifier and signified because they can never achieve a perfect consubstantiality with their 
corporeal counterparts. The adumbral image of the dome "floats" precariously on the water, 
subjected to both a temporal and spatial mutation. The dome now fails to function as an image of 
unification because it is consistentiy belied by the vicarious activities of its shadow. As the 
reflection frames the dome inside its own parameters, it fancifully disrupts the relationship between 
image and idea by creating a "metaphorical" representation of the dome. This slippage from 
faithful re-creation of internal perception to self-interested distortion of extemal appearance, is the 
necessary consequence of art: "It was a miracle of rare deviceM sunny pleasure-dome with caves 
of icel" (35-6) As a performative and arbitraiy entity, language can blasphemously fuse together 
natural opposites, creating its own theatre of illusions. The oxymoron aptly suggests the 
irreversible dichotomy of words which, as metaphorical representations of ideas, act as shadows 
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rather than templates. 
Stanza iv, in its recognition of loss and bereavement of vision brings t l ^ poem to an exquisite 
romantic conclusion. The inefficacy of words to represent faithfully the insouciant imagination is 
vividly articulated in lines 37-43: 
A damsel with a dulcimer 
In a vision once I saw: 
It was an Abyssinian maid. 
And on her dulcimer she played, 
Singing of Mount Aboia. 
Could I revive within me 
Her symphony and song... 
The vision depicts an emancipated and elusive representation of female otherness. The poem, on 
the contrary, is haunted by the dubious shadow of the wailing woman who functions only as a 
recipient of masculine domination. 
If the speaker could incorporate the former's song into his own words, he could bring his verse to 
a unified, androgynous conclusion, devoid of the shadows and disseminations that already threaten 
it^^. This potential, however, can never be fully realised because the vision will always be 
diminished by its translation into language. The maiden's stubborn refusal to be incorporated in the 
poem is a recognition of language's inability to represent her harmonious song. In fact she has 
already anticipated her linguistic falsification into the wailing demon by singing of the fallen 
mount of Abora (originally Amahra in the first draft, corresponding to Milton's false paradise 
Amara). The speaker can only overcome the disjmction between articulation and meaning by 
projecting himself into the non-existent time zone of the conditional: "To such a deep delight 
'twould win me,/That with music loud and longjl would build fliat dome in air,/That sunny dome! 
those caves of icel" (44-7). This, of course, can only emphasise his failure in the present where he 
has unabashedly collaborated with the Khan's imperial desires. Indeed the final irony of the poem 
is that the potentate becomes the metaphorical representation of the speaker, a ghastiy alter-ego or 
shadow which cannot be disburdened. Such a collaboration of subjective desire between Khan, the 
speaker of the poem, and the speaker of the preface, extends the figurative level of the poem ftiom 
speaker as creator and master of metaphorical language, to speaker as product and victim of his 
own metaphorical language. R. Woodman asserts that "tiie will to metaphor may be described as 
Nietzsche describes 'the Will to Power*; the. will to inhabit one's metaphorical invention of 
oneself'^ .^ As an essentially figurative entity, language thus constitutes: 
a break, a fissure, a representation that is otber than what is i^resented which is nevertheleu 
unlmowable except as it is iqvesented. Cast out of n^ore by a coDsciousness alien to it, he Oaan) 
soifen the pain of alienation which is the pain of his own cast-out body, a body invaded by 
consciousness and subjected to its conticd. Metapbm, as Bkxidel aptly describes it, is a "quasi-
hysterical and displaced language: it is the boify's syn^ Jtomatic coaveniai into language .^ 
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The first person narrative which would re-create the heavenly vision becomes, in the realisation of 
failure, complicit in tbe act of false creation. Coleridge can only desperately attempt to detach 
himself from the Khan's influence by rejecting him as a Medusa figure who must be avoided in 
order to preserve his own moral safety: 
And all who heard should see them there, 
And all should ciy. Beware! Bewarel 
His flashing eyes, his floating hairl 
Weave a circle round him thrice, 
And close your eyes with holy dread, 
For he on honey-dew hath fed. 
And damk the milk of Paradise. (47-54) 
The repeated admonition half discloses the alluring fascination of the visionary Khan: appearing 
befare the speaker as an overbearing and controlling necromancer, he reinforces the Bloomian 
suggestion that poetic enlightenment is a Pandemonium of flashing insph^on, where man can 
inhabit his self-ililiiUing fantasies. The mind, as Satan articulates, "is its own place, and in 
itself/Can make a heav'n of hell, a hell of heav'n" (PX: I 2S4-S). Ait can only mean a step towards 
the daemonic because language, as the metaphorical translation of perception, is contaminated by 
the shadows of human ftailty. The poetic vision thus appears as the source of original sin, filling 
the speaker's soul with the fear of moral disintegration so that he must not look any further. In 
harnessing the power of romantic imagination in die language of men, tiie speaker has become the 
sacrificial victim of the visionary muse, damned as botii a moral and literary postiapsarian, a son of 
Adam and a son of Milton. 
IV 
The final poem of the 1816 volume, 'Christabel', is similariy suspicious of flie ability of poetic 
language to correspond direcfly to vision. Like 'The Pains of Sleep' and 'Kubla Khan', 'Christabel's 
incompletion attests to the impossibility of congiuence between words and thoughts. This, as 
Janowitz aigues, is significant specifically to the 1816 volume because: 
we find that the stnictuie of spatial incompletun, of the incommensiuateness of visioo and language, is 
made into a major theme. The poems cannot end because the vision they aspire to cannot be mbodied 
in ianguage. Stractural incompleticn is bolstered by theme: die genre's obligatoy element then, is the 
difficult relation between visicm and language^ .^ 
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However, it is important to point out that whilst both 'Kubla Khan' and 'Christabel' dramatise the 
equivocal nature of poetic utterance, the manner in which they subvert their ideas is intrinsically 
different. 'Kubla Khan', being far less contrived in structure, immediately focuses on the problems 
of language which proves to be consistenfly elusive in representing the poet's intentions. 
'Cfaristabel', on the otiier hand, has a specific design and purpose, as Coleridge intimates, \^en 
refiecting on its incompletion in 1833: 
The reason of my not finishing 'Chnstabd' is not that I don't know how to do it- for 1 have, as I always 
had, the whole plan entire from b^^maag to end in my mind; but I fear I could not carry aa with equal 
success the execution of the Idea, an extcemety subde and difficult one {Table Talk: 1409-10). 
Although the plan is never disclosed by Coleridge, the intenc^ conclusion of 'Christabel' is, 
periiaps, inherent in the actual structure of the poem. 'Christabel' can be differentiated from 'Kubla 
Khan' in its emphasis on genre rather than poetic utterance. In the poem, as I intend to demonstrate, 
Coleridge by-passes the notion of poetic language as truth per se, and looks towards literary genres, 
with their solid claims to perform specific literary precedents, in order to regulate the 
inconsistencies of words. 'Christabel' specifically draws upon the mechanics of two literary genres, 
namiely the gottuc and the narrative romance. It is the complex interplay between the two genres 
within the poem and the resulting tensions that inevitably occur, that accounts for 'Christabel"s 
incompletion. 
That Coleridge should resort to utilising the gothic genre so explicitiy in a poem like 'Christabel' 
is interesting considering his own opinions on it. Writing on Radcliffe's The Italian in 1798, 
Coleridge disparagingly comments: 
It was not difiBcuIt to foresee that the modem itmance ... would soon experience the fate of every 
attmpt to please by what is uimatural, and by the departure bom that observance of real life, which 
has placed the works of Fielding, Smollett, and some other writers, among the pennanent sources of 
amusement. It might fcr a time afford an acceptable variety of persons whose reading is confined to 
works of fiction, and who would, perhaps, be glad to exchange dullness for extravagance; but it was 
probable that, as its constitution Ql we may so speak) was maintained only by the passion of t«Tor, and 
that excited by trick, and as it was not conversant in incidents and characters of a natural conplexion, 
it would degenerate in repetition, and would disappoint cunosity^ .^ 
The gothic imagination here is implicitiy related to the woridngs of the fancy; it is a limited mode 
of operation that appeals to the external forms of perc^tion. Unlike the true law of the poetic 
imagination, the gothic is capable of degenerating into self-enclosure or "repetition". By the time of 
The Friend Coleridge had cemented his views on the gothic as a purposeless expression of 
"pleasure without any exertion of thought" which, like the fancy, reduces its understanding "to a 
deplorable imbecility" (JFtiend I I : 151). In the narrative of 'Christabel' I believe that Coleridge 
mtroduces the gothic as a debased form of literature whose particular inadequacies he hopes to 
reject by bringing his poem to a conclusion in the spirit of the narrative romance. The first part of 
the poem is thus set in a foreign, unlocalised gothic scenario which is distanced and objective; the 
second part is brought to earth in the detailed topogmphy of CumbeilaDd as the narrative moves 
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towards a subjective and conciliatory ending. However, 'Clmstabel"s condition, is more obviously 
dependent upon the suppression of comedy or romance-specifically Guistabel's eventual rescue by 
her betix)thed-whose omission renders 'Christabel' a fragment. The relationship between the genres 
within the poem proves more problematic in practice than in theoiy and periiaps can be understood 
in a closer examination of Coleridge's feelings towards gothic literature. 
Reviewing Radcliffe's The Mysteries of Udolpho in 1794, Coleridge's approach towards tiie 
narrative is highly ambiguous, expressing a revulsion for the devised con-trick of the text, and yet 
simultaneously confessing a palpitating excitement for its hidden secr^s: 
The same powers of desctiption [as in niei^omaace of tte Forest] are displayed, tbe same predilection 
is discovered iat tbe wondeiful and the gjloomy-the same mysterious temxs are continually exciting in 
the mind the idea of a supernatural aK>earance, keefxng us, as it weie, npm the veiy edge and 
c(»ifines of the worid of spirits...cmiosity is kept iq>oa the stretch fh>m page to page, and horn volume 
to volume, and the secret, which the reader thinks himself every instam on die point of penetrating, 
flies like a phantom before him, and dudes his eagerness till the very last moment of (xotracted 
expectation...This method is, however, liable to the following inconvenience, that in search of what is 
new, an author is apt to forget what is naturaL..Curio8ity is raised far otteoer than it is gratified; or 
rathei, it is raised so high that no adequate gratification can be given it; tbe interest is completely 
dissolved once the adventure is finished, and the reader, when he is got to the end of the work, looks 
about in vain ttx the spdl which has bound him so strongjy to it^ .^ 
The prospect of obtaining the "secret" that lies behind the novel is recoimted with a spellbinding 
fascination which stimulates the imagination. It is as if tiie reader is tantalisingly brought to the 
point of acquiring some prohibited source of knowledge. Importanfly, Coleridge's objections do not 
call into question the imaginative power of the tale, rather they confirm the seductive power of the 
gothic imagination. Coleridge's criticism of gothic novels discloses an empathy for its illegitimate 
processes, delighting in the excitement of the sense of the foriridden which the narrative provides: 
in Tbe Frfeod Coleridge describes the gotbic as being "at once terrific and libidinous" (II: 11). Such 
an equivocality towards the genre is reflected in the narrative dimensions of 'Christabel' where the 
poetic imagination seems to be informed by a pervading gothic consciousness that proves 
impossible to shake off. Mario Praz's understanding of the gothic as "an anxiety with no possibility 
of escape"^ ^ serves as a useful description of 'Christabel': the gotbic elements of the poem exert a 
stranglehold over the the narrative so that, in part two, the characters become incapacitated, 
ineffective in bringing the poem to its intended conclusion in romance. In accommodating the 
degenerate mode of the gofliic within its own parameters, 'Chistabel' may be said ambitiously to set 
out on an early poetic version of the imagination/fancy distinction. Its failure to achieve this 
distinction is directly accountable for its incompletion and one can draw comparisons with the large 
Gothic cathedral that menacingly shadows Coleridge's definition of the imagination in chapter 
thirteen of the Biograpbia. 
The most striking point of comparison betweai the prefaces of 'Christabel' and 'Kubla Khan' is the 
former's apparent clarity of expression and straightforwardness. The introduction to 'Christabel' 
appears to be devoid of the evasiveness and obscurities which haunt the narrative of its infamous 
counterpart: the whole passage is written in tiie i int person singular, tiie late date of its publication 
is attributed directiy to the speaker's "own indolence"; and tiie defence of the poem's originality is 
wholly and honourably vindcated. None of the doubts or excuses concaning the poem's merits 
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appear to be evident here. Such frankness, however, is unusual in Coleridge and ought to arouse 
suspicion, especially in his prefatory material which normally provides apologies and alibis for the 
nature of poetic utterance, and which often invokes bogus charges of plagiarism against himself 
(re: notes in 'The Nightingale' and 'Lines on an Autunmal Evening'). Plagiarism is not something 
that apparenfly worried Coleridge, a point which De Quincey echoes in his Recollection^, and his 
elongated denial bears the mark of a man who, whilst protesting his innocence against any such 
spurious charges, simultaneously believes that a comparison with the alleged source will provide a 
worthy reflection of the aims of his own poem (the evidence of the date of composition would, after 
all, be ample in exculpating himself from any such accusations). 
In the preface to 'Christabel', Coleridge's excuses for his poem have aheady been created for him 
by his critics, thus providing him with a subterfuge that he secretiy delights in. The particular poem 
m question is Scott's 'Lay of the last Minstrel' which was actually composed in 1805 and influenced 
directly by 'Cbristabel' (and not the other way around). The poem dramatises a return to 
prominence of the lost values of a bygone age which were embodied in the unpretentious spirit of 
the romance ballads , and is brought into a "true picturesque unity" (a phrase Coleridge himsdf 
coined in his appreciation of Scott's poetry) by the chivalric values of the minstrel's final song: 
The present scene, the future lot. 
His toils, his wants, were all forgot; 
Cold diffidence, and age's frost. 
In the full tide of song were lost; 
Each blank, in faithless memory void. 
The poet's glowing thought supplied; 
And, while his harp responsive rung, 
'Twas tiius tiie LATEST MINSTREL sung. 
A comparison with Scott's poem would not be wholly unfavourable to Coleridge in the sense that 
'The Lay of the last Minstrel' successfully asserts the spirit of the narrative romance in its 
conclusion (reflecting Coleridge's own aims in 'Christabel'). This is evoked in the preface where 
Coleridge makes an indirect coimection between his own poem and Scott's concerning the "tone 
and the spirit of the whole". However, in the first place Coleridge's poem remains a fragment, and 
secondly, flie spirit of Scott's poem (even if it structurally resembles its counterpart) is hardly 
reminiscent of the anomalies of reality that plague ttie narrative of 'Christabd'. Furthermore 
Coleridge is apparency at no pains to establish any purpose of design behind his own poem that 
might contradistinguish it from its imitations, and almost allows its reputation to rest on the merits 
of these very imitations. His phraseology continually brings attention to "striking coincidence[s]"; 
and the "two monkish Latin hexameters" which he invokes, in an apparentiy magnanimous 
gesture-"'Tis mine and it is likewise your5;/But an if this will not do;/Let it be mine, good fiiendl 
for I/Am the poorer of flie two"- are oddly, as E.H Coleridge notes, translated in November 1801, 
"long before the 'celebrated poets' in question had made, or seemed to make, it desirable to 
'preclude a charge of plagiarism'"^ .^ In this way they have the air of an almost pre-arranged alibi. 
If Coleridge is again attranpting to protect or disassociate himself from his own subject-matter, he 
ironically gives the reader an insight into the processes of his own poem when, introducing the 
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necessity to provide the exact date of the poem, he comments: "The dates are mentioned for the 
exclusive purpose of precluding char^ of plagiarism or servile imitation from myself'. As I shall 
ai^ue in my exposition of 'Christabel', the tteft is not from others, but more dangerously from the 
the recesses of the speaker's own mind which manifests itself fully in the gothic elements of the 
poem. This naturally complicates the relationship between the gothic and the romance genres 
within the poem because the gothic can now be recognised as an explicitiy subjective model of 
reality. This is reflected in the nature of the narrative which eschews such simple categorisations of 
white and black, good and evil, subjective and objective, Christabel and Goaldine etc, and which 
suggests that Geraldine is most intimately related to her counterpart as a phantom-like 
manifestation of Christabel's own sub-conscious. The narrative of the poem is, accordingly, 
perverted away fit>m tiie chivalric motive of the romance text in part two, and contiwlled by the 
more sinister and transgressive designs of a dominating gothic consciousness. 
The opening paradoxes of 'Christabel' immediately bring the reader into tiie alien and external 
landscape of a gbtiiic setting. The birds of the night have awoken the birds of the day; the "mastiff 
bitch" is aware of a presence that is most obviously supernatural: "Some say, she sees my lady's 
shroud" (13); and the moon, although full, remains "both small and dull" (19). The series of 
antitheses most obviously creates the sort of devised scenario which would be familiar to readers of 
gothic novels. This ambiguity is heightened by the narrator of the poem who continually prompts 
the reacter's curiosity into expecting something beyond the normal experience of reality: "What 
makes her in the wood so late,/A furlong from tiie castie gate?" (25-6); "Jesu, Maria, shield her 
well" (54); "What sees she there?" (57). At this early stage in the poem the narrator's interruptions 
merely lend the narrative an air of fiction, briefly holding up events in order to "excite by tiick" and 
tiiereby inducing an atmosphere of suspense. This technique is, of course, precisely what Coleridge 
himself objected to in his own criticisms of the gothic getme, in its uimatural stimulation of the 
passions. The gotbic is therefore being evoked as a degenerate sub-genre which is incapable of 
representing a human condition because it is necessarily external to the realms of human 
experience. This is emphasised by the entrance of Christabel within this extemaUsed scenario. 
Christabel's representation is consistent with the female protagonists of the narrative romance: her 
dream of marriage is a hint of the manner in which the narrative intends to conclude in the 
conciliatory spirit of the romance; and her prayer is an intensely subjective mode of experience 
which protects her from the disquieting atmosphere of the setting in its meditative silence. Such 
Christian fortitude is neatiy symbolised by the act of praying because first, it emphasises an iimer 
communion with God; and secondly because it directiy contrasts the ambiguity of the setting where 
language appears unstable and mutable in its rhetorical self-inquisitions ("Is the night chilly and 
dark?" (14); "Is it the wind fliat moaneth bleak?" (44)). Christabel is tiius a Spenserian Una-devout, 
focused and unchangeable. 
Getaldine, by contrast, fits into the gotbic surroundings far more easily. Christabel herself is not 
described, but with the introduction of Geraldine appearance becomes important Geraldine, like 
the landscape, is externalised: 
There she sees a damsel bright, 
Drest in a silken robe of white* 
That shadowy in the moonlight shone: 
The neck that made that white robe wan, 
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Her stately neck, and arms were bare; 
Her blue-veined feet unsandal'd were. 
And wildly glittered here and there 
The gems entangled m her hair. (58-65) 
Her white robe-normally indicative of purity-is deceptive as it casts a shadow, and her exceedmg 
beauty already arouses the suspicion that she may be a literary descendant of the mutable Duessa. 
Not surprisingly, her conmiand of language is highly proficient. She responds to Christabel's 
question "with answer meet" (71), and her story is eloquently recited. However, as Peterfreund 
observes, it is also explicitiy metaphorical: 
The notion that Geraldine's abductcas would drive their captive rather than lead her is troublesome. 
After all, if her horse were to break away or fall, they would kse what would appear to be a great 
prize, if Geraldine is to be credited. But Geraldine is not to be credited. If the moves like the wind, it is 
the result of being driven by a chariot diat "forth rush'd with whirlwind sound" (PL 6.749). Those who 
drive her are not five abductors riding ftniously, but die "four cherubic shapes" (6.753) of the Chariot 
of Judgement and the Son who commands them .^ 
Geraldine is being made analogous with the perfidious Satan of Paradise Lost and her entrance into 
the narrative aligns the gothic element of the text with a newly foimd motive. The "secret" behind 
gotbic novels, which Coleridge found so enthralling, is transformed into a source of forbidden 
knowledge, and it is Christabel's gradual acquisition of this knowledge that changes the initial 
presentation of the gothic as an external and foreign model of perception, into a dangerously 
subjective reflection of truth. 
The first evidence of this is when Christabel "with might and main/Lifted her up, a weary 
weight,/Over the threshold of the gate" (130-2). The marriage theme, which was earlier represented 
as the culmination of the romance narrative in Christabel's dream, is here being perverted away 
from its natural conclusion into a horrific metaphoric parody. The aUusion is continued when, 
bearing in mind that it has just struck twelve midnight, Christabel declares fliat her mother "on her 
death-bed she did say,/That she should hear the castle-bdl/Strike twelve upon my wedding-day" 
(199-201). Geraldine's subsequent dismissal of Christabel's guardian-spirit-"'C)ff, woman, off I Uiis 
hoiff is mine-/Though thou her guardian-spirit be,/Qff, woman, off! 'tis given to me'" (211-13)-
renders the irmocent maid wholly susceptible to the seductive lure of knowledge. Christabel now 
acquires a curiosity that is the fatal flaw of the gothic heroines. Her mind becomes resttess and 
perturbed and this represents a fracturing of the wholeness of the self which was initially evoked in 
her silent act of prayer. As a result she cannot prevent herself from glancing at ti^ naked form of 
Geraldine: 
Beneath the lamp the lady bowed. 
And slowly rolled her eyes around; 
Then drawing in her breath aloud. 
Like one that shuddered, she unbound 
The cincture from beneath her breast: 
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Her silken robe, and inner vest, 
Dropt to her feet, and full m view. 
Behold! her bosom and half her side-
A sight to dream of, not to tell! 
O shield her! shield sweet Christabell (245-54) 
The passage dramatises Christabel's initiation into a universe of sin and her met^horical marriage 
to the dark meaning behind the figure of Geraldine. The offending half of the temptress, as a 
deleted line informs us, is 'lean and old and foul of hue", revealing perhaps that Christabel now has 
knowledge of life and death and that her previously spiritual probity is about to undergo a similar 
decay. When Geraldine declares: "In the touch of this bosom there worketh a spell ,AVhich is lord 
of thy utterance, Christabel I/Thou knowst to-night, and wilt know to-morrowj/This mark of my 
shame, this seal of my sorrow" (267-70); the tranference is complete and Christabel accordingly 
has the power to speak the language of her newly acquired knowledge. 
The narrative romance element of the poem is thus halted in its tracks because Christabel, the 
genre's initial representative, has become Geraldine, the representative of the gothic element 
Geraldine, having presented to Christabel what was already present in Christabel's own mind, has 
enslaved the narrative of the poem to a dominating gothic presence which is, like.Geraldine's curse, 
tiie master of its speech. This is made explicit at the very beginning of part two of the poem when 
the Baron pronounces "Each matin bell.../Knells us back to a world of death" (332-3). The lines are 
suggestive of a passage in Paradise Lost where the fallen angels traverse 
O'er many a Frozen, many a Fiery Alp, 
Rocks, Caves, Lakes, Fens, Bogs, Dens, and shades of deatii, 
A Universe of death, which God by curse 
Created evil, for evil only good. 
Where all life dies, death lives, and nature breeds. 
Perverse all monstrous, all prodigious things. 
Abominable, unutterable, and worse 
Than Fables have yet feigned, or fear conceiv'd. (II: 620-27) 
As Peterfreund explains: "If the universe of Cbristabel is a "Universe of death", then, it is so 
because some evil cause is immanent in it, just as Satan and his legions are immanent in their 
universe as the cause both of its existence and of the nature of that existence"^ .^ What has 
happened in the story is that evil has manifested itself through the seduction of Christabel by 
Geraldine. The idealised conclusion of the poem is now an insuperable task because its motive 
(embodied by the imified figure of Christabel) has been dispaced by the anxieties of a fallen-
consciousness which "knells" the narrative of the poem back to the (^ generate origins of the gothic 
imagery with which it began. The problem the poem seems to have set itself, and fails to solve, is 
that i f the state of grace corresponds to an innocent vision and tbe fall of man is a fall away from 
that vision, is it ever possible for tbe iimocent to redeem the experienced? Interpretations which 
postulate Coleridge's intended conclusion miss the point: the poem cannot be completed because 
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paradise cannot be regained. 
Bard Bracy's dream allegorises the entrapment of the narrative to the sinister forces that have 
msiduously exerted their influence. The dove, which represents Christabel, is discovered in the 
vision to be a victim of the tyratmous power of the serpent: 
'And in my dream methought 1 went 
To search out what might there be found; 
And what the sweet bhd's trouble meant. 
That thus lay fluttering on the ground. 
I went and peered, and could descry 
No cause for her distressful cry; 
But yet for her dear lady's sake 
I stooped, metbought, the dove to take. 
When lof I saw a bright green snake 
Coiled around its wings and neck. (541-50) 
Bracy's account demonstrates how (feceptive appearances can be, and it is only afier closer 
examination that he notices the bird's entrapment in the coils of the snake. What is more alarming, 
however, is the following description which reveals the initial stages of a process of "becoming", 
as the bird's breathing patterns are synchronised with those of the serpent: "And with the dove it 
heaves and stirs^Swelling its neck as she swelled hers!" (553-4). The dream episode is emblematic 
of the whole poem and this is emphasised by the Baron's response to it. Failing to take heed of the 
Bard's warning about appearances he, only "half-listening" (565), wilfully misreads the vision and 
assimilates the dove with Geraldine rather than his own daughter. The Baron evokes the spirit of 
chivalry in his "courtly accents fine" (568), but he has blindly misinterpreted Gaaldine's motives. 
When she responds to the Baron in like manner-"With blushing cheek and courtesy fine" (575), 
romance is consequentiy choked to death within the narrative because it is wholly appropriated by 
the dark and duplicitous nature of a gothic consciousness. 
Because the gothic is now recognisable as a highly subjective mode of experience which is at the 
centre of the characters' conditions, it realises a destructive potential which goes beyond tiie 
boundaries of credibility that apply even to the gothic prose tales. This is powerfully evoked by the 
hideous transformation of Christabel into the double of (Greraldine which, effectively, merges 
together the supposedly separate states of the real and the imaginary: 
So deeply had she drunken in 
That look, those shrunken serpent eyes. 
That all her features were resigned 
To this sole image in her mind: 
And passively did imitate 
That look of dull and bieacherous hate! (601-6) 
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Christabel undergoes tiie punishment meted out to Milton's Satan, finally revealing tiiat Ught and 
dark, far from being polar opposites, are schizophrenic counterparts. The narrative of 'Christabel', 
which had hoped to disassociate the imagination from a gothic intelligetK e^ by concluding in the 
wholesome spirit of the romance, actually discloses the poetic faculty's intimate relationship with 
the seditious energies of the gothic's transgressive purposes. 
Coleridge believed that the gothic tale was incapable of articulating any moral truth, but the 
narrative of 'Christabel' seems to suggest that it is the very nature of poetic language itself that is 
responsible for an explicit moral renunciation. The 'Conclusion to Part W appears to be a comment 
not on moral triith, but on a truth about the irreconcilable disjimctions between willed thought and 
meaning: 
And pleasures flow in so thick and fast 
Upon his heart, that he at last 
Must needs express his love's excess 
With words of immeant bitiemess. 
Perhaps 'tis pretty to force together 
Thoughts so all imlike each other; 
To mutter and mock a broken charm, 
To dally with wrong that does no harm. 
Perhaps 'tis tender too and pretty 
At each wild word to feel witiiin 
A sweet recoO of love and pity. (662-72) 
The passage can be seen as referring not only to Leoline, but to Coleridge himself who effoitively 
fathers the poem. Poetic language proves to be "wild" and uncontrollable in its revealing of 
subconscious anxieties and neuroses. Within its ambiguous parameters moral precepts are imbued 
with the "sorrow and shame" (674) of a "world of sin" (673), transforming them into horrific 
parodies which belie their intentions. A poem is thus "A little child, a limber elf,/Singing, (^cing 
to itself (656-7), creating its own laws and fantasies and, for tiie moral safety of its author, it must 
be rejected. 
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Ill 
' T H E RIME O F THE ANOENT MARINER* 
In this idea originated the plan of the Lyrical Ballads; in which it was agreed, tliat my endeavours 
should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at least romantic; yet so as to transfer 
from our inward nature a human interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these 
shadows of imagjiiadon that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which coiutitutes poetic 
faith. (BL- II6) 
In his famous pronouncement on his poem "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner', Coleridge intimates 
that in momentarily suspending a disbelief in the supernatural phenomena of the poem, the reader 
might grasp a semblance of the inner unity that is the guiding spirit behind the act of poesis. The 
sentence is important because it hints at the moral function that Coleridge believes poetry ought to 
possess, and he expounds upon this point explicitiy two or three pages later 
What is poetry? is so nearly the same question with, what is a poet? diat the answer to one is involved 
in the sdutun of the odier. For it is a distinction resulting from the poetic genius itself, which snstmns 
and modifies the images, thoughts and emotions of the poef s own mind. The poet, described in ideal 
perfection, bring;! die whole soul of a man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each 
other, according to their relative worth and dignity. He difE^es a tone, and spirit of unity, that blends, 
and (as it were) Aises, each into each, by diat syntbetic and magical power, to '^ch we have 
exclusively ^>(»opriated the name of imagination. (BL: II15-16) 
As a "modifying & fusing" power, imagination encourages a unity of the self which corresponds to 
the imity of the poem. The reader of 'The Ancient Mariner' can, i f he/she suspends his/her disbelief 
in the exti^ aneous matter of the poem, partake of this unashamedly moral power and thereby gain a 
poetic faith. The crucial factor behind this poetic communion of reader and poet is the want to 
achieve this subjective truth, the act of "willing", which releases the "ab initio, identical and 
incoherent" self-consciousness. Poetry is thus the vehicle for making conscious the process of 
perception that has become, through time and custom, imconscious. Its function is to move the 
reader one step further up the Ascent of Being and, in this respect, it is explicitiy didactic. 
Strange then that, some thirteen years after justifying 'The Ancient Mariner's' position within the 
scheme of tiie Lyrical Ballads, Coleridge should charge his poem of having too much moral: 
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Mrs Barbauld onoe told me that she admired tlie Ancient Mariner very much, but there were two faults 
in it-it was improbable, and had no moral. As for the probability, I owned tiiat that might admit some 
question; but as to the warn of a moral, I told her that in my judgement the poem bad too much; and 
that tbe only, at chief fault, if I might say so, was the obtrusion of die moral sentiment so openly on 
the reader as a piindple or cause of action in a work of such pure imagination. It ought to have had no 
more moral than the Arabian Nights' tale of the mercham's sitting down to eat dates by the side of a 
weU... (Tafete Talk: H 100) 
Coleridge has fiippantiy divorced the Biograpbia sentiment that imagination and morality are 
naturally aligned and, in doing so, has reduced the intended purpose of his poem to the status of 
mere fable. Such a blatant retraction of his previously quoted poetic theory should immediately 
arouse suspicion: in the Biograpbia Uteraria Coleridge has asked his readers to "suspend their 
disbelief in the supernatural elements of the poem in order that they might share in the inner truths 
that are symbolically embedded within it; here, on the other hand, he implicitiy encourages a 
reading that goes no further than accepting the poem on its own superstitious terms. The reason 
behind this poetic apostasy is, periiaps, impJicit in the subsequent invocation of the tales of Tbe 
Arabian Nigbts. Throughout his life Coleridge would remain fascinated by the impact that the 
stories made upon him as a child and, in a particularly revealing letter to Thomas Poole, he 
describes the book's irresistible allure: 
...and then I found the Arabian Nights' enteitainments-one tale of which (the tale of a man who was 
compelled to seek for a pure virgin) made so deep an impressicm m me (I bad read it in tbe evening 
while my mother was mending stockings) that I was haunted by spectres, whenever I was in the daric-
and I distincdy ranember titie anxious & fearftil eagerness, with which 1 used to watch the window, in 
which the books l^-& whenever the Sun lay upon them, I would seize it, carry it by the wall, & bask, 
andrea±(CL:I347) 
The passage metaphorically enacts a mini-fall where the victim, at once disturbed and attracted by 
the volume's air of mystery, is compelled, at last, to apprehend its forbidden secrets and, in doing 
so, is exposed to the haimtings of his own imagination. As Holmes suggests: "The childish mixture 
of fantasy and superstition is acutely recalled: the beautiful virgin who is also a fearful spectre; the 
relentless moving finger of the sun which is also a kind of benevolent protecting power...are themes 
that Coleridge would cany into his adult poetry of his late twenties, in 'Christabel' and the Ancient 
Mariner"'. Coleridge's experiences with the haunting narratives of Tbe Arabian Nigbts prove, 
evidaitiy, to be a formative influence on his own poetic development, revealing to the fascinated 
reader, not just a series of pleasurably exciting stories, but an insight into his very own labyrintiiine 
imagination. 
Behind the jocularity of Coleridge's response to Mrs Barbauld is thus an arcane tension between 
his proposed theories of what poetry ought to achieve, and the reality of what his poems actually 
dramatise. Coleridge may secretiy share with Mrs Barbauld the suspicion that his poem has belied 
its own intentions and has eradicated its own moral purpose by releasing powers that are beyond 
his control. The subterfuge is to pretend that the poem should not really have a moral at all, and 
that its supposedly overbearing moral sentiment obstructs what should be a non-instructive tale of 
fantasy and superstition. If, at this point, we return to the more ingenuous Biograpbia explanation 
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of 'The Ancient Mariner' we can see that it is already wary of such moral obfuscation in the 
foreboding words "these shadows of imagination". The phrase recalls a moment at the beginning of 
the second chapter of ttie Biograpbia, where Coleridge explains the "supposed irritability of men of 
genius": 
A debility and dimness of the imaginative power, and a ocmequent necessiQ' of reliance on the 
immediate impressions of the senses, do, we well know, render the mind liable to superstition and 
fanaticism. Having a deficient portion of internal and (voper warmth, minds of this class seek in die • 
crowd area fana [around the temples] for a warmth in cnnmon, which they do not possess singly. 
Cold and phlegmatic in their own nature, like damp hay, they heat and inflame by co-acerva-tion; or 
like bees they tiecome restless and irritable through the increased tonperature of collected multitudes. 
Hence the German word for fanaticism (such at least was its original import) is derived from die 
swarming of bees, namely, Scbwarmen, Scbwarmer^. The passion being in an invme pn^xxtion to 
die insigjit, that the more vivid, as t&is the less distinct (J3L: I 30-1) 
This passage is important because it provides an insight into the naturally dichotomous nattire of a 
poet. Coleridge proposes that a poet has two distinct sides to his character passion and insight 
When passion is in an unbalanced proportion to insight, genius is diminished because it is rendered 
susceptible to fanaticism. Coleridge goes on to explain that the men of true genius are of calm and 
tranquil temper and that this is reflected in their writing so that their passion is adequately 
controlled. Coleridge reserves this accolade of commanding genius for the likes of Chaucer, 
Shakespeare, Spenser and Milton. However, he also describes an intermediate state of mind where 
the balance between passion and insight is precariously balanced: 
These in tranquil times are formed to exhibit a perfect poem in palace at temple or landsc^ garden; 
or a tale of rcxnance in canals that join sea with sea, or in waUs of rock, •vM.cb shouldoing back the 
tHiIows imitate the power, and sup[dy die benevolence of nahne to sheltned navies; or in aqiKducts 
that arching the wide vale from mountain to mountain give a I^ dmyia to the desert But alas! in times 
of tumult tiiey are the men destined to come forth as the shaping spirit of Ruin, to destroy the wisdom 
of ages in order to substimte the fancies of a day, and to change kings and kingdoms, as the wind shifts 
and shales die clouds. (BL: I 32-3) 
Unassured of his own particular genius, such a poet treads a fine line between complete inner belief 
and the various neuroses and deficiencies of character that can destroy such belief. Coleridge's 
description of the virtuous poetry which conmiunicates a sympathetic appreciation of nature, 
laconically meanders from one natural description to the next. This, however, suddenly gives way 
to an urgent, bombastic narrative which is both wilfully creative and violentiy iconoclastic, 
demonstrating language's attraction to images of power and elitism. Coleridge is here revealing his 
own truths, implicitly disclosing the nature of his own tortured mind. His genius reveals itself in 
similar images of power and destruction within his own poetry because it contrasts with his 
Christian beliefs that are firmly embedded within his ideal of poetic language. His genius, 
therefore, tends to burst out all the more violentiy because it is repressed by his own moral edicts. 
The pattern of 'The Ancient Mariner', as I intend to demonstrate, follows precisely this seemingly 
endless struggle of irtBconcilable teosions, as the imaginatioD's attraction to the pagan myths and 
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superstitions reveals an ineradicable human depravity that can never be contained by the symbolic 
Christian framework of the poem. Like the fanatic, the Mariner is attracted "circa fana" (he 
interrupts the wedding ceremony) so thai he might free himself of the burden of his own chronic 
individuality. This incfividuality is heretical because it advocates a complete independence from the 
codes and restrictions of Christian belief. Accordingly it is presented within the poem as the source 
of forbidden knowledge that is hansferred from poet to Mariner, Mariner to Wedding-Guest, and so 
on, with the result that the poem must continually be revised as it is caught in the trap of its own 
fallermess. More so than even 'Kubla Khan' or 'Christabel', "The Ancient Mariner' dramatises the 
impossibility of conjoining poetic theory and practice, because, even in its completion, it reveals 
itself to be ultimately fragmented. 
II 
In his New Historicist approach to 'The Ancient Mariner', Jerome McGaim argiKs tiiat the poem is 
structured around a gradation of authoritative layers that are each imbued with a historical self-
consciousness. Each layer sheds a historical light on tiie previous one so that the poem embarks 
upon a process of evolution which unearths its origins in the textual history of ancient ballad and 
develops via "a perpetual process of becoming", into a work where "various meanings apparentiy 
alien to each other", can be "reconciled and harmonised": 
By the time Coleridge has "evolved" his 1817 text, we are able to distinguish four clear layers of 
development: (a) an original mariner's tale; (b) the ballad narrative of that story; (c) the editorial gloss 
added when the ballad was, we are to suppose, first printed; and (d) Coleridge's own point of view on 
his invented materials^ . 
According to McGaim the final development represents Coleridge's "special religious/symbolic 
theory of interpretation founded upon his own understanding of the Higher Critical analytic"^ of 
German philosophical thought. This argument allows McGann to conclude that the poem "imitates 
or represents a process of textual evolution, and the symbolic meaning of that process bas a 
symbolic value and meaning, that is, a religious, a Christian, and ultimately a redemptive 
meaning'"*. In other words, the text overcomes its superstitious subject-matter by integrating it 
within a higher Christian formula that both informs and redeems it. 
McGarm's theory of the poem relies primarily on the distance that each layer creates, in turn, from 
the iniBvious one so that the poem achieves, in some sense, a historical perspective whereby the 
"ideological structure of its symbolist jx-ocedures"^  can be continually revised. Such an 
interpretation, however, cannot be achieved without deferring the control the poet has over his own 
work, to the end of the historical completion of the text. By containing Coleridgean agency within 
the imaginative construction of the ballad itself, McGann neatiy side-steps the issue of a pervading 
daemonic consciousness which consistentiy haunts the narrative. The effect of containing such 
subversion can ultimately only serve to re-establish it more vociferously^. In "The Ancirat Mariner', 
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the various levels of historical distinction that McGann perceives are, in fact, a complex process of 
impersonalisation which attempt to evade the question of poetic ownership. In this way they 
function in Uke matmer to the disclamatory preface of "Kubla Khan', rather than acting as a 
modifying power that brings discordant elements of the poem into a unified whole. 
The title of the poem initially appears in the 1798 version of the Lyrical Ballads as "The Rime of 
the Ancyent Marinere". However, under the insistence of Wordsworth, in the 18(X) text it has 
changed to "A Poet's Reverie". The text is now no longer the Mariner's own narration and he must 
speak through his creator, hence his story is now contained in quotation marks. That Coleridge felt 
a certain discomfort in narrating his own poem is emphasised in the alteration of the Argument. In 
the 1798 version Coleridge can distance himself from his poem by creating a mythical barrier 
where events are sufficientiy mystified by an archaic diction. 
How a Ship having passed the Line was driven by storms to the cold Country towards the South Pole; 
and how from thence she made her course to die tropical Latitude of the Great Pacific Ocean; and of 
the strange things that befell; and in what manner the Ancyent Maiinere came back to his own 
Country. 
However, in the 1800 text the Mariner is made directiy responsible for the "strange things" that 
accompany the journey: 
How a Ship, having first tailed to the Equator, was drivoi by Storms to the cold Country towards the 
South Pole; how the Ancient Mariner cruelly and in contempt of the laws of hospitality killed a Sea-
twd and how he was foUowed by many and strange Judgements: and in what manner he came back to 
his own Country. 
The result of modernising the style of the argument is to reduce the effect of historical distance 
between poet and persona. The argument of 1798, in its mysterious introduction of ancient ballad 
material ("the strange things that befell"), effectively relieves the poet of the responsibflity of 
morally qualifying his own material: the Mariner can relate his own tale and can accept the blame 
for the disturbing forces that threaten to subsume it. In the 18(X) argument, on the other hand, text 
and author now become perilously close and Coleridge feels the necessity to pre-judge the Mariner 
in order to exculpate his own imagination from any charge of daemonic possession. 
The 1817 version of 'The Ancient Marine' both restores its initial titie and dispenses with the 
prefatory Argument. The latter is replaced by a marginal gloss which commentates on the poetry as 
it goes along. McGarm interprets thus gloss as a level of authority within the text that assumes the 
part of a "fictive editor", through whom Coleridge may, ventriloquistically, make explicit "his 
religious theory of interpretation", which has its roots in "the Higher Critical tradition"'. But the 
gloss, as a number of commentators have pointed out^ , fails adequately to represent the process of 
the poetry itself, rather its purpose seems specificaUy designed to mollify or alter the events it is 
describing. The gloss provides the moral sentiment that has been perverted beyond all recognition 
in the narrative itself and thus its presence is,deployed to cure the poem's spiritual deficiencies by 
attaching to it a meaning it does not possess. As a "level of autiiority", the gloss encourages a 
reading of the poem as a symbolist dramatic monologue where personality is extinguished. 
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However, it brings acute attention to itself by its very presence and, in doing so, consistentiy 
reminds us that it is a fabricated alibi. The gloss is a self-conscious attempt to expound the poetic 
ttieory that the poem has forsaken, and is thus a potential escape-route for the poet to disassociate 
himself from the nightmare visions of his own imagination. 
The marginal gloss is part of a process of continual textual editing that the poem undergoes from 
its initial publication in 1798, through its various other manifestations until 1828. The alterations 
effected by these revisions continually bring attention to the crucial issue that 'The Ancient 
Mariner' is a fable that must be related compulsively without end. Each revision does not lend a 
clearer meaning to the poem but, on the contrary, de-stabilises identity to the extent that it becomes 
increasingly fragmented. Furthermore, as Wallen comments: 
Corresponding with these texhial problems is the issue that arises when Colraidge's name is attached to 
the revisions of the poem. Because of the textual instability taught on by continual revision, any 
assumption regarding an authmial priority, or ev»i an authorial identity, Ixeaks down into questions of 
how one text should be juxtaposed to another. In other words, the amfaor of this poem is not sim{dy an 
object of disceniment that exists beyond the text, but is, instead, the text diat continually revises itsdf^ . 
The poem may be read as essentially Coleridgean to the point that both Marit^r and Wedding-
Guest are Coleridge. In other words the verse is a dialogue between Coleridge the serpent and 
Coleridge the innocent; Coleridge as Satan and Coleridge as Eve. Such refiexivity means that the 
poem can never purge itself of its own sin for, just as Coleridge entraps his own creation, the 
Mariner, inside an allegorical version of the fall of man, the Mariner, in turn, condenms the 
Wedding-Guest to the same fate. This continual mirroring of experience, whereby author, 
protagonists (and by implication reader) undergo some sort of dreadful recognition, distorts the 
concept of linear time-where events may be brought to a resolvable conclusion-because it 
implicates everybody simultaneously. In reciting his story, the Mariner is not only reliving a former 
experience, he is forcing his auditor to live it for him. As a direct consequence of this, the 
Wedding-Guest's experiencing consciousness (which I consider to be the crucial subtext of the 
poem) participates so intimately inside the narrative that it continually prevents the Mariner from 
achieving salvation. The poem, as a result, is influenced as much by experiences beyond its own 
narrative as by those within i t My own interpretation of the poem will rely heavily upon fliese 
tensions between textual absences and presences and how they prevent poetic language, from 
arriving at any (fefinitive meaning. The more the poem attempts to revise and correct itself, tiie 
more it can only, as a consequence, reinfect itsdf. 
m 
For this reason 'The Ancient Mariner' cannot be read as a poem of restoration where its central 
character undergoes, in the words of Kitson, a "process of individual and internal redemption"^ .^ 
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W. M Alcorn similarly, in denying that The Ancient Mariner' is either a "narcissistic fantasy", or 
an "Oedipal nightmare", interprets the poem as: 
the dramatisatioii Qn symbob) of a imiversal devek^mental piocess. Coleridge discnssed the pnx»ss 
in theological temu: the movement from oiigjnal tin to redemptioa. I suggest that the symbology 
pcvtrays original sin as an expression of narcissistic incompletion; similariy, it grasps redemption as the 
sublimated recovery of an original narcissism. The poem thus portrays narcissistic "symptoms" or 
"traits". But these "symptoms" are not representations of Coleridge's penonal pathology, they are 
universal steps in human devdopmem^'. 
The "symbology", however, that Alcorn believes brings the poem to an eventual redemption, is 
midermined by what Conrad describes as a "dual conveyancing of proscribed meanings" within 
The Ancient Mariner', "from teller to hapless auditor, and from the poem to the marginal prose"^ .^ 
Original sin, in other words, cannot be contained by the symbolic frameworic of the poem because 
it is involved in the act of transmission. The "s3nnptoms" of narcissism, in this respect, are the 
disease of the poem because they are presented in the terms of man's tragic compulsion to receive 
knowledge, and they invest the narrative with a subversive, allegorical power. 
This is made evident in the initial exchange between the Mariner and the Wedding-Guest. In 
soliciting the attention of his auditor, the Mariner has hoped to establish a relation between himself 
and another that will give him meaning and direct his narration into a symbolic structure of union 
and progressive understanding. However, he manages only to commimicate a sense of his own 
self-obsession and this is made explicit in the disruption of the marriage service. Marriage, as 
Coleridge comments in his essay on Romeo and Juliet, lends the individual a natural moraUty: 
It is inevitable to every noble mind, whether man tx woman, to feel itself, of itself, imperfect and 
insufOdent, not as an animal cmly, but as a moral being. How wmdolUly, then, has Providence 
contrived for us, making that which is necessary to us as a step in our exaltation to a higher and 
noUer state! The Creator has radained that oae should possess the qualities v^ch the other has not, 
and the union of both is the most complete ideal of human character. In everything the blending of the 
similar with the dissimilar is the secret of all pure delight. Who shall dare to stand alone, and vaunt 
himself, in himself, sufficient? In poetry it is the blending of passion with order that constitutes 
perfection: this is still more the case in morals, and more than all in the exclusive attachment of the 
sexes. (X-ects 1808-19: VL 498) 
The Mariner, on the contrary, detains the Wedding-Guest on the soUpsistic grounds of his own 
compulsive narrative. He is already prepared "to stand alone", and his repudiation of communal 
sympathy hints at the daik, amoral nature of his imagination. The Wedding-Guest's failure to resist 
the Mariner's tale can be understood in terms of the tension between presence and absence: the 
Mariner's present poitrait is continuously deferred or absent, or reduced to the momentaiy intensity 
of a "glittering eye". His visions of anguish r^nesent the compulsive re-onergence of the 
repressed. The Mariner, in other words, is actually a figurative manifestation of the Wedding-
Guest: he represents a repressed altei^ego whom the latter has yet to come to terms with. The 
Wedding-Guest's fascination with the Mariner is, ultimately, a fascination with himself and is, thus, 
an act of narcissism. Similarly, when the Mariner passes on his affliction to the Wedding-Guest 
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and achieves, at last, a stable identity, he knows it shall not be for very long because his auditor 
now represents a deferred, or "absent", version of himself that will once again resurface. In 
approaching the Wedding-Guest in the first place he is, effectively, reapproaching himself as text 
to be re-read. 
The Wedding-Guest's initial attempts to resist the Mariner's advances are ultimately futile: Urst he 
explains his position in the matrimonial gathering; secondly, when this fails, he orders him 
physically to release him. But the Mariner does not require physical dominance to ensure his 
auditor's attention and he has already anticipated the Wedding-Guest's morbid fascination to 
acquire a prohibited knowledge in the latter's earlier inquisitory comment "Now wherefore stopp'st 
thou me?" (4). The Mariner can thus hypnotically transHx the Wedding-Guest in the dazzling allure 
of his gaze which, like the potentate's "flashing eyes" in 'Kubla Khan', offer the visionary promise 
of a foitidden paradise: 
He holds him with his glittering eye-
The Wedding-Guest stood still, 
And listens like a three years' child: 
The Mariner hath his wil l . (13-16) 
The Wedding-Guest "cannot choose but hear" (18) the Marina's tale as he is mentally imprisoned 
by his own subconscious desire to taste the secrets of creation. He suspects that what he is about to 
hear wil l be an education in evU, but he cannot prevent himself from transgressing into this 
perditious narrative. As soon as the bassoon sounds the union of the wedded couple, it ironically 
knells him into the "world of death" of the Mariner's nightmares. His own moral safety threatened, 
the Wedding-Guest beats his breast in protestation, but still he is irresistiWy compelled, in 
anticipation, to gaze in wonder at the infernal visions of his detainer. 
Because both speaker and auditor are participants in a dialectic in which each depends on the 
other as the antithesis that defines the self, meaning within the poem cannot be lixed. The language 
of the poem can no longer function symbolically because the tale may be read as either (a): the 
original account of the Mariner; or (b): the allegorical dramatisation of the mind of the Wedding-
Guest. This duplicity of understanding means that the poem can never reach its symbolic 
redemption because it is always shadowed by an absent text that consistently asserts itself from the 
margins. The Mariner cannot be expiated from, his sins because the shadow of his own 
consciousness (which is the experiencing consciousness of the Wedding-Guest) will always catch 
him up in his own present narrative. 
The first forty lines of the poem take the Wedding-Guest to the brink of otherness, and his 
subsequent plunge into the stoty lends the narrative almost immediately a power that threatens to 
de-stabilise the symbolic framework of the text. Allegorised as the STORM-BLAST (and later as 
LIFE-IN-DEATH), the "absent" text begins its pursuit of the "present" text: 
He struck with his o'ertaking wings. 
And chased us south along. 
79 
With sloping masts and dipping prow. 
As who pursued with yell and blow 
Still treads the shadow of his foe, 
And forward bends his head. 
The ship drove fast, loud roared the blast. 
And southward aye we fled. (43-50) 
The Mariner has hoped that the participation of his auditor within his story will lend the narrative a 
communal meaning which will enable the former to escape from his perpetual nightmare. However, 
the narration instead, proves a continual critique of any such possibility of relation which is made 
explicit in the extensive revision that the stanzas undergo. In the 1798 version of the text the 
Mariner attempts to turn his narration into what Wallen describes as "an act of communication, to 
provide his listener with the details of an experience that would then become not the experience of 
isolation or loss" ^^ : 
Listen, Stranger! Storm and Wind, 
A Wind and Tempest strong I 
For days and weeks it play'd us freaks-
Like Chaff we drove along. (4043) 
The 1817 version of the poem, however, has dispensed with the communicative "Listen, 
Stranger!", and has also personified the 'Storm and Wind' into the STORM-BLAST. The effect of 
this is to retract any form of redemptive communication by allowing language allegorically to 
transform the auditor's "absent" ego into a "present" one within the text itself. Throughout the 
poem we will see how allegorical or metaphorical language becomes an entry point for the 
Wedding-Guest's experiencing consciousness to assert itself from the mai^ guis and become a 
present force within the text itself. Consequenfly, as the Mariner relates the historical events of his 
tale and hopes to bring this chapter of his life to a conclusion by discovering some moral truth, he 
is prevented from doing so as the narrative suddenly acquires an immediacy which forces him to 
relive his vision of anguish. The Mariner's ship is thus no longer driven along by its crew, on the 
contrary, it is controlled and directed by the unnatural force of the STORM-BLAST which leads 
him, once again, into the act of original sin. 
The lancbcape of the poem, as a result, is reshaped in a maniacal assertion of ego that attempts to 
supersede the natural sublimity of Godly creation. The powerfiil description of the ice in lines 54-
62 exaggerates the actuality of the perceived object so that it becomes an independent entity, willed 
into an exclusive poetic existence by the incantatoiy nature of language: 
The ice was here, the ice was there. 
The ice was all around: 
It cracked and growled, and roared and howled, 
Like noises in a swoundl (59-62) 
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This non-acceptance of nature as the symbolic order of God manifests itself more vociferously in 
the killing of the albatross. The bird, in all its natural magnifilcence, embodies the later definition of 
the primary imagination, not only superstitiously, but imaginatively making the "breeze to blow" 
(94) as it, in the bond between subject and object, unconsciously enacts the infinite act of creation. 
The Mariner knows that i f he could retract his deed in the retelling of his tale, he would 
consequently achieve an identity in its fullest sense. He does, in fact, already illustrate in his 
narration a recognition of the albatross as a symbol of redemption in his hospitality towards it: 
"And every day, for food or play^Came to the mariner's [singular] hollo!" (73-4). The actual 
shooting of the bird, however, and the reasons behind it are curiously omitted. This is because the 
act of destruction is imaginatively supplied by the Wedding-Guest. His interruption signifies his 
integration within the text as a willing participant rather than a coerced fistenen 
'God save thee, ancient Mariner! 
From the iiends, that plague thee thusl-
Why look'st thou so?'-With my cross-bow 
I shot the ALBATROSS. (79-82) 
The hiatus of the penultimate Une, which divides the speech of the two personae so that they 
metrically mirror each other (and thus momentarily become each other), represents a transmission 
which facilitates the now metaphorical destruction of the albatross. The Mariner, therefore, cannot 
escape from his initial crime because he is forced to relive his nightmare via the agency of his 
auditor who continually reinfects the narrative with his fallen consciousness. 
This becomes increasingly explicit in the narrative where the nightmare visions continually 
resurface, even when salvation appears imminent. As the Mariner attempts to move his narrative 
forwards and away from his initial act of sin, the language of the poem is always aUegorically 
interpreting events according to that very act as it accommodates the experiencing consciousness of 
the auditor. In other words, the poem is functioning both diachronically (the Mariner's historical 
development) and synchronically (the Wedding-Guest's immediate reaction to events). Having 
afflicted the Wedding-Guest with an acute awareness of his own autonomy, the Mariner's story is 
supplemented by his auditor's silence. It is a silence which, as Galperin notes: "effectively signals 
that subversion is at work: a silence that does no less and ultimately no more than envelop a text as 
does the Wedding-Guest, whose 'wisdom' is clearly many things"^''. 
The Wedding-Guest's muted participation within the poem lends the text an immediacy and 
vividness as i f events were actually recurring. When, in Part I I , the breeze picks up and the danger 
appears to be over, progression is suddenly halted by the allegorical implications of the language. 
The image of the Mariner's ship as "the first that ever burst/Into that silent sea" (105-6), is 
transgressive, akin to Satan's violation of the immaculate peifection of Eden. The narrative now 
becomes subservient to the self-consuming demands of an artistic ego which wishes to assert its 
individuality by violently transforming the world according to its own perceptions: the natural 
elements are sucked out of the scene so that the ship is held in an eerie suspended animation as a 
picture holds its contents: "Day after day, day after day,AVe stuck, nor breath nor motion;/As idle 
as a painted ship/Upon a painted ocean" (115-118). Like the cahn before the storm, the text 
suddenly collapses into a daemonic burst of enei:gy: 
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The very deep did rot: O Christ! 
That ever this should be! 
Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs 
Upon the slimy sea. (123-26) 
As the verse morally disintegrates, art subsumes the natural worid, diffusing it in order to recreate it 
according to its own self-enclosed volitions. The sea becomes the object of the artist's pallet, 
burning in vivid colours which are inspired by a promethean-like fire: 
About, about, in reel and rout 
The death-flres danced at night; 
The water, like a witch's oils. 
Burnt, green, and blue and white. (127-30) 
The whole process of the narrative can thus be understood in terms of the imagery of pursuit 
which dominates the events. The Mariner cannot escape from his own story because he is: 
Like one, that on a lonesome road 
Doth walk in fear and dread, 
And having once turned round walks on. 
And turns no more his head; 
Because he knows, a frightful fiend 
Doth close behind him tread. (446-51) 
The gloss cautiously plays down flie elements of subversion that subsume the poem, interpreting 
the Spirit which follows the ship as: "one of the invisible inhabitants of this planet, neither departed 
souls nor angels; concerning whom the learned Jew, Josephus, and the Platonic ConstantinopoUtan, 
Michael Psellus, may be consulted. They are very numerous, and there is no climate or element 
without one or more". With its fabricated philosophy, the gloss attempts to contain the daemonic 
possession of the narrative within a facile moral schema. However, the language of the poem 
continually refuses to be solidified by any external influences and this becomes apparent in Part I I I 
with the approach of the phantom-ship. As it looms in the distance, it refuses to t ^e on a definitive 
form: "At first it seemed a little speck,/And then it seemed a mist;nt moved and moved, and took at 
last/A certain shape, I wist" (149-52). It is only when the Mariner bites his arm in orda- to herald 
its approach, that the shape begins to materialise into the spectre-bark. The unnatural deed becomes 
another allegorical sign for original sin and, as the Mariner drinks from his own life-force, he 
contaminates the narrative of the poem with his own blood. This horrific action, which the marginal 
gloss underscores as a "dear ransom", facilitates the "absent" texts embodiment into voice and the 
emergence of the ghastly spectre, LIFE-IN-DEATH, is necromantically invoked in the Mariner's 
description of her 
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Her lips were red, Zier looks were free. 
Her locks were yellow as gold: 
Her skin was as white as l^nosy. 
The Night-mare LIFE-IN-DEATH was she. 
Who thicks man's blood with cold. (190-94) 
The accentuated word 'Hei* gives the stanza a compulsive and incantatory quality, as it rises from 
four syllables to six, and reaches a crescendo at eight as her evil image appears before him. When 
LIFE-IN-DEATH plays with her mate for the Mariner's soul, her victory ensures the moral 
disintegration of the verse as it descends into a foreboding darkness: "The Sun's rim dips; the stars 
rush out:/At one stri(te comes the dark" (199-200). 
The poem, therefore, always suggests the possibility of the Mariner's redemption, but it can never 
do anything more, for the very being of the text depends on the Mariner never being saved. The 
Mariner discovers that the retelling of his tale cannot release him from his desperate solipsism 
because poetic language will always provide an outlet for the silent text of his auditor. As the 
Wedding-Guest hears the story for the first time, his experiencing consciousness asserts itself 
within the narrative, forcing the Mariner to rdive his nightmares. Poetic language is, thus, a realm 
where the self can most powerfully assert itself or where, in the words of Kipperman, "the 
enchanted mind is enthralled only with. ..the magic responsiveness of the world to the ego's 
desires"'^. Throughout the poem the supersession of nature by the egomaniacal demands of art is 
dramatised by the constantly altering image of the sun. Before the Mariner's transgressive act the 
sun is portrayed as a natural sign, providing a wholesome and benevolent light which 
communicates the sympathetic powers of divine creation (25-8). However, its transformation 
begins after the destruction of the albatross where its creative powers undergo immediate 
adumbration: the sun now no longer shines brightly but is "hid in mist" (85). As the narrative 
progresses and the Mariner's moral renimciation intensifies, the images become more violent. In 
lines 111-14 the sim, in a parody of the crucifixion, bleeds as it is held right above the mast of the 
ship: 
Al l in a hot and copper sky. 
The bloody Sun, at noon, 
Right up above the mast did stand, 
No bigger than the Moon. 
Nature's imprisonment in the confines of art is complete when the stm is held hostage by the 
skeletal outline of the phantom-ship so that "As i f through a dungeon-grate he peered/With broad 
and burning face" (179-80). Poetic language, in this light, is elitist and heretical because it 
transforms divine creation into matter which is shaped by the desires of the self. 
This is made explicit with the subsequent death of the crew which leaves the Mariner as the sole 
orchestrator of his universe: 
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Alone, alone, all, all alone. 
Alone on a wide wide sea! 
And never a saint took pity on 
My soul in agony. (232-35) 
The cry, however, is double-edged. On the one hand it represents an ego that ecstatically delights 
in its own artistic fieedom: being "alone" means being "all", which in turn means being God On 
the other hand, it is a desperate recognition of the spiritual disintegration that accompanies 
selfhood. In his complete isolation the Mariner has, like Milton's Satan, attained the heights of 
autonomy. His world is his own self-created Pandemonium which attests to the usurpating powers 
of the poetic imagination. As Eagleton explains: 
All knowledge, as Romanticism is awaie, contains a secret irony or incipient contradiction: it must at 
aace master its object and cbnfhxit it as other, acknowledge in it an autoncxny it simultaneously 
subverts. The fantasy of total technological omnipotence conceals a nigbtmare: in appropnating Nature 
you risk eradicating it, expropriating nothing but your own acts of consciousness^ .^ 
The Mariner, consequentiy, cannot achieve redemption because his world has become the product 
of his own imaginative construct. When he attempts to pray in order to release himself from his 
acute seif-enthraUment, he discovers that God no longer exists and his prayers, subsequenfly, turn 
to dust: 
I looked to heaven, and tried to pray; 
But or ever a prayer had gusht, 
A wicked whisper came, and made 
My heart as dry as dust. (244-47) 
Commentators often regard the Mariner's blessing of the water-snakes as the turning point in his 
spiritual development^"'. However, the snakes, which are euphemistically referred to as "God's 
creatures" in the gloss, appear to be the creations of his own imagination and his blessing of them 
does not release him from his incumbent nightmares. The Mariner's response to them is not one of 
simple or natural appreciation, but rather of aggrandisement: the snakes adorn the "rich attire" of 
art, exaggerating their appearances as they leave behind them "a flash of golden fire" (281). When 
the Mariner blesses them he is, effectively, condoning the power of his own imagination. 
The Mariner's declaration that " I had dnmken in my dreams,/And still my body drank" (303-4), 
indicates that the narrative continues to be wholly susceptible to daemonic visions and no progress, 
or even resolution appears imminent. The text responds by collapsing into a cataclysmic turmoil 
where the elements completely run amok: "The upper air burst into lifel/And a hundred fire-flags 
sheen,/To and fro they were hurried about!/And to and fro, and in and out,/The wan stars danced 
between" (313-17). These lines have often been interpreted as the elements' celebratory recognition 
of the Mariner's redemption, but their interpretation must be dependent upon the sinister events that 
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follow where the crew, like the stars themselves, acquire a life of their own. The setting, as the 
"thick black cloud" (322) casts its shadow over the ship, and the moon replaces the sun as the 
narrative's central image, forebodes an atmosphere of drastic, evil intention. This is supplied by the 
ghastly resurrection of the dead crew who necromantically spring to life: 
They groaned, they stirred, they all uprose. 
Nor spake, nor moved their eyes; 
It had been strange, even in a dream. 
To have seen those dead men rise. (331-34) 
The zombies, who steer the boat in a horrific parody of life, have no control over their own bodies: 
they raise "their limbs like lifeless tools" (339) and are invigorated only by the malign Coleridgean 
narrative. The gloss quaintly refers to the "ghastly crew" as-"a blessed troops of angelic spirits, 
sent down by the invocation of the guardian sainf'-attempting to incorporate their unnatural 
existence within some fatuous moral design. But the dead men are, on the contrary, the servants of 
a poetic creativity which has profanely tapped the secret of life itself. Like the STORM-BLAST, 
LIFE-IN-DEATH and the Polar Spirit, they are allegorical agencies of a repressed subtext which 
endlessly transports the Mariner back into the worid of his own infernal nightmares. 
In spite of the gloss's periodic announcements that "The spell begins to break", or "The curse is 
finally expiated", the daemonic visions persistently resurface. The cyclic nature of 'The Ancient 
Mariner', like Dante's depiction of Hell, amounts to an endless repetition where release from the 
self proves impossible. Vlasopolos understands 'The Ancient Mariner' in terms of a deviation from 
the traditional romantic quest which usually involves a circular structure to lend a "sense of 
completion", or a "visionary gain": 
Because of its customary positive value, the circular structure in Tie Rime could be taken as a sign of 
the Mariner's return to normality. in the Romantic Q i K S t to return to the treadmill of nature's cycle 
suggests the hero's lack of psychic [M-ogress. Although, like the speakers of the Greater Romantic 
Lyrics, the Mariner begins his visionary experience from a specified locus to which he returns, what 
should be his imaginative gain makes him a perpetual exile fran human society insteai of integrating 
him within it 
When the Mariner completes his voyage, his unholy appearance causes the Hermit to enquire 
"What manner of man art thou?" (577), and the pilot, as i f he had been presented with a vision of 
the anti-Christ himself, is reduced to insanity: 
I moved my lips-the Pilot shrieked 
And fell down in a fit; 
The holy Hermit raised his eyes. 
And prayed where he did sit. 
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I took the oars: the Pilot's boy, 
Who now doth crazy go. 
Laughed loud and long, and all the while 
His eyes went to and fro. 
'Hal hal' quoth he, 'full plain I see. 
The Devil knows how to row'. (560-69) 
The Mariner is unrecognisable to the rest of humanity and has become the victim of his own story 
which has refigured him, in the eyes of others, as a version of the spectre LIFE-IN-DEATH. 
The Mariner, therefore, can never achieve freedom from his own text because it is the text itself 
which fashions his existence*'. In seeking out another to attend his tale, the Mariner hopes to 
disburden himself of the "woful agony" (579) that constitutes his story. And yet this does not lead 
him towards his own redemption because the man he inevitably chooses is as subconsciously self-
obsessed as he is. The Wedding-Guest is as compulsively attracted to the Mariner as the Mariner is 
to the Wedding-Guest: 
I pass, like night, from land to land; 
I have strange power of speech; 
That moment that his face I see, 
I know the man that must hear me: 
To him my tale I teach. (586-90) 
The narrative of the poem is not, therefore, an act of communication, but tiie transmission of an 
infection whereby the Mariner can relieve himself of his affliction by passing it on to another. The 
Mariner's freedom, however, is short-lived. When tiie Wedding-Guest departs "A sadder and a 
wiser man" (624), the Mariner has recreated himself as text to be read once again so that his 
narrative wil l always be infectal by an "absent" version of himself. The chinese-box effect of 'The 
Ancient Mariner', whereby the poem endlessly spawns mirror images of the self, condemns the 
Mariner to be frozen in time and space. His lack of mental progression is indicated by his rejection, 
once again, of the holy sanctity of marriage: "O sweeter than the marriage-feast,/'Tis sweeter far to 
me,/To walk together to the kiricAVith a goodly company!" (601-5). When he reaches the kiric even 
his "company" sunders into "each" who prays, further diminishing the sense of community. 
The moral stanzas which bring the poem to its conclusion consequentiy appear desperately out of 
place. Having just announced that his experience was so lonely that "God himself/Scarce seemed 
there to be" (599-600), the Mariner's sudden deferential invocation of the grace of God appears 
incongruous: 
He prayeth wen, who loveth best 
Botii man and bird and beast. 
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He prayeth best, who loveth best 
Al l things both great and small; 
For the dear God who loveth us. 
He made and loveth all. (612-17) 
The lines are knowingly bathetic for, after all, how can they correlate with a text ttiat defends the 
sanctity of life, supposedly, by killing off all the crew? Critics have often pointed out how these 
banal and insipid moral stanzas represent an anomaly within a narrative that provides its reader 
with a tense and immediate range of emotions^^. Recognising that it is the text which is responsible 
for his own psychic fragmentation, the Mariner purges poetic language of emotion and trope. This 
only emphasises that the poem's artistic gain is achieved at the expense of a redemptive, moral 
design. Unable to overcome the principle of selfhood within its own boundaries, 'The Ancient 
Mariner' fails to articulate the gloss's pedantic moral of "love and reverence to all things that God 
made". The true lesson of the poem is, as Coleridge intimates in his discussion on the "supposed 
Jnitability of men of genius", that the poetic genius is an insidious assertion of ego which can only 
communicate a sense of its own grandeur. 
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CONCLUSION 
The fine saying of Addism is familia- to most readers,- that Babylon in ruins is not so affecting a 
spectacle, or so solemn, as a human mind overthrown by lunacy. How much more awM, tten, and 
more magniiicem a wreck, when a mind so t^al as that of Coleiidge is oveitfarown or threatened with 
overthrow, not by a visitation of Providence, but by the treachery of his own will, and the conspiracy 
as it were of himself against himself.' 
De Quincey's comment on Coleridge proves to be a fitting epitaph for his predecessor's poetic 
career. The statement represents Coleridge as his own Mariner, speculating at the internal feud 
between Coleridge's professed beliefs and the compulsive emergence of his own repressed 
anxieties. De Quincey's use of language encapsulates the morbid fascination of the horror of "The 
unfathomable hell within" which characterises Coleridge's own poetic diction. The poet's tortured 
psyche is at once both "awful" and "magnificent" in its deterioration. The absence of "Providence" 
heightens the regality of a mind whose poetry is the necessary articulation of the struggle between 
Heaven and Hell within its very own conscious wil l . The lines dramatise the agonising solipsism 
that accompanies the nature of the poetic genius and which is, ultimately, responsible for the mind's 
decay. 
The visionary power is Coleridge's greatest, and yet deadliest asset; on the one hand it enables 
him to provide an acute insight into human psychology; and yet, on the other hand, it is a curse that 
exposes the flawed nature of a poetic creativity that finds its inspiration through an intense self-
estrangement. Writing for Coleridge is, therefore, often purgatorial, relieving the speaker of his 
own internal distress by exorcising Intense, subjective feelings outside himself into the objective 
and anonymous medium of language. Hence the proliferation of prefatory material that 
supplements the poetry, providing excuses and alibis for the nature of poetic creativity released in 
the verse. Here Coleridge can safely blame others or even discredit his own composition, in an 
effort to detach himself from the alluring secrets of the imagnation that insidiously haunt his 
narratives. But Coleridge's words inevitably betray him, relating him directly to the subjective 
desires that are released in the poetry. Often his language is compulsive and incantatory, providing 
an outlet for repressed fears and desires that must be released in order to purge the self of a guilt 
that threatens to subsume the mind in the power of its own violence. In similar circumstances to her 
own creator, Ellen in the 'Three Graves' is inflicted by a "sore grief of her own^A haunting in her 
brain" (428-9). Unable to stifle her own words, she struggles with herself to prevent the forces 
within from taking oven 
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Then harder, till her grasp at length 
Did gripe like a convulsion! 
Alas!' said she, we ne'er can be 
Made happy by compulsion!' 
And once her both anns suddenly 
Round Maiy's neck she flung 
And her heart panted, and she felt 
The words upon her tongue. 
She felt tiiem coming, but no power 
Had she the words to smother. 
And with a kind of shriek she cried, 
'Oh Clirist! you're like your motiierl (436-47) 
Ellen's inability to resist her inner distress from manifesting itself in language is paradigmatic of 
Coleridgean poetic practice. The emetic spontaneity of language as it acquires a life of its own is 
simultaneously both artistically inspired and morally destructive. A poem for Coleridge is not, as 
he would proclaim, the medium for the objective powers of divine inspiration to manifest itself, but 
a confession of the sickness of the speaker's own soul. As Basil Hallward ruminates in The Picture 
of Dorian Gray, artistic creation is imaginatively brought to life, not by the object of its attention, 
but by the subjective nature of its interpreter: 
"every portrait th^ is painted with feeling is a portrait of the artist, not of the sitter. The sitter is 
merely the accident, the occasion. It is not he -who is revealed by the painter; it is rather the painter 
who, oa the coloured canvas, reveals himself. The reason I will not exhibit this picture is that I am 
afraid that I have shown in it the secret of my own soul" .^ 
The imagination which ought to be benevolent in its workings in theoiy turns out, in 
practice, to be a potentially daemonic force which exposes Coleridge to the unhallowed arts. It 
must, as a result, be disburdened. In tiie Eclogue 'Fire, Famine, and Slaughter' Coleridgean 
transference is played out by the three necromantic [nt>tagonists who, having afflicted thousands of 
people with their diseases, fail to take personal responsibility for the crimes they have committed 
but rather blame an imnamed individual: 
Slau. He came by stealth, and unlocked my den. 
And I have drunk the blood since then 
Of thence three hundred thousand men. 
Both. Who bade you do't? 
Slau. The same! The same! 
Letters four do form his name. (21 -5) 
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The four lettered person, who is revealed to be Pitt in a Preface some twenty years later, may as 
wen be the MUSE, for the poet tries to blame his words on the source that gives him inspiration. 
Indeed, Fire initially desists in hearing the name of her master becatise she recognises that it is a 
promethean act that will unleash powers that align poetry with a morally destructive force: 
Myself I named him once below. 
And all the souls, that damned be. 
Leaped up at once in anarchy. 
Gapped their hands and danced for glee. 
But laughed to hear Hell's burning rafters 
Unwillingly re-echo laught^I (7-13) 
Fire, in true Coleridgean style, insists that she is acting against her will , or that she has released 
something that she can no longer control, and yet there is a sense of delight in her visions of 
destruction. The compulsive desire to acquire knowledge appears to be the secret behind artistic 
creation. 
This is made evident in the apology for the poem (published in Sibylline Leaves 1817) where 
Coleridge, remaining silent about his audiorship, uses Scott as his ventriloquist in order to deputise 
for his own "seething imagination": 
As my friend chose to remain silent, I chose to follow his exam(4e, and Mr [Scott] recited the 
poem. This he could do with the better grace, being known to have ever been not only a Grm and 
active Anti-Jacobin and Anti-Gallican, but likewise a zealous admirer of Mr. Pitt. bMfa as a good man 
and a great statesmaa As a poet exclusively, he had been amused with the Eclogue; as a poet he 
recited it; and in a spirit / ^ c h made it evident that he would have read it and repeated it with some 
(Measure had his own name been attached to the imaginaiy object or agent. 
After the recitation our amiable host observed that in his opinioo Mr had over-rated the merits of 
the poetiy; but had they been tenfold greater, they could not have ccxnpensated for that malignity of 
heart which could alone have prompted sentiments so atrocious. I perceived that my illustrious friend 
became greatly distressed on my account; but fonrtunately I was able to preserve fortitude and 
presence of mind enougjb to take iq> the subject without exciting even a suspidon how nearly and 
painfully interested me. (22-40) 
The distinction "as a poet" is interesting. Coleridge is suggesting that the recital involves itself 
intimately with the process of the poetry, in spite of the "malignity of heart" that prompts its 
"sentiments". Scott becomes another Coleridgean alibi, momentarily allowing the true author to 
discard his imaginative hauntings as he becomes "greatly distressed", just as the Wedding-Guest is 
"of sense forlorn". Imagination, like Frankenstein's monster, must ultimately be disowned as it 
anarchically draws upon the darker recesses of the subconscious, destroying the poet's idealistic 
convictions. 
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Coleridge's theoretical idealisation of the poetic imagination undergoes a rigorous redefinition in 
the hands of his immediate literary successors. HazHtt's account of the literaiy imagination in his 
essay on Coriolanus (1817) is, perhaps, the most debunking response to the blatant idealism of his 
predecessors. However, to conclude my survey I shall draw a brief comparison between Coleridge 
and De Quincey's Confessions of an English Opium Eater (1821). Within the complra narrative of 
the Confessions, the illegitimate imaginative torments of Coleridgean poetic practice are fully 
realised. De Quincey revalues Coleridge's notion of the imagination as a universal and harmonic 
power by emphasising the vision's potential for corruption. The Confessions provide an evocative 
account of the ambivalent nature of artistic presentation in its reappraisal of the imagination as a 
decadent and excessive faculty. 
In the Confessions, De Quincey sets himself up as flawed Coleridgean protagonist who is tortured 
by the ambivalent nature of the imagination whose visionary paradisal insights are capable of 
turning hellish at an instant. The Confessions, accordingly, show a persistent fascination with "the 
confluence of mighty and terrific discords with subtie concords"^, the blending and intertwisting of 
"laughter and tears'"*, for "it may be observed, generally, that wherever two thoughts stand related 
to each other by a law of antagonism, and exist, as it were, by mutual repulsion, they are apt to 
suggest each o t h e r T h e whole structure of the Confessions is based around this belief, the 
adventures presenting a realm of innocence and the latter section of experience, with the taking of 
opium causing the fall from one to the other. De Quincey conflates Heaven and Hell, creating a 
paradoxical world also to be found in 'Kubla Khan' of a fallen paradise. The "just, subtie, and 
mighty opium""^ is also "the accursed chain"^ that fetters him; the "Paradise of Opium-Eaters" is 
also the realm of "incubus and night-mare"^. The ambivalent nature of De Quincey's paradise is 
captured in the quotation, fittingly from Paradise Lost, which concludes the Confessaons-"with 
dreadful faces throng'd and fieiy arms"-giving a glimpse of paradise when it is most regretted and 
yet most resembles Hell. 
In an important passage, De Quincey creates a fascinating illusion, in his description of Piranesi's 
Antiquities of Rome, which aptly describes the entrapment that the imagination imposes over its 
subjects: 
Many years ago, when 1 was looking over Piranesi's Antiquities of Rome, Mr Coleridge, VAKJ was 
standing by, described to me a set of plates by that artist, called his Dieams, and which record the 
scenery of his own visions during the deliiinm of a fever. Some of them (I describe only from memory 
of Mr Colnidge's account) represented vast Gothic halls: on the floor of which stood all sorts of 
engines and machinery, 'txiieels, cables, pulleys, levers, catc^ts, &c. &c. expressive of enormous 
power put forth and resistance overcome. Creeping alcog the sides of the walls, you perceived a 
staircase; and upon it, grcqang his way upwards, was Piranesi himself: follow the stain a litde fbrtber, 
and you perceive it come to a sudden abrupt termination, without any balustrade, and allowing no step 
onwards to him who had reached the extremity, except into the depths below. Whatever is to become 
of poor Piranesi, you siq^xse, at least, that his labours must in scnne way tenninate here. But raise 
your eyes, and behold a second fligjit of stairs still higher on which again Piranesi is petcdved, by this 
time standing on the very biink of the abyss. Again elevate your eye, and a still more aerial flight of 
stairs is beheld: and again is poor Piranesi busy on his aspiring labours: and so on, until tte nniSoished 
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stairs and Piranesi both are lost in the upper gloom of the hall.-With tbe same power of endless growth 
and self-reproduction did my architecture {Hoceed in dreams .^ 
The passage, as Ward points out: "is ful l of self-directed pathos, and the figure of F i^ranesi is 
clearly intended to reflect the figure of Coleridge, both standing finally as versions of De Quincey, 
trapped in his own mind between the paradisal flights of aspiring imagination, and the Gothic 
'malady' of his addiction to drugs and the fleeting dreams they bring"^°. The sense of vertigo and 
the impossi*bility of escape conspire to condemn both Coleridge and de Quincey as Mariner figures 
who are repeatedly rediscovered in endless reflections of themselves, condemned to the solipsism 
of their own labyrinthine minds. 
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